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Abstract
Meanwhile, there exist a wealth of approaches for a Future Network Architecture (FNA). Al-
though these approaches differ in their orientation, they all suggest that a network should be
service-oriented and flexibly orchestrated from atomic smart in-network services. In order to
utilise the complete functionality of the orchestrated network, the in-network services require
access to various control data that is exchanged in different ways. Hence, the communication
endpoints have to expose more and more information about themselves. However, the in-
network services as well as third parties are able to sniff information while it is transferred in
cleartext. Beside these considerations, end-to-end encryption is the de facto method applied
to provide information confidentiality for two communicating endpoints. But if the com-
municating endpoints perform end-to-end encryption, in-network services cannot accomplish
their tasks anymore, since they cannot access the encrypted control data. Thus, it becomes
impossible to fully utilise the benefits of FNA approaches.
These issues indicate that it is only possible to realise one of the two goals – information
confidentiality and smart in-network services – at once. But we demonstrate the feasibility to
simultaneously establish smart in-network services and to provide information confidentiality
by redesigning the packet forwarding service to make it operate blindly, which we call Blind
Packet Forwarding (BPF). We choose this in-network service as an example because packet
forwarding is one of the basic services required for most network architectures. Moreover,
packet addresses act as the basis for operations performed by further in-network services.
Furthermore, it was not possible so far to transfer packet addresses in end-to-end encrypted
form. BPF provides confidentiality for packet addresses during transmission as well as during
processing by network nodes.
Keywords:
Blind Packet Forwarding, Network Address Confidentiality, Future Network Architecture,
Public key Encryption with Keyword Search, Locator/Identifier Split, OpenFlow
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The current network architecture of the IPv4/IPv6 Internet [Pos81a], [DH98] has been de-
signed in a way that it can provide connectivity and interoperability between a large number
of heterogeneous end systems by deploying a single global network layer. However, this princi-
ple of a fixed network layer restricts the innovative development and integration of additional
in-network services such as Quality of Service (QoS), Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), and traf-
fic engineering [Wol10]. Meanwhile, there exist a wealth of approaches for a Future Network
Architecture (FNA). Although these approaches differ in their orientation, they all suggest
that a network should be service-oriented and flexibly orchestrated from atomic smart in-
network services [HSK10].
In these approaches, in-network services orchestrated in a network require certain control
data to be signalled for their operability. Here, we can consider various kinds of control data
signalling established so far. For example, control data can be put in front of the user data
such as packet addresses. Additionally, control data can be signalled on a separate plane as is
the case with routing information exchange. Furthermore, control data can be also signalled
by coding it into user data such as transcoding multimedia data in the network [VLBA12].
Thus, we can state that in-network services require access to various control data signalled
in different ways to utilise the complete functionality of the orchestrated network. Moreover,
the diversity and amount of control data required by in-network services rises progressively.
Hence, the communication endpoints have to allow more and more access to information about
themselves in order to utilise the complete functionality of an orchestrated network. How-
ever, the in-network services are able to sniff information. Furthermore, even third parties can
sniff information while it is transferred in cleartext in order to operate the in-network services.
Beside these considerations for a FNA, providing information confidentiality for two com-
municating endpoints is one of the services that has to be provided on the end systems
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as well as to be ensured in the network. The de facto method applied so far is end-
to-end encryption of information transferred between two endpoints. Cryptographic algo-
rithms, e.g., AES [DR13] and RSA [RSA78] are used in secure communication protocols such
as SSH [YL06], TLS [Die08], and IPsec [KS05]. However, in-network services have then no
longer access to the encrypted control data and they cannot accomplish their tasks anymore.
Thus, utilising the benefits of FNA approaches is not possible anymore, if the communi-
cating endpoints perform end-to-end encryption. Furthermore, not all control data can be
transferred in end-to-end encrypted form. For example, the ultimate source and destination
addresses of IP packets can be transferred in encrypted form only between IPsec peers (se-
curity gateways) by means of IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol in tunnel
mode [Ken05].
The issues identified above reveal that realising only the one of the two goals is possible, but
together they contradict each other. Thus, we can define the present unsatisfactory state “ei-
ther establishing smart in-network services or providing information confidentiality”. This
thesis presents the Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF) which can represent the beginning of a
new state “establishing smart in-network services as well as providing information confiden-
tiality”.
1.1 Motivation
Address-based packet forwarding is the fundamental in-network service present in all connec-
tionless packet-based network architectures except the content-based networks. Basically, for
an incoming packet, a network node has the task to forward the packet to one of its neighbour
nodes based on the destination address of the packet and the metric used in that network.
For selection of the most fitting neighbour node, a network node maintains a routing table
which is set up and updated by means of a routing algorithm. In a local network, the des-
tination address of the packet is resolved to a MAC address, and the packet is forwarded to
the MAC address of the destination endpoint. Thus, the packet forwarding in its basic form
is associated with two in-network services, namely routing and address resolution.
To realise the packet forwarding, a packet has to be addressed in a way that the source
and destination endpoint of the packet can be uniquely identified on the network level. In
addition, unrestricted access to the network addresses in the packet has to be provided to
the network nodes in order to forward the packet in the correct direction. Thus, the network
nodes inevitably become authorised entities accessing packet addresses for establishment of
the packet forwarding service. Consequently, the network nodes taking part in the transfer
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have the possibility to identify which endpoints communicate with each other. Moreover,
even third parties, e.g., eavesdroppers on the network nodes, can sniff the packet addresses
in order to disclose the communicating endpoints.
We tackle this problem by defining a confidentiality for the network addresses of the packets
transferred between two communicating endpoints, where only both endpoints are the autho-
rised entities to access the packet addresses in cleartext. We call this information security
property end-to-end network address confidentiality, or shortly, network address confidential-
ity (NAC) classifying also network nodes as adversary. BPF is a clean-slate security approach
aiming to simultaneously establish the packet forwarding service and to provide NAC. BPF
allows to correctly match masked packet addresses with masked routing table entries. In
this way confidentiality for packet addresses is provided during transmission as well as during
processing by network nodes.
1.2 Organisation of the thesis
After sketching approaches leveraged by this thesis and discussing works related to our ap-
proach in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 presents a basic BPF construction that redesigns the packet
forwarding and its associated services to blind ones which can still correctly process masked
network addresses being based on a simple structure. In addition, this chapter discusses
BPF’s security benefits and the effects of applying BPF in the current Internet architecture.
Moreover, we present BPF’s prototype implementation utilising OpenFlow [Ope16a] and its
deployment in a real hardware testbed. Finally, this chapter evaluates the implementation of
the basic BPF design.
While demonstrating the feasibility to simultaneously establish the packet forwarding ser-
vice and to provide NAC, the basic BPF design is not suitable to be deployed o a broad scale
in the current Internet architecture. Moreover, the basic BPF design introduces a consider-
able amount of overhead. In Chapter 4, we define requirements to be fulfilled by a suitable
architecture for BPF and extend the basic BPF design to two further BPF architectures by
means of the existing FNA approaches. Each of both BPF extensions introduces two blind-
ness modes with tolerable overheads achieved by reinterpreting the features of OpenFlow in
its implementation. Both BPF designs are deployed in a real hardware testbed to demon-
strate their feasibility for practical deployment. At last, we discuss the evaluations for the
implementations of both BPF extensions.
While both BPF extensions demonstrate that BPF can in principle be realised by using
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the existing FNA approaches, none of the BPF extensions alone can achieve all of the proper-
ties required for an adequate BPF design. Chapter 5 combines the beneficial aspects of both
BPF extensions into a new design. This new design does not only fulfil the requirements for
an adequate BPF design but also introduces a fine-grained, flexible and dynamic blindness
providing multiple NAC levels. Moreover, we adapt OpenFlow in order to achieve a BPF
implementation which provides high performance and can thus support multiple real-time
media communications each with a high sending rate.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and gives an outlook on future work. The main results
of this thesis have been published in [SBJR13], [SJBR14], and [SJR15].
Chapter 2
Basics
In this chapter, we briefly sketch approaches leveraged by this thesis and discuss works related
to our approach.
2.1 Public key Encryption with Keyword Search
The Public key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [BDCOP04] is a cryptographic al-
gorithm enabling to correctly determine for two PEKS ciphertexts whether their cleartext
values are the same, without decrypting the ciphertexts. By means of PEKS, we encrypt
network packet addresses in order to provide a new information security property called end-
to-end network address confidentiality which we have introduced in Section 1.1.
In [HYH13], Hsu et al. have presented a study of PEKS and its extensions [BSNS08], [Kha06],
[RPSL10], [ZCM+12], and [YXZ11]. In this thesis, we apply the PEKS construction based
on a bilinear map of elliptic curves [BF01]. It uses two groups G1 and G2 of prime order p
as well as a bilinear map e : G1 × G1 → G2 between them. The map satisfies the following
properties:
• Given g, h ∈ G1 there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute e(g, h) ∈ G2.
• For any integers x, y ∈ [1, p], e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)xy.
• If g is a generator of G1 then e(g, g) is a generator of G2.
There are also two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : G2 → {0, 1}log p. Thus, the
PEKS algorithm consists of the following methods:
• KeyGen(s): The security parameter s determines the size p of the groups G1 and G2.
The function picks a random α ∈ Z∗p and a generator g of G1. It outputs a public
key Apub = [g, h = g
α] and a private key Apriv = α.
5
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• E(W ) = PEKS(Apub,W ): It computes t = e(H1(W ), hr) ∈ G2 for a random r ∈ Z∗p
and outputs a searchable encryption E(W ) = [gr, H2(t)].
• T (W ) = Trapdoor(Apriv,W ): It outputs an encrypted trapdoor T (W ) = H1(W )α ∈ G1.
• Test(E(W ), T (V )): Let E(W ) = [A,B]. If H2(e(T (V ), A)) = B then it outputs 1
(W = V ) otherwise it outputs 0 (W 6= V ).
In [BDCOP04], Boneh et al. have proved that the PEKS construction is semantic-secure, i.e.
E(W ) and T (W ) do not reveal any information about W . The PEKS construction does not
allow to decrypt ciphertexts, i.e. the encryption is not invertible. Moreover, the encryption
function of PEKS is not deterministic. This means that the function outputs different ci-
phertexts for each encryption of the same cleartext with the same public key. In contrast to
the encryption function of PEKS, its trapdoor function is deterministic. Thus, the function
always outputs the same trapdoor value for a pair of a cleartext and a private key. Further-
more, Test(E(W ), T (W )) outputs 1, if and only if E(W ) and T (W ) are generated with the
same key pair (Apub, Apriv).
PEKS is applied in various approaches for different purposes. On the basis of PEKS, Aviv et al.
have proposed a system for searchable remote encrypted Email storage [ALPK07]. In addition,
Kim et al. have presented a mechanism supporting secure validation of routing information
in the inter-domain routing protocol of the Internet [KXNP08]. Moreover, Liu et al. have
proposed a privacy preserving keyword search scheme in cloud computing [LWW09]. Fur-
thermore, Shikfa et al. have focused on the privacy and confidentiality in context-based and
epidemic forwarding [SO¨M10]. The last work is most relevant to ours, since it enables to
blindly process control data in networks, i.e. to blindly compare message profiles with node
profiles. In this work, message profiles are encrypted with the public key of a third party and
also trapdoor values for node profiles are generated with its private key. However, this third
party acts then as a further in-network service, which can attain knowledge of the identities
of message sources and destinations and node profiles.
2.2 Locator/Identifier Split
While an IP address identifies an endpoint (identifier) and describes its network attachment
point (locator) at the same time, the Locator/Identifier (Loc/ID) Split principle [MZF07] sep-
arates the locator functionality from the identifier. Thus, the network address of an endpoint
consists of a Loc and an ID part. The ID part serves to locate the endpoint within a local
network to which the endpoint is connected, while the Loc part specifies the location of the
local network in the entire infrastructure, e.g., in the Internet. Moreover, a mapping system is
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needed to map the actual Loc of an endpoint to its ID. Furthermore, the ID of an endpoint has
to be resolved to its actual Loc before sending a network packet to the endpoint. The Loc/ID
Split principle is regarded as the de facto addressing standard for Future Network Architec-
ture (FNA) and supports scalability, mobility and multihoming by design [Li11], [SG 12].
Currently, there exists a wealth of approaches relying on the Loc/ID Split principle. As
in [HMH13], these approaches can be categorised into two classes on the basis of how the ID
of an endpoint is resolved to its actual Loc. Approaches (e.g., [AB12], [FCM+09], [MN06],
and [PPJB08]) from the first class perform the mapping lookup in endpoints, while intermedi-
ate nodes query the mapping system for a mapping information in approaches (e.g., [FFML13],
[MHK13], [HSKE09], and [XJ09]) from the second class. Towards achieving an adequate de-
sign for Blind Packet Forwarding, we leverage pioneer approaches from each class, which we
sketch below.
2.2.1 Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split
The Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split (GLI-Split) [MHK13] is one of the
FNA approaches relying on the Loc/ID Split principle. This approach splits the functionality
of IP addresses into global and local locators as well as identifiers. In GLI-Split, identifiers
and locators are encoded in regular IPv6 addresses. In this way, a new routing protocol is
not needed, and GLI-Split is backward-compatible with the IPv6 Internet. The architecture
of GLI-Split divides the network into a global domain (IPv6 backbone) and multiple local
domains connected to each other via the global domain. Gateways (border routers of local
domains) and nodes of local domains have a local locator that describes their positions within
their local domains. Within the global domain, the position of each gateway is described by
a global locator. GLI-Split separates global and local routing from each other and performs
core routing on global locators and edge routing on local locators. Thus, the changes in a
local domain do not affect the global domain, and vice versa.
2.2.1.1 Addressing
GLI-Split defines three types of addresses: identifier address, local address, and global ad-
dress. The identifier address of an endpoint represents its identifier and does not contain
any locator information. This address type is used in the transport layer. In this way, the
transport layer sees the same address regardless of the current location of the endpoint. On
the network layer, the identifier address is rewritten in an appropriate locator address of the
endpoint, and vice versa. This process is called vertical address conversion (see Figure 2.1).
The local address of the endpoint contains its identifier and the local locator of the edge
node to which the endpoint is currently connected. The local address is used for forwarding
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Dst: identifier address
Src: identifier address
Dst: local address
Src: local or global address
Vertical address
conversion
Receiver
Dst: identifier address
Src: identifier address
Dst: local or global address
Src: local address
Vertical address
conversion
Sender
Dst: local or global address
Src: local or global address
Horizontal address
conversion
Transport
layer
Network
layer
Figure 2.1: Address translations in GLI-Split [MHK13].
within the endpoint’s local domain. Gateways at the border of a local domain rewrite local
addresses in global addresses, and vice versa. This address translation is called horizontal
address conversion. A global address of the endpoint contains its identifier and the global
locator of a gateway responsible for the local domain. Thus, global addresses are utilised for
forwarding within the global domain.
The three address types are encoded by reusing the 128-bit IPv6 address format. A n-bit
prefix (GLI-prefix) differentiates GLI-addresses from classical IPv6 addresses. The 64 lower-
order bits contain an identifier, while the remaining bits are used for the locator information.
The locator part of identifier addresses is filled with padding zeros. In a locator address,
two bits following the GLI-prefix determine whether the locator part contains a global or
local locator. Global locators are IPv6 prefixes that are globally allocated to gateways from
ISPs in the same manner as in the current IPv6 Internet. Local locators are locally assigned
according to the topology and management of local domains.
2.2.1.2 Mapping
The mapping system in GLI-Split consists of a global mapping system and a local mapping
system in each local domain. The global mapping system maps any identifier to a set of global
addresses. The set contains multiple addresses, if the associated local domain is multihomed.
For identifiers of endpoints being located in a local domain, the associated local mapping sys-
tem maintains their mappings to local addresses. In [MHH10], Menth et al. have presented
how the mapping system works in detail.
An endpoint newly connected to a local network queries an enhanced DHCP server which
responds with a local locator, a set of global locators (if the local domain is multihomed),
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and reachability information for the mapping system. After that, the endpoint registers its
global and local addresses at the global and local mapping systems. In case of reattachment
to another local network, the endpoint repeats this procedure.
Before sending a network packet, the source endpoint S has to resolve the actual locator
of the destination endpoint D. For that, the source endpoint queries the local mapping sys-
tem responsible for the local domain in which the source endpoint is located. If both endpoints
reside in the same local domain, the local mapping system responds with a local address of the
destination endpoint. Otherwise, the local mapping system forwards the request to the global
mapping system which responds with a set of global addresses for the destination endpoint.
The set contains multiple global addresses, if the destination local domain is multihomed.
The source endpoint can cache the addresses for the following packets so that it does not
have to perform a mapping lookup for each packet.
S D
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(a) Intra-domain communication.
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𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐺𝐿#.𝐼𝐷#𝑆𝑟𝑐: 𝐿𝐿". 𝐼𝐷" 𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐺𝐿#.𝐼𝐷#𝑆𝑟𝑐:𝐺𝐿". 𝐼𝐷" 𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐿𝐿#.𝐼𝐷#𝑆𝑟𝑐:𝐺𝐿". 𝐼𝐷"
Gateway Gateway
(b) Inter-domain communication.
Figure 2.2: Packet delivery in GLI-Split [MHK13].
2.2.1.3 Packet delivery
The endpoint S wants to send a packet to the endpoint D. We assume that both endpoints
have already registered their global and local addresses at the global mapping system and at
the associated local mapping systems. Moreover, it is assumed that the initiating endpoint S
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has already found the identifier of the destination endpoint, e.g., via DNS. The source end-
point performs a mapping lookup for D’s identifier.
If the source endpoint gets a local address, both endpoints reside in the same local do-
main (see Figure 2.2a). In this case, the endpoint S uses the local address as the destination
address and its own local address as the source address. The packet is locally forwarded to
the endpoint D on the basis of the local locator in the destination address.
In case of inter-domain communication (see Figure 2.2b), the endpoint S gets a set of global
addresses. If the destination local domain is multihomed, the set consists of multiple ad-
dresses. The endpoint chooses one of the global addresses as the destination address and its
own local address as the source address. The packet is forwarded in three steps:
1. The packet is forwarded to a gateway of the source local domain by using the default
route.
2. Upon receiving the packet, the default gateway replaces the source local address with S’s
global address which contains the source identifier and the global locator of the gateway.
After that, the packet is globally forwarded to the destination local domain on the basis
of the global locator in the destination address.
3. When the packet arrives at a gateway of the destination local domain, the gateway
queries the local mapping system for D’s local address and replaces the destination
global address with D’s local address. After that, the packet is locally forwarded to the
endpoint D on the basis of the local locator in the destination address.
Classic IPv6
Domain
Local DomainGlobal DomainS D
𝐿𝐿"𝐺𝐿" 𝐼𝐷"D’s identifierD’s local locator
D’s global locator
Gateway
S’s IP address
2001:db8::11
𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐺𝐿".𝐼𝐷"
Src: 2001:db8::11
𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐿𝐿".𝐼𝐷"
Src: 2001:db8::11
𝑆𝑟𝑐: 𝐿𝐿". 𝐼𝐷"Dst: 2001:db8::11𝑆𝑟𝑐:𝐺𝐿". 𝐼𝐷"Dst: 2001:db8::11
Figure 2.3: Communication between an IPv6 host and a GLI-Split host [MHK13].
If the endpoint S resides in a classical IPv6 domain (see Figure 2.3), i.e. the endpoint is a
classical IPv6 host, the source endpoint obtains D’s global address encoded in IPv6 address
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format directly from DNS. The endpoint S uses the global address as the destination address
and its own regular IPv6 address as the source address. According to the global locator in
the destination address, the packet is forwarded to a gateway of the destination local domain.
From then on, it is proceeded as described in step 3 above. In the reverse case, steps 1 and 2
are performed. After that, the gateway of the source local domain forwards the packet on the
basis of the conventional IPv6 address in the destination field.
2.2.2 Hierarchical Architecture for Internet Routing
The Hierarchical Architecture for Internet Routing (HAIR) [FCM+09] is a FNA approach
which relies on the Loc/ID Split principle. This approach defines a n-level-based hierarchical
scheme which reflects the current Internet structure (see Figure 2.4). There, local networks
placed at level n are called Edges. At levels n−1 to 2 we have the so called Intermediate (INT)
networks which consist only of routers and ensure the reachability between the attached Edges
and INTs of the next higher level. We can conceive the INTs as access providers or enterprise
networks. The top level of the hierarchy is the so called Core providing routing reachability
between the INTs at level 2. Each router in the Core belongs to one administrative domain
and is under the control of a single ISP, just like in the today’s Internet backbone. The or-
ganisation of hierarchy levels is not restricted to be globally symmetrical. Domain providers
can independently organise their own domains in various hierarchy levels. Each node in a
domain has a locator describing its position within the domain.
… … …Ln−1AP Ln−1AP Ln−1AP Ln−1AP
L2AP L2AP
L2AP
L1AP L1AP
L1AP
L1(Core)
L2(INT )
Ln(Edge)
Figure 2.4: HAIR’s n-level-based hierarchical scheme [FCM+09].
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Levels 1 to n are connected via so called Level Attachment Points (LAPs) acting as gateway
nodes. A routing domain at level k is connected to a routing domain at level k+ 1 via LkAP .
A LAP has at least two locators which describe its positions within the domains connected
with each by the LAP. In HAIR, the routing is performed domain-wise so that a network
node in a routing domain at level k maintains routing entries only for the network nodes in
the same domain at level k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. In this way, the changes in a domain do not affect
the neighbouring domains.
2.2.2.1 Addressing
The address of an endpoint consists of its identifier and actual locator sequence. It is assumed
that identifiers are organised in a global flat namespace. The locator sequence of an endpoint
defines the LAPs to be traversed for forwarding a packet from the Core to the endpoint, which
is similar to loose source routing. The address of the endpoint X with the identifier IDX is
AddrX : L1APX |...|Ln−1APX︸ ︷︷ ︸
LocX : locator sequence
| IDX .
Here, L1APX , ..., Ln−1APX are the locators of LAPs that have to be traversed to reach the
endpoint X. The length of a locator sequence can be variable. In the prototype implementa-
tion of HAIR, IPv6 addresses are used for both identifiers and locators.
2.2.2.2 Mapping
HAIR defines a hierarchical mapping system which binds the actual locator sequence to the
identifier of an endpoint. The mapping system consists of a Core Mapping Service (CMS)
and multiple INT Mapping Services (IMSs). An IMS holds the actual mappings for the
endpoints belonging to that INT, and the CMS keeps a pointer to the IMS maintaining
the current mapping for each identifier. The CMS is provided by the Core, while IMSs are
administered by INTs. Although HAIR does not specify how to implement the mapping ser-
vice, it proposes to use any distributed directory service (e.g., DNS) for the CMS and IMSs.
HAIR does not specify how to perform a mapping registration and lookup. In the pro-
totype implementation of HAIR, the mapping system is realised as a single HTTP server
which keeps mappings. Moreover, an endpoint gets the locators of the associated LAPs from
a DHCP server and registers the mapping of its identifier to the composed locator sequence
at the mapping server via HTTP. Furthermore, the identifier of an endpoint is resolved to its
actual locator sequence by means of an HTTP-like query to the mapping server.
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2.2.2.3 Packet delivery
The endpoint S with the identifier IDS wants to send a packet to the endpoint D. It is
assumed that both endpoints have already registered their mappings at the mapping system,
and S has already found D’s identifier IDD, e.g., via DNS. First, the endpoint S resolves D’s
identifier to its actual locator sequence by querying the mapping system.
If both endpoints reside in the same INT (see Figure 2.5a), the packet is locally forwarded
to the destination Edge on the basis of the last locator in the destination locator sequence.
Eventually, the packet arrives at the destination edge node which resolves the destination
identifier to a MAC address. Finally, the packet is forwarded to the MAC address.
S D
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(a) Intra-domain communication.
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𝐷𝑠𝑡: 𝐿$𝐴𝑃)|… |𝐼𝐷)𝑆𝑟𝑐: 𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟'
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(b) Inter-domain communication.
Figure 2.5: Packet delivery in HAIR [FCM+09].
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If the endpoints S and D are located in different INTs, the endpoint S gets the locator
sequence LocD : L1APD|...|Ln−1APD from the mapping system. Thus, the destination ad-
dress of the packet is AddrD : LocD | IDD, and its source address is AddrS : LocS | IDS .
The packet is forwarded in three steps (see Figure 2.5b):
1. The packet is forwarded up to the Core either by using the default route or by utilising
the locator sequence LocS in the source address.
2. The packet is forwarded domain-wise. Here, LkAPD is taken as the basis locator for
packet forwarding in a routing domain at level k, 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1.
3. Eventually, the packet arrives at the destination Edge. The edge node resolves D’s
identifier to its MAC address and forwards the packet to the MAC address.
2.3 OpenFlow
Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [Fun12] is a network architecture which proposes de-
coupling the control plane and the forwarding plane of network devices (e.g., switches and
routers) from each other and centralising the control logic in a software-based controller (see
Figure 2.6). While the SDN controller maintains the network intelligence, the network devices
perform instructions from the controller. OpenFlow [Ope16a] is a SDN protocol which spec-
ifies the components and the basic functions of network devices as well as their management
by a controller.
Network	Device Network	Device Network	Device
Network	Device Network	Device
INFRASTRUCTURE	LAYER
SDN
Control
Software Network	Services
CONTROL	LAYER
Control	Data	Plane	interface
(e.g.,	OpenFlow)
Figure 2.6: SDN Architecture [Fun12].
Due to the SDN approach, OpenFlow offers support for innovative networking concepts, such
as Blind Packet Forwarding, in real hardware testbeds without a lot of effort. In this way,
new networking approaches can be evaluated in realistic environments. Beside this aspect
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of networking experiments, the management of experimental environments is also crucial.
The topology management tool (ToMaTo) [MSC14] developed as part of the German-Lab
project [SRZ+14] allows to provide as well as manage realistic and lightweight components
with regard to high realism and parallelism by using multiple virtualisation technologies.
The OpenFlow specification is under continuous development, and it is available in differ-
ent versions [Ope16b]. A detailed list of all version changes can be found in [Opeb]. More-
over, the currently available deployments of OpenFlow and the associated controllers are given
in [Ope16c]. For this thesis, we leverage OpenFlow version 1.3 [Opea]. An OpenFlow-enabled
network device called OpenFlow switch consists of an OpenFlow datapath and an OpenFlow
channel (see Figure 2.7), which we discuss below on the basis of OpenFlow 1.3.
OpenFlow Switch
OpenFlow Datapath
Flow
Table
Flow
Table…
Pipeline
OpenFlow Channel
Controller
OpenFlow Protocol
Figure 2.7: OpenFlow switch [Opea].
2.3.1 OpenFlow datapath
An OpenFlow datapath consists of one or more flow tables. A flow contains one or multiple
match fields, a priority for matching precedence, and a set of instructions. A flow match field
is described using the Type Length Value (TLV) format. Together the type and the length in
a flow match field define a packet field (e.g., Ethernet destination address (six bytes)) whose
value is matched against the value in the match field. The match fields of a flow are logically
linked to each other by means of the AND operator. Thus, if the values of the packet fields
specified by the flow match fields fit the values in the match fields, it is said that the flow
matches the packet, or vice versa. The types supported by OpenFlow 1.3 are listed in [Opea].
A flow match field can also define the ingress port or the metadata which is a register to carry
information from a flow table to the next one. A flow is identified by its match fields and
priority.
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Upon receiving a packet, the datapath parses the packet on the basis of pre-defined types
defining the respective fields of the packet according to supported protocols (see [Opea] for
protocols supported by OpenFlow 1.3). Next, the packet (i.e., its field values) goes through
a pipeline (flow tables). Here, flows matching the packet are determined in priority order as
well as the instructions defined in these flows are performed on the packet. An instruction
can modify pipeline processing such as directing the packet to another flow table or contains
actions which are performed either immediately or after exiting the processing pipeline.
An action of a flow can forward the matching packet via a specified port (Output), send
the packet to the controller (Controller-Output), and drop the packet. Moreover, an action
can push/pop certain tags (e.g., VLAN, MPLS) and modify values of respective packet fields
specified by their types and lengths. A detailed list of possible actions as well as supported
tags and packet fields in OpenFlow 1.3 can be found in [Opea].
2.3.2 OpenFlow channel
An OpenFlow datapath is connected to a controller by means of the OpenFlow channel
through which the controller manages the datapath and receives events from the datapath.
Here, the datapath initiates a standard TLS or TCP [Pos81b] connection to the controller,
and the connection is identified by the OpenFlow-specific ID of the datapath. The OpenFlow
protocol specifies the format of all OpenFlow channel messages to be classified into three
types:
• Controller-to-datapath messages are initiated by the controller. By means of such mes-
sages, the controller can request datapath capabilities (Features), set/query configu-
ration parameters (Configuration), add/modify/delete flows (Modify-State), and send
packets out of a specified port on the datapath (Packet-Out).
• By means of asynchronous messages, a datapath can inform the controller of packet
arrival and state changes (e.g., flow removal or port configuration change). If a flow
instructs sending a matching packet to the controller, the datapath can send the packet
to the controller by means of a Packet-In message. This message contains the OpenFlow-
specific ID of the datapath and the ingress port of the packet as well as the entire packet
or a specific part of the packet, e.g., only the Ethernet and IP headers. In the last case,
the remaining part of the packet is cached at the datapath, and the message also contains
the cache ID for the packet.
• Between a datapath and controller, symmetric messages are exchanged upon connection
setup (Hello) and for verifying the liveness of the connection (Echo request/reply).
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Figure 2.8: NOX architecture [nox16].
2.3.3 NOX
NOX [GKP+08] is an OpenFlow controller written in C/C++. NOX provides a high level
programmatic interface for management and development of network services encapsulated
by components (e.g., switching, routing). The architecture of NOX is given in Figure 2.8. All
components inherit from the class Component. By means of this class, components can send
controller-to-datapath messages and become listener of events generated by asynchronous
messages. The most important events are
• Datapath-Join: Resolved when a new datapath is detected.
• Datapath-Leave: Resolved when a datapath leaves the network.
• Packet-In: Resolved when a packet is received from a datapath.
• Datapath-Port-Description: Resolved when port description of a datapath is received.
After detecting a new OpenFlow datapath, a NOX component queries the datapath to send
its port description. After that, the component defines a flow whose match field is wildcarded.
This flow matches any packet and has the lowest priority as well as instructs to send matching
packets to the controller. Thus, the flow matches a packet, if the packet has not matched
the other flows. In this regard, the first packet of a new traffic seen by a datapath is sent
to the controller. The component handles the packet, instructs the datapath to set one or
more correspondent flows, and sends the packet out of a specified port on the datapath. The
remaining packets of the traffic are then forwarded on the basis of the flows.
2.4 Anonymous communication
Confidentiality of information, which can be used to identify a subject, can deduce a cer-
tain degree of subject anonymity against adversaries. In Section 2.4.1, we first discuss the
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anonymity properties defined by [PH05]. Anonymity systems can be classified in high- and
low-latency anonymity systems as is the case in [EY09]. High-latency anonymity systems
(e.g., [Cha81], [SDS02], and [Dan03]) are designed to be applied for non-interactive appli-
cations tolerating delays of several hours or more, such as email. Since our approach aims
to support transparency to applications, high-latency anonymity systems fall out of scope of
our discussion. In [RW10], Ren et al. divide low-latency anonymity systems into the fol-
lowing categories: Mixnet-based schemes, routing-based techniques, peer-to-peer networks.
Below, we sketch pioneer approaches from each category. The anonymity properties of these
approaches are discussed in Section 2.4.6.
Messages
Senders
Communication	network
Recipients
Figure 2.9: Anonymity model [PH05].
2.4.1 Anonymity properties
In [PH05], Pfitzmann et al. define the following setting:
• Senders send messages to recipients using a communication network (see Figure 2.9).
• An attacker may be an outsider monitoring communication lines, but also an insider
able to participate in normal communications or/and to control at least some stations.
• A subject is an acting entity (e.g., sender or recipient) which might cause an action (e.g.,
sending or receiving).
• An identity is any subset of attributes of an entity which distinguishes this entity from
all other entities within any set of entities (e.g, a host can be identified on the basis of
its IP address).
• Items of interest (IOIs) can be subjects, messages, actions, and identities in which the
attacker might have interest for its observation.
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With regard to the setting above, the following anonymity properties are defined:
• Anonymity : The state of being not identifiable within a set of subjects (the anonymity
set).
• Sender/recipient unlinkability : A particular message is not linkable to any sender/re-
cipient and no message is linkable to a particular sender/recipient.
• Relationship unlinkability : It is untraceable who communicates with whom. In other
words, sender and recipient are unlinkable to each other.
• Sender/recipient unobservability : It is not detectable whether any sender/recipient
sends/receives.
• Relationship unobservability : It is not detectable whether anything is sent out of a set
of could-be senders to a set of could-be recipients. In other words, it is not detectable
whether within the relationship unobservability set of all possible sender-recipient(s)-
pairs, a message is exchanged in any relationship.
Here, the following relationships are stated between the anonymity properties:
• Sender/recipient unobservability implies sender/recipient unlinkability.
• Relationship unobservability implies relationship unlinkability.
• Sender/recipient unlinkability implies relationship unlinkability.
• Sender/recipient unobservability implies relationship unobservability.
2.4.2 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol in tunnel mode
ESP protocol in tunnel mode [Ken05], shortly ESP, encrypts an IP packet including its IP
header and encapsulates the encrypted packet in a new IP packet with a new IP header
containing the IP addresses of IPsec peers (security gateways) connecting the private networks
with the public network. Thus, the original packet with its ultimate source and destination
addresses are transferred between the security gateways in encrypted form. ESP classifies
the private networks including the security gateways as trusted and the public network as
untrusted. Hence, security gateways and network nodes within the private networks are
authorised entities having access to the ultimate source and destination addresses of the
original packet in cleartext. To the best of our knowledge, ESP is the only approach aiming
to achieve network address confidentiality primarily.
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2.4.3 Tor
Tor [DMS04] is a mixnet-based overlay network aiming to anonymise TCP connections. Tor
clients choose a path through the network and build a circuit by negotiating a symmetric
key with each node called onion router (OR) in the path. Traffic is packed in fixed-size cells
which are encrypted layer-wise with each shared key, like the layers of an onion. The cells
flow down the circuit and are unwrapped by a symmetric key at each OR.
In the Tor network, each OR maintains a TLS connection to each other OR. Tor users run
onion proxies (OPs) communicating with ORs using TLS connections. By means of directory
servers (redundant, well-known ORs) acting as HTTP servers, OPs can fetch current network
state and descriptors of ORs (their keys, addresses, bandwidths, and so on), and other ORs
can upload their descriptors. Each OR keeps a long-term identity key and a short-term onion
key. An OR uses its identity key to sign TLS certificates and its descriptor. Moreover, the OR
decrypts circuit setup requests from OPs by means of its onion key.
CircID Control
CircID Relay StreamID Digest Length RelayCommand Data
Data
2 1 509
2 1 2 6 2 1 498
Control	cell
Relay	cell
Figure 2.10: Cell structures in Tor [DMS04].
2.4.3.1 Cell
Traffic between two ORs as well as between an OP and OR is packed in fixed-size cells (512
bytes) and transferred over the associated TLS connection. A cell consists of a header and a
payload (see Figure 2.10). The header contains a circuit identifier (circID) and a command.
On the basis of the command, a cell is either a control cell used to set up/destroy a circuit or
a relay cell carrying end-to-end stream data. The control cell commands are create, created,
and destroy. A relay cell includes an additional header called relay header. The relay header
contains a stream identifier (streamID), an end-to-end integrity checksum (digest), the relay
payload length, and a relay command. The relay commands are
• relay extend for extending the circuit by a hop,
• relay extended to acknowledge the circuit extension,
• relay begin inducing to open a TCP connection,
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• relay connected to notify the OP of the TCP connection setup,
• relay data for transferring TCP data, and
• relay end closing a TCP connection.
The relay header and payload are encrypted or decrypted together using the 128-bit AES
cipher to generate a cipher stream.
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Figure 2.11: Circuit setup and transferring TCP payloads in Tor [DMS04].
2.4.3.2 Circuit
An OP periodically builds a new circuit, rotates between the existing circuits once a minute,
and expires the old ones. To build a new circuit, the OP selects a path of usually three ORs
(OR1, OR2, OR3) and negotiates a symmetric key with each OR in the path (see Figure 2.11):
1. The OP selects a new circID c1, maps this to OR1 as the successor, and generates
the first half of the Diffie-Hellman handshake (gx1) encrypted with OR1’s onion key by
means of RSA. After that, the OP sends a create cell containing the circID c1 and the
encrypted gx1 to OR1.
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2. Upon receiving the create cell, OR1 maps the circID c1 to the OP as the predecessor.
Moreover, OR1 decrypts the cell payload content and generates gy1 as well as a crypto-
graphic hash of the negotiated key K1 = g
x1y1 . After that, OR1 packs the second half
of the Diffie-Hellman handshake as well as the hash of the key into a created cell with
the circID c1 and sends it back to the OP. Thus, the circuit between the OP and OR1
is established, and they share the secret key K1 mapped to the circID c1. By means of
the circuit, the OP and OR1 can send relay cells encrypted with the symmetric key K1
to each other.
3. For extending the circuit to OR2, the OP uses the circuit to send a relay extend cell
to OR1. This cell has the circID c1 and contains OR2’s address and gx2 encrypted
with OR2’s onion key by means of RSA. The relay header and payload of the cell is
encrypted with K1 by means of AES.
4. Upon receiving the relay extended cell, OR1 looks up the key mapped to the circID c1
and decrypts the cell with K1. OR1 selects a new circID c2 and maps this to OR2 as
the successor. Moreover, the circIDs c1 and c2 are correlated with each other. After
that, the encrypted gx2 is packed into a create cell which gets c2 as its circID. Finally,
the create cell is sent to OR2.
5. For the incoming create cell, OR2 proceeds in the same manner as OR1. Thus, OR2
maps the circID c2 to OR1 as the predecessor and responds with a created cell which
gets c2 as its circID and contains gy2 and a cryptographic hash of the negotiated key
K2 = g
x2y2 mapped to the circID c2.
6. After receiving the created cell, OR1 packs its payload content into a relay extended
cell which gets the circID correlated with c2, namely c1. After that, the cell is sent to
the address mapped to the circID c1 as the predecessor, namely to OP’s address. Thus,
the OP and OR2 share the secret key K2 mapped to the circID c1 as the second key.
7. To extend the circuit to the last OR, the OP proceeds analogously and negotiates the
key K3 with OR3.
Thus, the OP shares a symmetric key with each OR (K1, K2, K3), and each OR on the
circuit learns its predecessor OR/OP (IP address) and successor OR (IP address), which are
mapped to the circuit IDs that are selected hop-wise.
2.4.3.3 Transferring TCP payloads
For opening a TCP connection to a given address and port, a Tor user requests its OP that
chooses the newest circuit or creates a new one if needed. Here, we assume that the OP
2.4. ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATION 23
selects the circuit created above. The OP then packs the address and port into a relay begin
cell which gets c1 as its circID. The cell payload is encrypted layer-wise with the keys K3, K2,
and K1 in this order (see Figure 2.11). After that, the OP sends the cell to the OR mapped
to the circID as the successor, namely to OR1. For the incoming relay cell from a predeces-
sor, an OR on the circuit looks up the key mapped to the circID of the cell and decrypts
the outer layer with this key. After that, the OR finds the successor circID correlated with
the circID of the cell, and thus, the next hop for the cell. The OR updates the circID in the
cell and sends the cell to the successor OR. In this way, OR3 gets the cell payload in cleartext.
After connecting to the specified host, OR3 responds with a relay connected cell which gets c3
as its circID. The cell payload is encrypted with the key mapped to the circID c3, namely
with K3. After that, the cell is sent to the OR mapped to c3 as the predecessor, namely to
OR2. For an incoming relay cell from a successor, an OR on the circuit finds the predecessor
circID correlated with the circID of the cell, and then, the key mapped to the predecessor
circID. The OR encrypts the cell payload with this key and updates the circID in the cell
which is sent to the predecessor. After receiving the cell, the OP decrypts the cell payload
layer-wise with the keys K1, K2, and K3 in this order. The relay data cells flow down and
up the circuit in the same manner as the relay begin and relay connected cells.
2.4.4 Crowds
The Crowds system [RR98] is a routing-based technique for anonymous web browsing. A
crowd can be considered as a collection of endpoints running special web proxies called jon-
dos. When a jondo is started, the jondo registers itself at a server called blender. The new
jondo gets the membership of the crowd and is reported to other jondos. Each jondo shares
an encryption key with each other jondo, and the connection between each two jondos is
encrypted. Web requests and replies flow via one or more jondos which are randomly selected
hop-wise.
2.4.4.1 Membership
The blender is a central server which controls membership in a crowd and reports it to crowd
members. A new user establishes an account with the blender, i.e, an account name and
password. If the user starts a jondo, the jondo registers itself at the blender by means of
the account name and password. The blender adds the new jondo (i.e., its IP address, port
number, and account name) to its member list and reports the list back to the new jondo
as well as informs each other jondo of the new jondo. Additionally, the blender generates a
key for each other jondo and reports these keys to the new jondo. These keys are encrypted
under the account password of the new jondo. Moreover, each of these keys is reported to the
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associated jondo and encrypted under the account password of that jondo. Thus, the new
jondo shares an encryption key with each other jondo.
J1
J3
J6
J4
J5J2
W3
W1
W2
W5
W6
W4
J1 à J5 àW1
J2 à J6 à J2à W2
J3 à J1 à J6à W3
J4 à J4 àW4
J5 à J4 à J6à W5
J6 à J3 àW6
Crowd Web servers
A possible set of paths
Figure 2.12: Paths in a crowd [RR98].
2.4.4.2 Transferring web requests/replies
A crowd user selects the jondo running on the user’s computer as its web proxy. Thus,
requests coming from the user’s browser are forwarded to the jondo. For the first request to a
given web server, the jondo randomly picks a jondo in the crowd, caches the selected jondo as
its successor, and forwards the request to the selected jondo. Here, it is also possible that the
initiator jondo selects itself. When receiving a request, a jondo either forwards the request to
another jondo selected at random, or it submits the request to the web server. The probability
for forwarding the request to a further jondo is more than fifty percent. If the jondo decides
to forward the request, it caches the jondo from which the request came as its predecessor,
and the jondo to which the request will be forwarded as its successor. Subsequent requests
from the initiator jondo to the web server take the same path, and server replies travel back
the path in reverse. A possible set of such paths is shown in Figure 2.12.
2.4.5 Tarzan
Tarzan [FM02] is a peer-to-peer network aiming to anonymise IP packets. Peers discover each
other decentrally and relay packets for each other. Packets are forwarded through pre-built
tunnels and encrypted layer-wise with the symmetric keys of peers belonging to the tunnels.
Each peer selects a certain number of peers (mimics) with which the peer exchanges dummy
traffic (mimic traffic).
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2.4.5.1 Peer discovery
In the Tarzan network, a new peer discovers other peers by means of a gossip-based algo-
rithm [HBLL99]. Here, the new peer randomly selects a peer from a set of bootstrap peers.
After that, the new peer learns the neighbour peers (their IP addresses, port numbers, and
public keys) of the bootstrap peer and reports itself to these peers. The new peer then selects
another peer from the new set of known peers at random and repeats the process analogously.
After discovering the network, the new peer validates peers which correctly respond to a dis-
covery request including a random nonce.
/16
/32
/32
/32
/32/32
!"#
Figure 2.13: Tarzan’s three-level hierarchy ring table and mimic selection [FM02].
The new peer maps IP addresses of validated peers into a three-level hierarchy ring table
(see Figure 2.13). Here, the ring at the first level keeps hash values of all known /16 domain
addresses. Each ring at the second level holds hash values of /24 subnet addresses belonging
to one of the 16-bit address spaces from the ring at the first level. Consequently, rings at
the third level maintain hash values of peer addresses belonging to each /24 subnet from the
second level. For hashing, the current date and the leading d-bits of an address are taken as
parameters: idd := hash(addr/d, date), where d ∈ {16, 24, 32}.
The new peer n selects k peers1 (mimics) with which the peer exchanges dummy traffic
1The value k is a global parameter.
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(mimic traffic). Each mimic is selected in three rounds (see Figure 2.13). For selecting the
ith mimic Mni , the peer recursively applies the hash function i times to (n.addr/16, date):
idi16 := hash
i(n.addr/16, date). The peer takes the smallest identifier in the ring at the
first level, which is bigger than, or equal to, the calculated hash value: lookup(idi16) :=
min{id | id ≥ idi16}. In the second round, the peer computes the hash value idi24 and per-
forms lookup(idi24) in the ring at the second level, which is referenced by lookup(id
i
16). In
the last round, the peer analogously performs lookup(idi32) in the associated ring at the third
level. Thus, Mni is the peer whose hash value is equal to lookup(id
i
32) from the third level.
In this way, mimics are selected from different domains in order to ensure that they can not
be under the control of a single adversary 2.
2.4.5.2 Tunnel setup
To select peers for a tunnel of length l, the initiator peer p randomly chooses a mimic Mpi
from its mimic set {Mp1 ...Mpk}. After that, p randomly selects a mimic M
Mpi
j from M
p
i ’s mimic
set {MM
p
i
1 ...M
Mpi
k }. This process is repeated for l peers.
After selecting the peers {p1, ..., pl}, the initiator peer sends an establishment request to
each peer pi. The request contains the forward and backward symmetric keys (fkpi , bkpi),
the IP addresses of the predecessor and successor peers (pi−1, pi+1), and the pairwise flow
identifiers to tag data packets to the forward and backward flows. Moreover, the request is
encrypted with the public key of the peer pi and relayed as a normal data packet from p1
through pi−1.
2.4.5.3 Packet relaying
Once the tunnel is established, the initiator peer can begin with the transfer of IP data packets
from an application. To send a packet, the initiator peer first rewrites the real source address
of the packet with a random address and creates the onion Efkp1 (...Efkpl (packet)...) tagged
to the forward flow. After that, the peer encapsulates the onion and its tag in a UDP [Pos80]
packet and sends it to p1. Upon receiving the UDP packet, each peer pi decrypts the outer
layer of the onion with its symmetric key fkpi , retags the remaining onion, encapsulates the
result in a new UDP packet, and sends the packet to the successor peer. Eventually, the
packet arrives at the last peer that decrypts the last layer of the onion and gets the IP packet
of the initiator peer. Finally, the last peer on the circuit writes its IP address into the source
address field of initiator’s IP packet and sends it to the destination endpoint. The reply
packets take the same tunnel path in reverse, and each peer puts its encryption layer using
its backward symmetric key. Thus, the initiator peer gets the onion Ebkp1 (...Ebkpl (packet)...).
2Tarzan assumes that peers being under the control of an adversary are located in the same IP prefix space.
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2.4.6 Analysis
Although ESP does not aim to provide any anonymity property explicitly, ESP provides a re-
stricted sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability within the public network with regard
to the ultimate source and destination addresses of packets. However, adversaries within the
private networks can link packets to their ultimate source and destination endpoints and know
who communicates with whom on the basis of their addresses. In addition, the anonymity
properties do not apply to security gateways. Thus, any adversary within the public network
can link traffic to the security gateways and detect which security gateways communicate
with each other.
Network packets carrying Tor cells from/to an initiator endpoint have its address in cleartext.
Thus, the entry OR has access to the network address of the source endpoint in cleartext. The
same with regard to the network address of the destination endpoint applies to the exit OR.
However, no single OR alone has access to the cleartext network addresses of the source and
destination endpoints simultaneously. Nonetheless, this is possible for a global adversary hav-
ing the ability to sniff the incoming/outgoing network packets to/from the entry/exit OR. But
the adversary has to correlate these network packets with each other, which is also possible
by means of traffic analysis techniques stated in [DC07]. Thus, sender/recipient unlinkability
is not provided by Tor. In contrast to that, Tor aims to supply relationship unlinkability
anyway. Moreover, Tor also prevents traffic analysis attacks being based on packet size by
means of cells of a fixed size. However, a global adversary can link traffic to communicating
endpoint pairs by means of timing analysis attacks [LRWW04].
Recipient unlinkability is not the case in the Crowds system, since each jondo on a path
knows which web server is requested. Although the second jondo on the path has access
to the cleartext address of the initiator jondo, it does not know with certainty whether the
request comes from the initiator jondo or from a jondo that just forwards the request. How-
ever, the actual initiator jondo of a request can be disclosed by means of predecessor attacks
presented in [WALS04]. Thus, sender unlinkability is also not provided. Due to the ability
to link requests to clients and servers, their relationships are also linkable.
The last peer on a path in Tarzan has access to the cleartext address of the destination
endpoint. The same applies to the traffic between the initiator peer and the first peer on the
circuit. However, it cannot be stated with certainty from which peer the packets originate.
Moreover, the real data traffic is masked by means of mimic traffic. Nonetheless, an adversary
controlling the first and last peer on the path can disclose the actual initiator peer by means
of the intersection attack [WALS02]. Thus, sender/recipient unlinkability is not provided by
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Tarzan. Furthermore, an adversary, which controls the first and last peer on the path and
performs the intersection attack, is able to link packets to their senders and recipients. Hence,
relationship unlinkability is also not supplied by Tarzan.
In the next chapter, we present a basic design for Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF) on the
basis of a basic addressing structure. The basic BPF design demonstrates the feasibility
to provide end-to-end network address confidentiality which deduces sender/recipient and
relationship unlinkabilities.
Chapter 3
A basic design for BPF
Address-based packet forwarding is the fundamental in-network service present in all connec-
tionless packet-based network architectures except the content-based networks. Basically, for
an incoming packet, a network node has the task to forward the packet to one of its neighbour
nodes based on the destination address of the packet and the metric used in that network.
For selection of the most fitting neighbour node, a network node maintains a routing table
which is set up and updated by means of a routing algorithm. In a local network, the des-
tination address of the packet is resolved to a MAC address, and the packet is forwarded to
the MAC address of the destination endpoint. Thus, the packet forwarding in its basic form
is associated with two in-network services, namely routing and address resolution.
To realise the packet forwarding, a packet has to be addressed in a way that the source
and destination endpoint of the packet can be uniquely identified on the network level. In
addition, unrestricted access to the network addresses in the packet has to be provided to
the network nodes in order to forward the packet in the correct direction. Thus, the network
nodes inevitably become authorised entities accessing packet addresses for establishment of
the packet forwarding service. Consequently, the network nodes taking part in the transfer
have the possibility to identify which endpoints communicate with each other. Moreover,
even third parties, e.g., eavesdroppers on the network nodes, can sniff the packet addresses
in order to disclose the communicating endpoints.
We tackle this problem by defining a confidentiality for the network addresses of the packets
transferred between two communicating endpoints, where only both endpoints are the autho-
rised entities to access the packet addresses in cleartext. We call this information security
property end-to-end network address confidentiality, or shortly, network address confidential-
ity (NAC) classifying also network nodes as adversary. Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF) is a
clean-slate security approach aiming to simultaneously establish the packet forwarding service
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and to provide NAC.
This chapter presents a basic BPF construction that redesigns the packet forwarding and its
associated services to blind ones which can still correctly process masked network addresses
being based on a basic structure. For encryption of the network addresses, we leverage PEKS
which is regarded as semantic-secure as we discussed in Section 2.1. Section 3.2 discusses
BPF’s security benefits and the effects of applying BPF in the current Internet architecture.
Since our approach is a clean-slate design, the prototype implementation of the basic BPF
design and its deployment in a real hardware testbed are presented in Section 3.3 and 3.4 in
detail. Finally, we evaluate the implementation in Section 3.5.
3.1 Construction
In the current Internet architecture, a network node (router) connects multiple networks with
each other by means of its interfaces. Each interface of the router has its own ID (IP address)
and provides access to a network. Thus, the networks N1, N2, N3, and N4 in Figure 3.1a are
interconnected with each other by means of the interfaces of a node. In contrast to that, in
order to simplify the construction, a network node in our design has only one ID, and each
interface of the node only has a MAC address. In this regard, the interconnected interfaces of
two neighbour nodes represent the end-points of a point-to-point link (see Figure 3.1b). Thus,
a node is responsible only for one local network which is represented by the ID of the node.
In this way, at least two network nodes are needed in order to connect two local networks.
Hence, we need two nodes in order to interconnect the local networks N1 and N2 with each
other, as illustrated in Figure 3.1b.
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(a) In the current Internet architecture.
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(b) In the basic BPF design.
Figure 3.1: Network nodes.
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We define a basic address structure which can be extended to more complex address struc-
tures, such as the address structure in IP, in a straightforward way. In our design, an endpoint
address in cleartext is canonically represented in dotted decimal notation, which consists of
two decimal numbers. The address for the endpoint X is then
AddrX : NX .HX . (3.1)
Here, the first decimal number NX is the ID of the network node responsible for the local
network to which the endpoint is connected, and the second decimal number HX is the ID
of the endpoint. Thus, the address fields in a packet from the source endpoint S in the local
network NS to the destination endpoint D in the local network ND consist of AddrD | AddrS
(see Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.2: A basic address structure.
For the construction, it is assumed that all network nodes and endpoints have already gen-
erated a key pair by using PEKS and that the public keys of source and destination network
nodes and endpoints have already been exchanged and bound to network nodes and endpoints,
and furthermore, the communicating endpoints have already found the network addresses of
each other.
3.1.1 Address masking
In our design, the cleartext address of an endpoint consists of a network and host part (see
equation 3.1). For masking the address, these two parts are separately encrypted using PEKS.
Thus, the masked address of the endpoint X in the local network NX is
mAddrX : E(NX).E(HX), where (3.2)
• E(NX) = PEKS(NXpub , NX) is the ciphertext for the ID of the network node, which
is generated with its public key NXpub .
• E(HX) = PEKS(HXpub , HX) is the ciphertext for the ID of the endpoint, which is
generated with its public key HXpub .
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The masked address fields in a packet from the source endpoint S in the local network NS to
the destination endpoint D in the local network ND consist of
mAddrD | mAddrS | C(AddrS). (3.3)
Here, mAddrD and mAddrS are the masked addresses of the destination and source endpoint,
which are generated according to equation 3.2. Moreover, C(AddrS) is the ciphertext gener-
ated by conventionally encrypting (e.g., with RSA) the source address with the corresponding
public key of D (see Figure 3.3).
S D
𝐸(𝑁$) 𝐸(𝑁&)
𝐸(𝐻$) 𝐸(𝐻&)𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟$ :𝐸(𝑁$). 𝐸(𝐻$) 𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟&: 𝐸(𝑁&). 𝐸(𝐻&)𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟&𝑚𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟$𝐶(𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑟$)
Figure 3.3: Address masking and the structure of a masked packet.
For packet generation, the source endpoint separately encrypts the network and host part
of the destination address with the public key of the destination network node and desti-
nation endpoint using PEKS. In the same way, the source endpoint encrypts the parts of
its own address with its own public key HSpub , and with the public key NSpub of the node
responsible for its own local network. This address field (mAddrS) is needed in case that
the packet cannot be forwarded to the destination. Hence, a corresponding ”unreachable”
message can be sent back to the source endpoint by using (mAddrS) as its destination address.
By applying a public key scheme like RSA, the source endpoint address is conventionally
encrypted and transferred in the third address field. This is required since the PEKS con-
struction used for our design does not allow to decrypt ciphertexts. Thus, the destination
endpoint decrypts C(AddrS) and gets the source address of the incoming packet in cleartext.
To send a packet back to the source endpoint, the destination endpoint can however leverage
the address field (mAddrS) as the destination address of the packet. The sender and receiver
endpoint can cache the encrypted addresses so that they do not have to encrypt the addresses
for each packet.
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3.1.2 Link layer discovery
In the basic BPF design, each network node maintains a table of links to its neighbour nodes,
which is a simplified version of a LLDP neighbour table [LLD09]. At the network node N ,
the table entry for the link to the neighbour node Ni is
[LP,MACLP ,MACRP ], where
• LP denotes N ’s port number through which it is connected to Ni’s port with the
number RP .
• MACLP is the MAC address of N ’s port LP .
• MACRP is the MAC address of Ni’s port RP .
For the cold start, each network node broadcasts a link setup request message via all its ports
(see Figure 3.4). Each of these messages contains the MAC address of the port via which the
request is sent. Each neighbour network node creates a new entry for an incoming request
message. This entry contains the MAC address from the message, the MAC address and
the number of the local port via which the message is received. After that, each neighbour
network node sends a reply message to the MAC address from the request message. The reply
message contains the MAC address of the local port via which the request message is received.
For each received reply message, the requesting node creates a new table entry accordingly.
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Figure 3.4: Link layer discovery.
After a link is set up, by means of keep-alive requests, the link is periodically checked whether
it is still valid. If a node does not receive a keep-alive response from one of its neighbour
nodes, the link to this neighbour node is declared as void.
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3.1.3 Masked routing
To enable a network node to correctly forward a masked packet, its routing table has to
be restructured accordingly. In our design, a Masked Routing Table Entry (mRTE) for the
network node N is
mRTEN : [(E(N), T (N)), PN , DN ], where
• E(N) = PEKS(Npub, N) is N ’s encrypted ID generated with its public key Npub.
• T (N) = Trapdoor(Npriv, N) is N ’s trapdoor value generated with its private key Npriv.
• PN is the number of the port via which the network node N can be reached.
• DN is the distance to the network node N .
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Figure 3.5: Masked routing table setup.
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For a masked routing table setup, we redesign the Distance Vector Routing algorithm [BG87]
to be able to work in a blind manner. For the cold start, a network node encrypts its own
ID with its public key and generates the trapdoor value for its own ID with its private key
by using PEKS. Moreover, the network node inserts these two values as well as the port
number and the value 0 as the distance to its local network into the first routing table entry
(see Figure 3.5). After that, each network node broadcasts a masked routing update message
consisting of its masked routing table except the port numbers in the entries. Thus, a Masked
Routing Update Entry (mRUE) for the masked routing table entry i, which keeps the masked
routing information for the network node Ni, contains Ni’s encrypted ID, trapdoor value and
the distance to Ni:
mRUENi : [E(Ni), T (Ni), DNi ].
A network node maintaining a masked routing table with the size of n, broadcasts the masked
routing update message
masked routing update{mRUEN1 , ...,mRUENn}
to all its neighbour nodes. For an incoming update message, each network node performs
Test(E(Nj), T (Ni))
for each masked routing table entry j, and for each masked routing update entry i.
 If the Test method returns 1 for the entry j, i.e. the entry contains the masked routing
information for the network node Nj , the network node receiving the update message
compares the distances in the routing table entry and in the routing update entry with
each other.
 If DNj > (DNi + 1), i.e. the new route announced in the update message is
shorter1, the routing table entry is updated with the new encrypted ID E(Ni), the
distance (DNi + 1), and the number of the port via which the update message is
received.
 Otherwise, only the masked ID in the routing table entry is updated with the
masked ID in the routing update entry in order to update the byte value of the
ciphertext for node’s ID.
 If the Test method returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry exists for the node Ni so far,
a new entry is created with (E(Ni), T (Ni)), (DNi + 1), and the number of the port via
which the network node has received the update message.
1Hop count
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If the masked routing table of the network node receiving the update message is changed
in this way, the network node generates a masked routing update message for its updated
routing table, and it broadcast the update message to all its neighbour nodes.
If a network node detects the failure of a link to the neighbour node NX , the node broadcasts
a delete message in Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RLH06] and Routing Information Pro-
tocol (RIP) [Hed88]. The delete message in the masked routing contains the trapdoor value
in the entry that maintains the masked routing information for the failed neighbour
mRTE delete{T (NX)}
to all of its other neighbours, and the node removes the masked routing table entry for the
neighbour node. For an incoming delete message, each network node performs
Test(E(Ni), T (NX))
for each entry i. If the Test method returns 1 for an entry, i.e. an entry exists for the node
NX , the entry is removed from the table and the delete message is broadcasted to all of
the neighbours except the neighbour from which the delete message has arrived. If the Test
method returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry exists for the node NX , the delete message is
dropped.
3.1.4 Masked address resolution
When a packet arrives at a local network node, or if both communicating endpoints are
connected to the same local network, the masked destination address of the packet is resolved
to the MAC address of the destination endpoint and the packet is forwarded to this MAC
address. In this section, we present how masked network addresses can be resolved to MAC
addresses. The address resolution cache table is redesigned so that an entry for the host X
with the cleartext address AddrX = NX .HX consists of
[(mAddrX , T (HX)),MACX ], where
• mAddrX = E(NX).E(HX) is X’s masked address generated according to equation 3.2.
• T (HX) = Trapdoor(HXpriv , HX) is X’s trapdoor value which is generated with its
private key HXpriv .
• MACX is the MAC address of the host X in cleartext.
In case of an empty neighbour cache, the host D aiming to resolve the masked network
address mAddrX to a MAC address broadcasts a request message (see Figure 3.6). This
message consists of the masked network address which has to be resolved as well as the
masked network address, trapdoor value, and MAC address of the requesting host:
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Figure 3.6: Masked address resolution.
addr res req{mAddrX , (mAddrD, T (HD)),MACD}.
For the incoming request message, each host Xj in the local network performs
Test(E(HX), T (HXj )).
The Test method returns 1 only at the host X, since it is the only host that can gener-
ate T (HX). While the other hosts drop the request message, the host X performs
Test(E(HD), T (Hi))
for each cache entry i in order to determine whether it already keeps a cache entry for the
host D.
 If the Test method returns 1 for an entry, i.e. an entry already exists for the host D,
the entry is updated with mAddrD and MACD.
 If the Test method returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry exists for the host D so far, a
new entry is created with the values from the request message.
Then the host X sends a reply message containing its own trapdoor value, and MAC address
addr res reply{T (HX),MACX}
to the host D. After receiving the reply message, D creates a new entry in its table.
In case that some entries in the neighbour cache already exist, the resolution of X’s masked
address mAddrX = E(NX).E(HX) occurs by performing
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Figure 3.7: Masked packet delivery.
Test(E(HX), T (Hi))
for each cache table entry i. The masked address is then resolved to the MAC address at
the entry for which the Test method returns 1. Performing a binary comparison of a masked
address with the masked addresses in the cache table before executing the Test method can
speed up the masked address resolution. If no entry can be found in this way, the masked
address is resolved as described above.
3.1.5 Masked packet delivery
The endpoint S in the local network NS wants to send a packet to the endpoint D in the
local network ND (see Figure 3.7). We assume that all masked address resolution and routing
tables are already set up. The source endpoint creates the packet with the masked addresses
according to equation 3.2. Thus, the source endpoint gets the packet
< mAddrD | mAddrS | C(AddrS) >, and mAddrD = E(ND).E(HD).
 If NS = ND, i.e. the source and destination endpoint are connected to the same
local network, the masked destination address is resolved to the MAC address of the
destination endpoint and the packet is sent to this MAC address (see Section 3.1.4).
 Otherwise, the source endpoint resolves the masked ID of the network node NS to its
MAC address and sends the packet to the network node.
For the incoming masked packet, a network node performs
Test(E(ND), T (Ni))
for each masked routing table entry i.
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 If the Test method returns 1 for an entry, the source MAC address of the packet is
updated with the MAC address of the port mapped in that routing table entry, while
the destination MAC address of the packet is replaced with the MAC address mapped
in the neighbour table entry for that port. After that, the packet is forwarded via this
port.
 If the Test method returns 0 for all entries, it means that no masked routing table
entry for the destination network node exists. In this case, the packet is dropped, and a
corresponding ”unreachable” message can be sent back to the source endpoint by using
the second address field (mAddrS) as its destination address.
Eventually, the packet arrives at the network node responsible for the local network ND. It
also performs the Test method, and detects that the packet is addressed to its own local
network. Thus, the node resolves the masked destination address to the MAC address of the
destination endpoint D and sends the packet to it.
3.2 Analysis
Information confidentiality is one of the most important security properties in communication.
The goal here is to disclose information only to authorised entities. Ideally, only communicat-
ing endpoints have access to information transferred between them. However, a in-network
service could also require access to that information in order to accomplish its task. Thus,
either the in-network service has inevitably to be classified as an authorised process having
access to the information in cleartext, or the communicating endpoints cannot use the in-
network service anymore. Network packet addresses are the basic information transferred
between two communicating endpoints, and the packet forwarding service is the fundamental
in-network service needed by the endpoints.
Beside third parties, e.g., potential attackers sniffing network packets, network address confi-
dentiality (NAC) also classifies network nodes forwarding packets between two communicating
endpoints as adversary. Thus, only the source and destination endpoints are the authorised
entities having access to the network packet addresses in cleartext. Here, we want to point
out that communicating endpoints do not consider each other as adversary. NAC includes
end-to-end transmission confidentiality and end-to-end processing confidentiality for the net-
work addresses of packets transferred between two communicating endpoints. While end-to-
end transmission confidentiality masks network packet addresses from third parties during
transmission, end-to-end processing confidentiality masks the addresses from network nodes
processing packets transferred between two communicating endpoints.
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Confidentiality of information, which can be used to identify a subject, can deduce a cer-
tain degree of subject anonymity against adversaries. In Section 2.4.1, we have discussed
the anonymity properties defined by [PH05]. In the context of this thesis, subjects are com-
municating endpoints, the items of interest are network packets transferred between them,
identities are their network addresses in the packets, and adversaries are third parties and net-
work nodes taking part in the packet transfer. Thus, NAC deduces the following anonymity
properties:
• Sender/recipient unlinkability: Network packets (traffic) captured by an adversary
cannot be linked to their source/destination endpoint on the basis of their network
addresses.
• Relationship unlinkability: An adversary cannot link network packets (traffic) to
the communicating endpoint pairs on the basis of their network addresses so that it is
masked who communicates with whom. This can be also called traffic flow confidential-
ity masking the source-destination traffic pattern.
As stated in [PH05], sender or recipient unlinkability implies relationship unlinkability. This
means that an anonymity system providing sender or recipient unlinkability also supplies re-
lationship unlinkability.
We want to emphasize that NAC aims to mask only network packet addresses from ad-
versaries. Thus, NAC does not consider other traffic patterns such as packet quantities, sizes
and interarrival times. By means of these traffic patterns, an adversary can perform traffic
analysis attacks [DC07] in order to correlate network packets with each other. In this way,
the adversary can detect a traffic flow. However, the adversary still needs network packet ad-
dresses in cleartext in order to assign the traffic flow to its source and destination endpoints.
Thus, network packet addresses are still most crucial traffic patterns.
It is also to be pointed out that we do not consider end-to-end user information confidential-
ity. In order to achieve this property too, user payloads have to be conventionally encrypted
end-to-end as is the case in TLS.
3.2.1 Network address confidentiality in related works
Before analysing NAC and the deduced anonymity properties in BPF, we first discuss NAC
in related approaches with regard to our security model defining all entities except the source
and destination endpoints of network packets as adversary. To the best of our knowledge, IP
encapsulating security payload protocol in tunnel mode [Ken05] is the only approach aiming
to achieve NAC primarily.
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Since NAC deduces the anonymity properties discussed above, we also discuss approaches aim-
ing to achieve these properties. Anonymity systems can be classified in high- and low-latency
anonymity systems as is the case in [EY09]. High-latency anonymity systems (e.g., [Cha81],
[SDS02], and [Dan03]) are designed to be applied for non-interactive applications tolerating
delays of several hours or more, such as email. Since BPF aims to support transparency to
applications, high-latency anonymity systems fall out of scope of our discussion. In [RW10],
Ren et al. divide low-latency anonymity systems into the following categories: Mixnet-based
schemes, routing-based techniques, peer-to-peer networks. Thus, we discuss the anonymity
properties of pioneer approaches from each category. These approaches are already sketched
in Section 2.4 in more detail.
3.2.1.1 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol in tunnel mode
ESP protocol in tunnel mode [Ken05], shortly ESP, encrypts an IP packet including its IP
header, and puts the encrypted packet in a new IP packet with a new IP header containing
the IP addresses of IPsec peers (security gateways) connecting the private networks with the
public network. Thus, the original packet with its ultimate source and destination addresses
are transferred between the security gateways in encrypted form. ESP classifies the private
networks including the security gateways as trusted and the public network as untrusted.
Hence, security gateways and network nodes within the private networks are authorised en-
tities having access to the ultimate source and destination addresses of the original packet
in cleartext. In contrast to that, BPF classifies no entity except the source and destination
endpoints as authorised thus trusted.
ESP provides NAC for the ultimate source and destination addresses of the original pac-
ket within the public network, but not within the private networks, and security gateways
still have access to the addresses in cleartext. Thus, ESP provides a restricted form of NAC
for the ultimate source and destination addresses. Moreover, the addresses of the security
gateways in the outer header are transferred in cleartext so that NAC is not supplied for these
addresses.
Although ESP does not aim to provide any anonymity property explicitly, the restricted
NAC in ESP deduces sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability within the public net-
work with regard to the ultimate source and destination addresses of packets. However,
adversaries within the private networks can link packets to their ultimate source and destina-
tion endpoints and knows who communicates with whom on the basis of their addresses. In
addition, the anonymity properties do not apply to security gateways. Thus, any adversary
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within the public network can link traffic to the security gateways and detect which security
gateways communicate with each other.
By means of packet padding, ESP protects network packets transferred between security
gateways also against traffic analysis attacks being based on correlation of packets with re-
gard to their sizes. In [KTB+07], Kiraly et al. have presented an ESP extension masking
further traffic patterns such as packet quantities and interarrival times.
3.2.1.2 Tor
Tor [DMS04] is a mixnet-based overlay network aiming to anonymise TCP connections. Onion
routers (ORs) in the network maintain TLS connections to each other. Tor users run onion
proxies (OPs) communicating with ORs using TLS connections. The OP of an user aiming
to communicate anonymously selects an ordered set of usually three ORs (OR1, OR2, OR3).
After that, the OP negotiates a symmetric key with OR1 (entry OR), and thus builds a
circuit. Each newly created circuit is used to iteratively extend the circuit to the next OR
until reaching the last OR (exit OR). Thus, the OP shares a symmetric key with each OR
(OR1SK , OR2SK , OR3SK), and each OR on the circuit learns its predecessor OR/OP (IP
address) and successor OR (IP address), which are mapped to circuit IDs that are randomly
selected hop-wise.
To send a TCP payload to given destination address and port, the OP packs them as the
payload of a Tor frame (cell) and encrypts the payload layer-wise with each shared key. Thus,
the OP gets the onion EOR1SK (EOR2SK (EOR3SK (payload))). The header of the cell contains
the ID of the circuit to be used. The cell is then sent through the circuit. Each OR receiving
the cell decrypts the outer layer of the onion with its symmetric key mapped to the circuit
ID of the incoming cell, updates the circuit ID for the next hop and sends the cell containing
the remaining onion as payload to the successor OR mapped to the new circuit ID. Thus,
OR3 gets the cell payload containing the TCP payload that is sent to the specified destination
address. Thus, the destination endpoint considers OR3 as the source endpoint of the payload.
To reply to the actual source endpoint, the destination endpoint sends the reply TCP pay-
load to OR3 that packs the TCP payload and its source address and port as cell payload
and encrypts the cell payload with its key. After that, OR3 sends the cell to its predecessor
OR. Each OR on the circuit puts its own encryption layer to the onion and the OP gets the
onion EOR1SK (EOR2SK (EOR3SK (payload))). Finally, the OP decrypts the onion layers with
the shared keys to get the TCP payload.
3.2. ANALYSIS 43
Network packets carrying Tor cells from/to the source endpoint have its address in clear-
text. Thus, network nodes forwarding the network packets between the source endpoint and
the entry OR and the entry OR itself are authorised entities having access to the network ad-
dress of the source endpoint in cleartext. The same with regard to the network address of the
destination endpoint applies to the exit OR and network nodes transferring network packets
between the destination endpoint and the exit OR. However, no single network node and OR
alone have access to the cleartext network addresses of the source and destination endpoints
simultaneously. Nonetheless, this is possible for a global adversary having the ability to sniff
the incoming/outgoing network packets to/from the entry/exit OR. But the adversary has
to correlate these network packets with each other, which is also possible by means of traffic
analysis techniques stated in [DC07]. Hence, NAC is not provided by Tor.
Since adversaries have access to the cleartext network addresses of the source and desti-
nation endpoints, they can link network packets (traffic) to the source/destination endpoint
on the basis of their network addresses. Thus, sender/recipient unlinkability is not provided
by Tor. In contrast to that, Tor aims to supply relationship unlinkability anyway. Moreover,
Tor also prevents traffic analysis attacks being based on packet size by means of cells of a
fixed size. However, a global adversary can link traffics to communicating endpoint pairs by
means of timing analysis attacks [LRWW04].
Since the destination endpoint considers the exit OR as the source endpoint of the traf-
fic, the actual sender remains anonymous for the recipient. In addition, Tor supplies hidden
services masking the network addresses of servers accessible to clients requesting their services
through the Tor network. However, Øverlier et al. have presented an attack which can be
leveraged to disclose the true host of a hidden service [OS06].
3.2.1.3 Crowds
The Crowds system [RR98] is a routing-based technique for anonymous web browsing. A
crowd can be considered as a collection of endpoints running special web proxies called jon-
dos. When a jondo is started, the jondo registers itself at a server called blender. The new
jondo gets the membership of the crowd and is reported to other jondos. Moreover, the new
jondo shares an encryption key with each other jondo, and the connection between each two
jondos is encrypted.
To send a request to a given web server, the jondo randomly picks a jondo in the crowd,
caches the selected jondo as its successor, and forwards the request to the selected jondo.
Here, it is also possible that the initiator jondo selects itself. When receiving a request, a
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jondo either forwards the request to another jondo selected at random, or it submits the re-
quest to the web server. The probability for forwarding the request to a further jondo is more
than fifty percent. If the jondo decides to forward the request, it caches the jondo from which
the request came as its predecessor, and the jondo to which the request will be forwarded as
its successor. Subsequent requests from the initiator jondo to the web server take the same
path, and server replies travel back the path in reverse.
Each jondo on the path, third parties sniffing the traffic between the last jondo and the
web server, and network nodes transferring the packets between the last jondo and the web
server have access to the web server’s address in cleartext. Although third parties and net-
work nodes between the initiator jondo and the second jondo and the second jondo itself have
access to the cleartext address of the initiator jondo, they do not know with certainty whether
the request comes from the initiator jondo or from a jondo that just forwards the request.
However, the actual initiator jondo of a request can be disclosed by means of predecessor
attacks presented in [WALS04]. In summary, it can be stated that the Crowds system does
not provide NAC.
Since each jondo on the path knows which web server is requested, recipient unlinkability
is not the case in the Crowds system. Because of the vulnerability to predecessor attacks,
web requests can be linked to actual initiator jondos so that sender unlinkability is also not
provided. Due to the ability to link requests to clients and servers, their relationships are
thus linkable too.
3.2.1.4 Tarzan
Tarzan [FM02] is a peer-to-peer network aiming to anonymise IP packets. In the Tarzan
network, peers relay IP data packets for each other. To discover the network peers and to
get their public keys, a new peer selects a peer from a set of bootstrap peers at random and
learns the neighbour peers of that peer. The new peer then selects another peer from the
new set of known peers at random and repeats the process analogously. After discovering
the network, the new peer selects a certain number of peers (mimics) with which the peer
exchanges dummy traffic (mimic traffic).
To build up an anonymous tunnel for data packet transfer, the initiator peer randomly selects
an ordered series of peers {p1, ..., pn} from its mimic set. The initiator peer then sends an
establishment request to each peer pi. The request contains the forward and backward sym-
metric keys (fkpi , bkpi), the IP addresses of the predecessor and successor peers (pi−1, pi+1),
and the pairwise flow identifiers to tag data packets to the forward and backward flows. More-
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over, the request is encrypted with the public key of the peer pi and relayed as a normal data
packet from p1 through pi−1.
Once the tunnel is established, the initiator peer can begin with the transfer of IP data
packets from an application. To send a packet, the initiator peer first rewrites the real source
address of the packet with a random address and creates the onion Efkp1 (...Efkpn (packet)...)
tagged to the forward flow. After that, the peer encapsulates the onion and its tag in a UDP
packet and sends it to p1. Upon receiving the UDP packet, each peer pi decrypts the outer
layer of the onion with its symmetric key fkpi , retags the remaining onion, encapsulates the
result in a new UDP packet, and sends the packet to the successor peer. Eventually, the
packet arrives at the last peer that decrypts the last layer of the onion and gets the IP packet
of the initiator peer. Finally, the last peer on the circuit writes its IP address into the source
address field of initiator’s IP packet and sends it to the destination endpoint. The reply
packets take the same tunnel path in reverse, and each peer puts its encryption layer using
its backward symmetric key. Thus, the initiator peer gets the onion Ebkp1 (...Ebkpn (packet)...).
The last peer on the path, eavesdroppers between the last peer and the destination end-
point, and network nodes transferring the packets between them have access to the cleartext
address of the destination endpoint. The same applies to the traffic between the initiator
peer and the first peer on the circuit. However, adversaries cannot state with certainty from
which peer the packets originate. Moreover, the real data traffic is masked by means of mimic
traffic. Nonetheless, an adversary controlling the first and last peer on the path can disclose
the actual initiator peer by means of the intersection attack [WALS02]. Thus, the adversary
has access to the cleartext addresses of the destination endpoint and the initiator peer simul-
taneously. Hence, Tarzan does not supply NAC.
Since the last peer on the circuit knows which endpoint is the destination, it can readily
link packets to their destinations. Moreover, the intersection attack makes it possible to link
packets to their senders. Thus, sender/recipient unlinkability is not provided by Tarzan. Fur-
thermore, an adversary, which controls the first and last peer on the path and performs the
intersection attack, is able to link packets to their senders and recipients. Hence, relationship
unlinkability is also not supplied by Tarzan.
3.2.2 Network address confidentiality in BPF
BPF is a clean-slate approach aiming to provide NAC. In Section 3.1, we have presented
a basic BPF construction that redesigns the packet forwarding service and related services
to blind ones which can still correctly process masked network addresses being based on a
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basic structure. For encryption of the network addresses, we have leveraged PEKS which is
regarded as semantic-secure as discussed in Section 2.1. Moreover, the encryption function
of PEKS is not deterministic. This means that the function outputs different ciphertexts
(masked network addresses) for each encryption of the same cleartext (network address) with
the same public key.
In contrast to the approaches discussed above, network packet addresses in our design are
transferred as well as processed end-to-end in encrypted form. Although the addresses of the
packets are encrypted end-to-end, the packets can be still forwarded in the right direction so
that network nodes do not have to become entities authorised to access the packet addresses
in cleartext, anymore. Thus, no entity except the source and destination endpoints, i.e. no
adversary has access to the cleartext network addresses of the packets transferred between
both endpoints. Hence, BPF makes it possible to simultaneously establish the packet forward-
ing service and to provide NAC. Moreover, network node IDs in routing update messages are
also handled in encrypted form. In this regard, NAC in BPF also applies to network nodes
and their IDs.
In the low-latency anonymity systems discussed above, system participants relay packets
through a pre-built path to hide the identities (network addresses) of actual source end-
points. In [WALS02], Wright et al. have presented a general model of attacks to which these
systems are vulnerable. This model is based on the fact that each node on the path knows the
addresses of its predecessor and successor. Moreover, the entry and exit node of the path have
access to the addresses of the actual source and destination endpoints. By means of traffic
analysis being based on traffic patterns such as packet interarrival times, a global adversary
controlling the entry and exit node can correlate the incoming and outgoing packets with
each other. Thus, the adversary can detect a traffic flow and assign it to the addresses of the
source and destination endpoints. In this way, the adversary can disclose who communicates
with whom.
In contrast to that model, network nodes in BPF are not aware of the identities of each
other. Thus, network nodes do not know the previous and next hop of a packet. Moreover,
network nodes, even the source and destination network nodes, do not have access to packet
addresses in cleartext. Thus, even if a traffic flow is detected, it cannot be linked to its source
and destination endpoints on the basis of their network addresses. Furthermore, if packet ad-
dresses are re-encrypted at random, packets belonging to the same communicating endpoint
pair cannot be linked to the same traffic flow with certainty. Since BPF does not aim to mask
other traffic patterns such as packet quantities, sizes, and interarrival times, the packets can
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be correlated with each other using these patterns. However, the packets still differ in the
source-destination pattern at random. Thus, traffic flows cannot be distinguished from each
other with certainty.
A local adversary, i.e. a single network node or eavesdropper on that network node sees
packets containing encrypted addresses. Thus, the adversary does not know from which end-
point a packet originates and to which endpoint a packet is addressed. Hence, BPF provides
sender unlinkability and recipient unlinkability against a local adversary. Since one of these
properties implies relationship unlinkability, the adversary also cannot link a packet to a
communicating endpoint pair. Moreover, confidentiality of traffic flows is achieved, if packet
addresses are re-encrypted at random. These properties do not only apply to endpoints, but
also to local networks. This means that a packet cannot be linked to a local network as its
source or destination, and the relationship of communicating local networks is not linkable.
However, if a packet originates from an endpoint connected to the adversary network node,
the adversary knows the source local network of the packet. But the adversary still does not
know the source and destination endpoints of the packet and its destination local network.
The same with regard to the source local network applies to the packet, if the adversary is
the destination network node.
Sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability with regard to local networks do not apply
against a global adversary controlling the source and destination network node of a packet.
Thus, the adversary can link the packet to its source and destination local networks. In
this way, the adversary can restrict the set of endpoints to which the packet can possibly be
linked as its source and destination endpoints. But the packet is still not exactly linkable to
its actual source and destination endpoints on the basis of their network addresses. Thus,
BPF with regard to sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability is resistant to a global
adversary. Because of a restricted set of possible communicating endpoints, traffic analysis is
much easier for the adversary. Therefore, it is recommended to re-encrypt addresses for each
packet so that traffic flows between endpoints connected to the adversary network nodes still
remain undistinguishable from each other.
The byte values of the masked addresses of a packet do not change during the entire trans-
mission of the packet. Thus, a stronger global adversary, which controls all network nodes
participating in the transfer of a packet between two endpoints, can disclose the entire route
of the packet by means of a costly process. Here, the adversary monitors all ports of all nodes
and compares the masked addresses of all incoming and outgoing packets byte by byte with
each other. As the weak global adversary above, the strong global adversary knows from
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which local network a packet originates and to which local network a packet is addressed.
Thus, the strong adversary knows which local networks communicate with each other. But
the packet is still not linkable to its actual source/destination endpoint and to a communi-
cating endpoint pair. Hence, sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability is provided even
against the strong global adversary. As discussed above, to make traffic flows undistinguish-
able from each other, addresses are to be re-encrypted for each packet.
BPF makes it also possible that the network address of a source endpoint can remain anony-
mous for the destination endpoint just by omitting the third address field (C(AddrS)) in
equation 3.3. Thus, the destination endpoint receives a packet only with the masked address
fields mAddrD | mAddrS . Since the PEKS construction used for our design does not allow
to decrypt ciphertexts, i.e. the encryption is not invertible, the destination endpoint cannot
decrypt the masked source network address (mAddrS) in order to get it in cleartext. In this
case, to send a packet back to the source endpoint, the destination endpoint can set the value
in the second address field (mAddrS) as its destination address.
For a masked communication, a source endpoint needs a tuple consisting of public keys of the
destination endpoint and destination network node. Therefore, like other systems, which are
based on an asymmetric key encryption, our design requires an infrastructure to exchange
and certify public keys. For this, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in each network do-
main can be utilised so that each domain PKI manages the certificates of the network nodes
and endpoints in its own domain. In case of masked cross-domain communication, the root
Certification Authorities (CAs) of each domain can certify each other by using pairs of CA
cross-certificates.
As discussed above, BPF masks only the source/destination traffic pattern. Although packets
cannot thus be correlated with each other with certainty, other patterns of packets, such as
their sizes and interarrival times can possibly reveal information about applications running
at the communicating endpoints. To hide these patterns too, the basic BPF design can be
expanded by the packet padding/timing and traffic padding techniques [Tim96] in a straight-
forward way.
BPF does not aim to provide integrity of network packet addresses. Hence, any adversary
can unnoticeably manipulate masked packet addresses. E.g., an adversary can secretly redi-
rect packets to itself by replacing the masked packet addresses with its own masked address.
Moreover, BPF advances such an attack, since masked source address of a packet is not de-
cryptable. Thus, an endpoint receiving a masked packet cannot verify whether the packet
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actually originates from the endpoint whose address is conventionally encrypted and given
in the third address field of the packet (see equation 3.3). However, this can be resolved by
expanding the masked packet header by a integrity check value as in ESP. Nonetheless, the
adversary cannot target a specific endpoint or a certain communicating endpoint pair, since
packets cannot be linked to their source/destination endpoint and thus to a communicating
endpoint pair. The same with regard to masked routing information applies to routing update
messages. Thus, we can state that BPF, due to its traffic flow confidentiality, hides poten-
tial targets against active attacks such as address spoofing, man-in-the-middle and repetition
attack.
3.2.3 Applying BPF in the current Internet architecture
In the basic BPF design, a masked endpoint address consists of two parts. The first part
is the ciphertext of the network node ID, which has been encrypted with the public key of
the network node, and the second part is the ciphertext of the endpoint ID, which has been
encrypted with the public key of the endpoint.
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Figure 3.8: Masking of an IPv4 address according to the basic BPF design.
When this address structure is extended to a more complex one like IPv4 with conventional
address classes, the address parts of two communicating endpoints have to be encrypted byte
by byte according to the netmasks (i.e., without subnetting) used on the route between them
(see Figure 3.8). For that, we have to establish a signalling mechanism which can be used by
the communicating endpoints to get the required netmasks. Moreover, such a proceeding for
address masking leads to bandwidth problems, since only one address field in a masked packet
could require an enormous amount of packet sizes in this way (see Table 3.3). Furthermore,
the current flat structure of IPv4 addresses boosts this issue even more.
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In the basic BPF design, a source endpoint requires the public key of gateway nodes (i.e.,
nodes at the border of two neighbouring domains) on the route to the destination endpoint.
Thus, we have to design an infrastructure which exchanges and certifies the public keys. Since
the source endpoint requires all public keys of the gateway nodes, the flexible and dynamic
management of such an infrastructure would be very costly.
Since routing table entries are encrypted, they cannot be aggregated. Therefore, conventional
super- and subnetting is not supported. This would lead to critical scalability problems for
maintaining routing tables. Thus, while demonstrating the general feasibility to provide NAC
and its deduced security properties, the basic BPF design is not suitable to be deployed in
the current Internet architecture.
3.3 Implementation
In the prototype implementation of the basic BPF design, a cleartext endpoint address con-
sists of two bytes, where the first octet identifies the ID of the network node responsible for
the local network and the second octet identifies the ID of the endpoint in that local network.
We have implemented a new basic network packet header structure consisting of the masked
destination and source address fields according to equation 3.3, while the third address field
is omitted in our implementation. To encrypt network addresses and to generate key pairs
and trapdoor values we have leveraged the PEKS library [ALPK07].
A masked network packet encapsulating user data in its payload gets a new Ethernet payload
type in our implementation. To realise the functionalities designed for BPF we have defined
multiple new Ethernet payload types for the network control messages: Link layer discovery
packet, masked routing update packet, and masked address resolution packet.
3.3.1 Network side
For the implementation on the network side, we have utilised the SDN protocol OpenFlow 1.3
by expanding the OpenFlow controller NOX by the component Basic BPF which manages
network nodes called datapaths in the context of OpenFlow. We have sketched OpenFlow and
NOX in Section 2.3. Basic BPF is a subclass of the class Component from NOX. By means
of the functions handle datapath join event() and handle packet in event(), Basic BPF is a
listener of the OpenFlow-Datapath-Join and OpenFlow-Packet-In events which are resolved
by registering a new datapath, and by receiving a packet at a datapath.
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Basic_BPF_Node
+datapath_id:  uint64_t
-­network_id:  uint8_t
-­key_pair:  PEKS_Key_Pair
-­masked_network_id:  Masked_Data
-­trapdoor:  uint8_t[65]
-­ports:  map<uint32_t,  Port*>*
-­neighbour_table:  map<uint32_t,  Neighbour_Node*>*
-­masked_routing_table:  vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-­masked_addr_res_table:  vector<Masked_Addr_Res_Table_Entry*>*
-­Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*,  trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t,  data:uint8_t*,  size:size_t)
-­send_lld_packet()
-­handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t,  packet:LLD_Packet*)
-­send_masked_routing_update()
-­handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t,  packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-­handle_masked_packet(packet:Masked_Network_Packet*)
-­masked_addr_res(packet:Masked_Network_Packet*)
-­send_masked_addr_res_packet(addr:Masked_Address)
-­handle_masked_addr_res_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t,  packet:Masked_Addr_Res_Packet*)
<<struct>>
PEKS_Key_Pair
+pub_key_g:uint8_t[128]
+pub_key_h:uint8_t[128]
+priv_key:uint8_t[20]
<<struct>>
Masked_Data
+g_to_r:uint8_t[65]
+s_hash:uint8_t[128]
<<struct>>
Port
+port_no:uint32_t
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
<<struct>>
Neighbour_Node
+port:Port
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
<<struct>>
Masked_Routing_Table_Entry
+masked_network_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+port_no:uint32_t
+distance:uint8_t
<<struct>>
Masked_Addr_Res_Table_Entry
+network_addr:Masked_Address
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
<<struct>>
Masked_Address
+masked_network_id:Masked_Data
+masked_endpoint_id:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
LLD_Packet
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
<<struct>>
Masked_Routing_Update_Entry
+masked_network_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+distance:uint8_t
+next():Masked_Routing_Update_Entry*
<<struct>>
Masked_Routing_Update
+size:uint16_t
+first():Masked_Routing_Update_Entry*
<<struct>>
Masked_Network_Packet
+dst_addr:Masked_Address
+src_addr:Masked_Address
+payload_type:uint16_t
+payload_size:uint16_t
+header_size:uint16_t
+payload():uint8_t*
<<struct>>
Masked_Addr_Res_Packet
+sender_eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
+target_eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
+sender_network_addr:Masked_Address
+target_network_addr:Masked_Address
+sender_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+target_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
X
X
X
X
X
Figure 3.9: UML diagram of Basic BPF Node and the associated data structs.
The C++ class Basic BPF Node implements several attributes to keep the OpenFlow-specific
ID, the network ID in cleartext, the key pair, the encrypted ID, trapdoor value, the ports,
the neighbour table, the masked routing table, and the masked address resolution cache table
of a blind network node. Moreover, this class implements multiple functions to realise the
functionalities of a blind network node.
An UML diagram of the class Basic BPF Node and the associated data structures is given
in Figure 3.9. Thus, the controller component Basic BPF maintains a list of objects instan-
tiated from this class. Each class object is identified with an OpenFlow-specific ID of the
associated datapath (see Figure 3.10).
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NOX Controller
Basic-BPF
:Basic-BPF-Node
OpenFlow-ID=OF-DP-n
…
…:Basic-BPF-Node
OpenFlow-ID=OF-DP-1
OF-DP-1 OF-DP-n
Figure 3.10: Managing of blind network nodes.
3.3.1.1 Transactions between datapaths and the controller
If a new network node is added, it registers itself with its OpenFlow-specific ID at the
controller, and the controller component Basic BPF instantiates a new object from Ba-
sic BPF Node, which represents the new network node at the controller. For the new network
node, the controller component instructs the datapath to define flows which take care of send-
ing packets with the Ethernet types defined for our implementation to the controller.
For an incoming packet matching a flow, a datapath sends an OpenFlow-Packet-In mes-
sage to the controller. This message contains the OpenFlow-specific ID of the datapath and
the packet. After receiving the message, the controller component determines the object rep-
resenting the network node by means of the OpenFlow-specific ID contained in the message.
After that, the function handle packet in() is called on the object.
To send a packet from a datapath, the controller component sends an OpenFlow-Packet-
Out message to the datapath. This message contains the packet and the number of the port
via which the packet has to be sent. Figure 3.11 visualises the transaction between a network
node and the controller for sending and handling a masked packet. Thus, each incoming
packet has to be sent to the controller in order to be handled, since the flow match field types
currently defined in the OpenFlow specification rely on the IP packet structure.
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NOX Controller
Basic-BPF
:Basic-BPF-Node
OpenFlow-ID=OF-DP-i
OF-DP-i
OpenFlow-Packet-In{OF-DP-i, masked-packet}
masked-packet‘
OpenFlow-Packet-Out{port-number, masked-packet’}
masked-packet
Figure 3.11: Transaction between a network node and the controller.
3.3.1.2 Blind network setup
After generating a key pair and trapdoor value, and masking the identity of a new network
node in the constructor of Basic BPF Node, a link layer discovery packet is generated and
broadcasted by calling the function send lld packet() on the object representing the new net-
work node. A network node receiving a link layer discovery packet sends it to the controller
for handling the packet, which is implemented in the function handle lld packet().
After setting up the neighbour table of the new node, the controller component Basic BPF
calls the function send masked routing update() for generating and broadcasting a masked
routing update in order to set up the masked routing table for the new network node, and
to update the masked routing tables of the other network nodes with the masked routing
information for the new network node. The handling of an update packet received by a net-
work node is realised in the function handle masked routing update(). Thus, the functions for
sending and handling link layer discovery and masked routing update packets implement the
functionalities to set up a blind network.
3.3.1.3 Handling of an incoming masked network packet
For an incoming masked network packet, a network node sends an OpenFlow-Packet-In mes-
sage to the controller, which contains the packet and the OpenFlow-specific ID of the sender
datapath. By means of this ID, the controller component first finds out the object repre-
senting the network node, and calls the function handle masked packet() on the object. The
flowchart of this function is given in Figure 3.12. The function performs Test() which takes
the network part of the masked destination address and the trapdoor value in each masked
routing table entry as parameters.
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Figure 3.12: Flowchart for handling masked network packet.
 If Test() returns 1 for a routing table entry i > 0, the Ethernet source and destination
addresses of the packet are updated, and an OpenFlow-Packet-Out message is sent to
the network node which sent the OpenFlow-Packet-In message. The OpenFlow-Packet-
Out message contains the updated packet and the number of the port via which the
packet has to be forwarded. After receiving the message the network node forwards the
packet via the port ordered by the controller.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, the packet is dropped.
 In case that the packet is addressed to the local network for which the node is responsi-
ble, i.e. Test() returns 1 for the first routing table entry, the function masked addr res()
is called.
The masked addr res() function, whose flowchart is given in Figure 3.13, first performs a
binary comparison of the masked destination address with the masked addresses in the address
resolution table. If no entry can be found in this way, the Test() function is called with the
host part of the masked destination address and the trapdoor value in each masked address
resolution cache table entry as parameters.
 In case that Test() returns 1 for a cache entry, the Ethernet source and destination
addresses of the packet are updated, and the controller component orders the network
node to send the packet to the destination endpoint.
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Figure 3.13: Flowchart for masked address resolution.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entires, the packet is put in a FIFO queue, and the controller
component generates a masked address resolution packet, and it instructs the network
node to broadcast the resolution packet in the local network by calling the function
send masked addr res packet().
After receiving the reply packet at the network node, the packet is sent to the controller com-
ponent which calls the function handle masked addr res packet() on the object representing
the network node. This function fetches the packet from the queue, and updates the Ethernet
source and destination addresses of the packet. After that, the controller component tells the
network node to send the packet to the destination endpoint.
3.3.2 Host side
On the host side, we have created a framework in Linux that implements a basic network
stack with a socket-like interface in the user space. This network stack imitation, which we
call Blind Network Stack (BNS), realises the main functionalities of the transport (only UDP)
and network layer (see Figure 3.14). In our implementation we have realised BNS as a C++
singleton class whose UML diagram is illustrated in Figure 3.15.
For the initialisation, a UNIX socket and a RAW socket is created in the function init()
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UNIX socket
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Application-Interface
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Ethernet-Interface
RAW socket
Applicationn
Basic_BNS_Socket
UNIX socket
Figure 3.14: Blind Network Stack.
which takes the endpoint ID and an Ethernet interface index as parameters. Ethernet frames
are sent and received by means of the RAW socket bound to the specified Ethernet interface.
BNS gets user payloads from applications via the UNIX socket whose address is defined using
the ID of the endpoint. Moreover, BNS generates a key pair and a trapdoor value for the ID
of the endpoint, and encrypts the endpoint ID by means of PEKS.
After the initialisation, BNS broadcasts a request in the local network to which the end-
point is connected. The network node responsible for the local network responds to the
request with its public key and network ID. After receiving the reply, BNS encrypts the ID
of the network node with the public key contained in the reply message, and it thus creates
its masked network address. After masking the network address, two threads are created
and started. In the first one, BNS listens on the UNIX socket to get user payloads from
applications, and in the second one, it listens on the RAW socket to receive Ethernet frames.
For the communication between BNS and an application, we have implemented an interface
which we call Basic BNS Socket. This interface provides the functions bns socket create(),
bns socket send(), and bns socket receive() similar to a conventional UDP socket in Linux.
By calling the first function, the application creates a UNIX socket bound to an address
which is identified using the number of the BNS-UDP port on which the application listens.
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Basic_BNS
-­instance:Basic_BNS*
-­bns_unix_socket:int,  -­bns_raw_socket:int
-­bns_unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un,  -­bns_raw_socket_addr:sockaddr_ll
-­eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
-­endpoint_id:uint8_t
-­key_pair:  PEKS_Key_Pair
-­masked_endpoint_id:  Masked_Data
-­trapdoor:  uint8_t[65]
-­masked_network_addr:Masked_Address
-­masked_addr_res_table:  vector<Masked_Addr_Res_Table_Entry*>*  
+get_instance():Basic_BNS*
-­init(endpoint_id:uint8_t,  eth_if_index:char*)
-­Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*,  trapdoor:uint8_t*)
-­udp_send(dst_port_no:uint16_t,  src_port_no:uint16_t,  dst_addr:Masked_Address*,
payload_type:uint16_t,  payload_size:uint16_t,  payload:uint8_t*)
-­masked_network_send(dst_addr:Masked_Address*,  udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-­masked_addr_res(network_packet:Masked_Network_Packet*)
-­send_masked_addr_res_packet(addr:Masked_Address*)
-­eth_send(dst_eth_addr:uint8_t*,  payload_type:uint16_t,  payload_size:uint16_t,  payload:uint8_t*)
-­eth_receive(eth_frame:uint8_t*)
-­masked_addr_res_receive(packet:Masked_Addr_Res_Packet*)
-­masked_network_receive(packet:Masked_Network_Packet*)
-­udp_receive(src_addr:Masked_Address*,  udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
<<struct>>
Basic_BNS_Socket
+endpoint_id:uint8_t
+unix_socket:int
+unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un,  +bns_unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un
+bns_socket_create()
+bns_socket_send(dst_port_no:uint16_t,  dst_addr:Masked_Address*,
payload_type:uint16_t,  payload_size:uint16_t,  payload:uint8_t*)
+bns_socket_receive(size:uint16_t,  buffer:uint8_t*)
<<struct>>
Masked_Data
+g_to_r:uint8_t[65]
+s_hash:uint8_t[128]
<<struct>>
Masked_Address
+masked_network_id:Masked_Data
+masked_endpoint_id:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
PEKS_Key_Pair
+pub_key_g:uint8_t[128]
+pub_key_h:uint8_t[128]
+priv_key:uint8_t[20]
<<struct>>
Masked_Addr_Res_Table_Entry
+network_addr:Masked_Address
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
<<struct>>
Masked_Network_Packet
+dst_addr:Masked_Address
+src_addr:Masked_Address
+payload_type:uint16_t
+payload_size:uint16_t
+header_size:uint16_t
+payload():uint8_t*
<<struct>>
Masked_Addr_Res_Packet
+sender_eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
+target_eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
+sender_network_addr:Masked_Address
+target_network_addr:Masked_Address
+sender_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+target_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
<<struct>>
BNS_UDP_Packet
+dst_port_no:uint16_t
+src_port_no:uint16_t
+payload_type:uint16_t
+payload_size:uint16_t
+payload():uint8_t*
X
X
X
X
Figure 3.15: UML diagram of Basic BNS and Basic BNS Socket.
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Figure 3.16: Message sequence chart for sending user payload.
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In order to send an user payload, the following processing sequence is performed (see Fig-
ure 3.16):
1. After encrypting the destination network address by means of PEKS, an application
calls the function bns socket send(). This function takes the destination BNS-UDP port
number, the unmasked and masked destination network address, and the user payload
as parameters which are sent to the address of the UNIX socket on the BNS side.
2. After receiving the parameters by BNS, they are delivered to the BNS-UDP module
by calling the function udp send(). This function generates a BNS-UDP datagram
consisting of the source and destination BNS-UDP port number, the payload type and
size, and the user payload itself.
3. Via the function masked network send(), the Masked-Network module takes the un-
masked and masked destination network address and the BNS-UDP datagram to be
sent. This module puts the masked network header in front of the datagram and hands
the masked network datagram to the Masked-Address-Resolution module.
4. The Masked-Address-Resolution module takes the masked network datagram via the
function masked addr res(). After resolving the masked destination network address to
an Ethernet address, the masked network datagram is passed to the Ethernet module.
5. Via the function eth send(), the Ethernet module takes the destination Ethernet ad-
dress, the payload type and size, and the payload (the masked network datagram). This
module puts the Ethernet header in front of the datagram, and eventually sends the
Ethernet frame via the RAW socket.
Application
Basic_BNS_
Socket
Application-
Interface BNS-UDP Masked-Network Ethernet
Ethernet-
Interface
bns_socket_receive()
sendto()
udp_receive()
masked_network_receive()
eth_receive()
BNS
recvfrom()
Figure 3.17: Message sequence chart for handling masked network packet.
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An Ethernet frame arriving via the RAW socket is handled as follows (see Figure 3.17):
1. The frame is handed on the Ethernet module by calling the function eth receive(). If
the frame is broadcasted, or it is addressed to the Ethernet address of the interface via
which the frame arrived, the Ethernet payload type of the frame is checked.
 In case of a masked address resolution packet, the packet is passed to the Masked-
Address-Resolution module after removing the Ethernet header.
 If the value of the Ethernet payload type is equal to the type value of a masked
network packet, the masked network datagram is delivered to the Masked-Network
module.
2. Via the the function masked network receive(), the Masked-Network module takes the
masked network datagram. After checking the masked destination network address of
the packet by means of the function Test(), the BNS-UDP datagram and the masked
source network address is given over to the BNS-UDP module.
3. Eventually, the BNS-UDP module receives the user payload, the source BNS-UDP port
number, and the masked source network address via the function udp receive() and
sends them to the address of the UNIX socket on the application side. The address
of the application UNIX socket is identified using the the destination BNS-UDP port
number contained in the BNS-UDP header.
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Figure 3.18: OpenFlow testbed for the basic BPF design.
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3.4 Testbed
We have deployed the prototype implementation of the basic BPF design in a real hard-
ware testbed to demonstrate its feasibility for practical deployment. Our testbed consists of
two PCs and three HP 3800-24G-2SFP+ switches [Hew16] as shown in Figure 3.18.
The first PC has two network interfaces and an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU. On this PC,
we run two instances of BNS, which represent two endpoints. At the first endpoint, a ping
service runs, while a pong service runs at the second endpoint. The extended NOX controller
runs on the other PC with an Intel Core 2 Extreme 3.06 GHz CPU.
A HP 3800 switch can be configured in the virtualisation mode to create multiple HP Open-
Flow instances. If the instances are configured in a port-based way, as it is the case in our
configuration, they act as real OpenFlow switches. In our configuration, the switch ports are
assigned to 16 OpenFlow instances that are interconnected with each other according to the
testbed topology.
For the deployment of our implementation, we have decided on a linear topology consisting
of 16 network nodes (see Figure 3.19). Thus, each node maintains 16 routing table entries.
While the source endpoint S is connected to the first node, the destination endpoint D is
connected to the last node so that a packet from S to D, or vice versa, takes 16 hops.
S
D
Figure 3.19: Testbed topology for the basic BPF design.
3.5 Evaluation
For the evaluation of our implementation, we first have benchmarked the cryptographic op-
erations on the PC with an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU (see Table 3.1). The first row
in this table shows the execution time for generating a key pair and the sizes of the public
and private key. In the second row, we can see the completion time for masking a network
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or endpoint ID and the size of the masked ID, while the execution time for generating a
trapdoor value and its size for a node or endpoint ID are shown in the third row. The last
row shows the time required to preform the Test method for a masked ID and trapdoor value.
Execution time in milliseconds Output size in bytes
KeyGen()→ (Xpub, Xpriv) 4.37
Public key: 256
Private key: 20
X → E(X) 9.94 193
X → T (X) 6.14 65
Test(E(X), T (X)) 1.86 —
Table 3.1: Execution times and output sizes for the basic functionalities.
Table 3.2 presents the convergence times for the unmasked and masked routing table setup
in the testbed topology described in Section 3.4, and the execution times for resolving an
unmasked and a masked network address to a MAC address in case of an empty neighbour
cache. In addition, we present the sizes of unmasked and masked structures implemented for
the basic BPF design in Table 3.3. Furthermore, both tables show the increasing factors of
sizes and execution times in the implementation of the basic BPF design in comparison with
the unmasked packet forwarding.
Time in milliseconds Increase
Unmasked Masked by factor
Routing table setup 739.12 52813.59 71.45
Address resolution 1.66 4.78 2.87
Table 3.2: Execution times for unmasked and masked routing and address resolution.
Size in bytes Increase
Unmasked Masked by factor
Network address 2 386 193
Network packet header 10 778 77.8
Routing update entry 2 259 129.5
Address resolution packet 16 914 57.12
Routing table entry 12 268 22.33
Address resolution table entry 8 457 57.12
Table 3.3: Sizes of unmasked and masked structures.
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The performance of our controller component and the blind network stack is evaluated in
a ping-pong scenario in the testbed topology. By means of the conventional and blind packet
forwarding, the endpoint S pings the endpoint D ten times for each case, while D responds
by sending a pong packet back to S for every ping packet received. Figure 3.20 shows the
packet round trip times for the unmasked and masked ping and pong packets. Thus, the av-
erage round trip time for the conventional packet forwarding is 39.77 milliseconds, while it is
888.15 milliseconds for the blind packet forwarding, representing an increase by factor 22.33.
In principle, the performance can be boosted by integrating the blind network stack into the
Linux kernel. Moreover, the choice of the controller hardware is crucial for the throughput.
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Figure 3.20: Packet round trip times.
The prototype implementation of the basic BPF design and its evaluation in the real hardware
testbed proves the general feasibility of this approach and its practical deployment capabil-
ity. However, the security provided by the basic BPF design introduces a certain amount
of size and execution time overhead as is usually the case for every security mechanism. In
comparison with the conventional packet forwarding, the basic BPF brings in an execution
time overhead increase by a factor 32.21 with regard to the average RTT and Table 3.2, and
a size overhead increase by a factor 85.82 with regard to Table 3.3 in average. This enormous
amount of overhead leads us to state that the basic BPF design cannot satisfactorily be put
into practice in its entirety for environments such as the Internet nowadays, at least not by
default.
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3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a basic redesign of packet forwarding and the associated services
– routing and address resolution – to blind ones which can still correctly process masked
network addresses being based on a basic structure. To encrypt network addresses, we have
used the PEKS algorithm. This algorithm is regarded as semantic-secure, and the encryption
function of PEKS is not deterministic.
In this chapter, we have defined NAC which classifies only the source and destination end-
points as authorised entities having access to the cleartext addresses of packets transferred
between both endpoints. In Section 3.2, we have discussed NAC and its deduced security
properties – sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability. After analysing these properties
in related works, it has been stated that the basic BPF design demonstrates the feasibility to
simultaneously establish the packet forwarding service and to provide NAC. In addition, we
have discussed BPF’s sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability against different adver-
sary models – local adversary, weak global adversary, and strong global adversary. Moreover,
we have declared the effects of applying BPF in the current Internet architecture.
This chapter has also discussed the prototype implementation of the basic BPF design. For
the implementation on the network side, we have utilised the SDN protocol OpenFlow 1.3
by expanding the OpenFlow controller NOX by a further component. On the host side, we
have created a framework in Linux that implements a basic network stack with a socket-like
interface in the user space. The prototype implementation of the basic BPF design has been
deployed in a real hardware testbed to demonstrate its feasibility for practical deployment
capability. For the evaluation of our implementation, we have benchmarked the cryptographic
operations. In addition, we have compared the sizes of unmasked and masked structures, and
the execution times for the unmasked and masked processes. Furthermore, the performance
of our controller component and the blind network stack has been evaluated in a ping-pong
scenario in a linear topology consisting of 16 network nodes.
In summary, we can state that the basic BPF design and its implementation demonstrates
the general feasibility of our approach and its practical deployment capability, while intro-
ducing a considerable amount of overhead. Moreover, the basic BPF design is not suitable
to be deployed in the current Internet architecture. These issues will be tackled in the next
chapter.
64 CHAPTER 3. A BASIC DESIGN FOR BPF
Chapter 4
Towards an adequate design for BPF
In the previous chapter, we have presented a basic design for Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF).
This basic BPF design demonstrates the feasibility to simultaneously establish the packet for-
warding service and to provide network address confidentiality (NAC) and its unlinkability
properties. However, this design is not suitable to be deployed in the current Internet architec-
ture as discussed in Section 3.2.3. Moreover, the basic BPF design introduces a considerable
amount of overhead (see Section 3.5).
In order to design a suitable architecture for BPF, the architecture has to be based on a
hierarchical addressing structure, where it is well-defined, how many parts an endpoint ad-
dress consists of, and which part of the address has to be encrypted with which public key.
Moreover, the architecture has to be designed in a way that we do not need an additional
infrastructure for exchanging and certifying the public keys of network nodes. Additionally,
the architecture itself has to be hierarchically structured by design so that no supplementary
process is required to aggregate and partition the networks if necessary.
While an IP address identifies an endpoint (identifier) and describes its network attachment
point (locator) at the same time, the Locator/Identifier (Loc/ID) Split principle [MZF07] sep-
arates the locator functionality from the identifier. Thus, the network address of an endpoint
consists of a Loc and an ID part. The ID part serves to locate the endpoint within a local
network to which the endpoint is connected, while the Loc part specifies the location of the
local network in the entire infrastructure, e.g., in the Internet. This principle is regarded as
the de facto addressing standard for Future Network Architecture (FNA) and supports scal-
ability, mobility and multihoming by design [Li11], [SG 12]. Currently, there exists a wealth
of approaches relying on the Loc/ID Split principle as introduced in Section 2.2. In order to
achieve the features for an adequate BPF design, we choose two suitable Loc/ID Split ap-
proaches and extend the basic BPF design by means of them in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Each of
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these extensions resolves several issues of the basic BPF design and introduces its own benefits.
In the prototype implementation of the basic BPF design, we have utilised OpenFlow and the
controller NOX. There, masked packets are handled by the controller hop-by-hop which causes
a considerable overhead. Therefore, another contribution of this chapter is the reduction of
this overhead by leveraging flow-based forwarding in OpenFlow.
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Figure 4.1: GLI-Split’s architecture and addressing structure.
4.1 BPF using a Loc/ID Split approach
The Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split (GLI-Split) [MHK13] is one of the FNA
approaches relying on the Loc/ID Split principle, which we have sketched in Section 2.2.1.
This approach splits the functionality of IP addresses into global and local locators and iden-
tifiers. The architecture of GLI-Split divides the network into a global domain and multiple
local domains connected with each other through the global domain (see Figure 4.1). GLI-
Split separates global and local routing and performs core routing on global locators and edge
routing on local locators. The global address of an endpoint consists of its global locator and
identifier, while its local address is composed of its local locator and identifier. In GLI-Split,
gateways (nodes at the border of a local domain and the global domain) substitute global
and local locators with each other for incoming and outgoing packets. In a local network, the
destination identifier of a packet is resolved to the MAC address of the destination endpoint,
and the packet is forwarded to this MAC address.
The mapping system of GLI-Split consists of a Global Mapping System (GMS) and a Local
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Mapping System (LMS) in each local domain. The GMS maps the identifier of an endpoint to
a global locator, while the LMS in a local domain maintains the mapping of the identifier to
a local locator. Here, the LMS in a local domain is under the control of the domain provider,
while the GMS can be maintained by the local domain providers in a distributed manner.
An endpoint newly connected to a local network registers the mapping of its identifier to its
global and local locator at the GMS and LMS responsible for the local domain in which the
endpoint resides. Before sending a packet, a source endpoint resolves the actual locator of
the destination endpoint by querying the mapping system.
We adopt the architecture and addressing structure of GLI-Split and extend our BPF de-
sign to the Blind Packet Forwarding in Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split
(BPF-GLI). In this BPF extension, we construct threes modes, namely semi-blind mode, fully
blind mode, and alternately blind mode, in the following sections. For identifier resolution,
mapping registration, lookup, and packet delivery, BPF-GLI performs the same processes as
defined in GLI-Split. In Section 4.1.4, we first discuss the architectural features of BPF-GLI
and afterwards analyse the NAC levels and their unlinkability properties provided by the
blindness modes of BPF-GLI. Section 4.1.5 presents the implementation of BPF-GLI and
leveraging of the flow-based forwarding in OpenFlow. The deployment of our implementation
in a real hardware testbed is given in Section 4.1.6. Section 4.1.7 evaluates the implementa-
tion of BPF-GLI.
For the construction, we assume that all network nodes, communicating endpoints, and map-
ping systems have already generated a key pair using PEKS. Moreover, it is assumed that the
public keys of the communicating endpoints are already exchanged and bound to their own-
ers. Furthermore, we make the assumption that the communicating endpoints have already
found the identifiers of each other, e.g., via DNS.
4.1.1 Semi-blind packet forwarding
In this mode of BPF-GLI, we only mask identifiers, while global and local locators are handled
in cleartext. Thus, the semi-masked global and local addresses of the endpoint X with the
identifier IDX are
smGAddrX : GLX .E(IDX) and (4.1)
smLAddrX : LLX .E(IDX), where (4.2)
• E(IDX) = PEKS(Xpub, IDX) is X’s masked identifier encrypted with its own public
key Xpub.
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• GLX is the global locator of a gateway node responsible for the local domain in which
X resides.
• LLX is the local locator of the edge node responsible for the local network to which X
is connected.
In case of intra-domain communication, the semi-masked address fields in a packet from the
source endpoint S to the destination endpoint D consist of
smLAddrD | smLAddrS | C(IDS). (4.3)
If the communicating endpoints reside in different local domains, the semi-masked address
fields consist of
smGAddrD | smLAddrS | C(IDS) in the source local domain,
smGAddrD | smGAddrS | C(IDS) in the global domain, and
smLAddrD | smGAddrS | C(IDS) in the destination local domain.
(4.4)
Here, the semi-masked global and local addresses of the destination and source endpoints are
generated according to equations 4.1 and 4.2. Moreover, C(IDS) is the ciphertext generated
by conventionally encrypting (e.g., with RSA) IDS with the corresponding public key of D.
In case of intra-domain communication, a packet from S to D contains their semi-masked
local addresses. If both endpoints reside in different local domains, the address fields in the
packet comprise the semi-masked global or local addresses of the endpoints according to the
domain within which the packet is currently forwarded.
For semi-masked packet generation, the source endpoint encrypts only the identifier part
of the destination address with the public key of the destination endpoint by using PEKS. In
the same way, the source endpoint encrypts only the identifier part of its own address with
its own public key. In case that the packet cannot be forwarded to the destination endpoint,
the semi-masked address of the source endpoint serves as the destination address of a corre-
sponding destination unreachable message. For sending a packet back to the source endpoint,
the destination endpoint can use the second address field as the destination address of the
packet. To get the identifier of the source endpoint in cleartext, the destination endpoint
decrypts the ciphertext in the third address field. The source and destination endpoints can
cache encrypted identifiers so that they do not have to encrypt the identifiers for each packet.
Since only identifiers are masked in this mode, a conventional (unmasked) routing table
setup is established in local domains and in the global domain, e.g., by means of the Distance
Vector Routing algorithm. Here, the routing table of a node in the global domain contains the
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global locators (instead of the network addresses) of the other nodes, while a node in a local
domain holds the local locators of the other local nodes in its routing table. Moreover, each
node in a local domain maintains at least one routing table entry defining the default route to
a gateway node responsible for the local domain. Furthermore, the gateway nodes maintains
two tables, namely a global routing table and a local routing table. While the routing can be
used as it is, the identifier resolution, mapping registration and lookup, however, have to be
redesigned so that they can still correctly process masked identifiers.
4.1.1.1 Masked identifier resolution
In a local network, the masked destination identifier of a packet is resolved to the MAC
address of the destination endpoint and the packet is forwarded as proposed in Section 3.1.4.
For the host X with the identifier IDX , the entry in a masked identifier resolution cache table
consists of
[E(IDX), T (IDX),MACX ], where
• E(IDX) = PEKS(Xpub, IDX) is the masked identifier of the host X.
• T (IDX) = Trapdoor(Xpriv, IDX) is X’s trapdoor value for its identifier.
• MACX is the MAC address of the host X in cleartext.
In case that some entries in the neighbour cache already exist, the resolving of X’s masked
identifier E(IDX) occurs by performing
Test(E(IDX), T (IDi))
for each cache table entry i. The masked identifier is then resolved to the MAC address in
the entry for which Test() returns 1. Performing a binary comparison of the masked identi-
fier with the masked identifiers in the cache table before executing Test() can speed up the
masked identifier resolution. Since however the byte value of E(IDX) is not constant, it is
possible that no entry can be found in this way. In this case, the masked identifier is resolved
as described above.
In case that no entry is found for X in that way, or the cache table is empty, the host D
aiming to resolve the masked identifier E(IDX) to a MAC address broadcasts a request mes-
sage consisting of the masked identifier which has to be resolved, its own masked identifier,
trapdoor value, and MAC address (see Figure 4.2):
id res req{E(IDX), (E(IDD), T (IDD)),MACD}.
After receiving the request message, each host Xj performs
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D Xj X
𝑖𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑞{𝐸(𝐼𝐷-), (𝐸(𝐼𝐷0), 𝑇 𝐼𝐷0 ), 𝑀𝐴𝐶0}𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝐸 𝐼𝐷- , 𝑇(𝐼𝐷-7)) ⟶ 0 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝐸 𝐼𝐷- , 𝑇(𝐼𝐷-)) ⟶ 1
Masked ID Res. Cache Table
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Figure 4.2: Masked identifier resolution.
Test(E(IDX), T (IDXj ))
in order to determine, which host is addressed with the request message. Hosts, at which
Test() returns 0, drop the request message, while the host X performs
Test(E(IDD), T (IDi))
for each entry i in its cache table. In this way, the host X finds out whether it already keeps
a cache entry for the host D.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. an entry already exists for the host D, the entry is
updated with E(IDD) and MACD. In this way, the byte value of D’s masked identifier
is also updated.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry exists for the host D so far, a new entry
is created with the values from the request message.
Then the host X sends a reply message containing its own trapdoor value, and MAC address
id res reply{T (IDX),MACX}
to the host D. After receiving the reply message, the host D first creates a new entry with
X’s masked identifier, trapdoor and MAC address, and then it resolves the masked identifier
to the MAC address.
4.1. BPF USING A LOC/ID SPLIT APPROACH 71
4.1.1.2 Semi-blind mapping system
BPF-GLI in the semi-blind mode adopts the mapping system architecture of GLI-Split and
only masks endpoint identifiers in the mapping tables of the GMS and LMSs. The GMS
maintains a table which holds the semi-masked global mappings of endpoints. A semi-masked
global mapping table entry (sm-global-MTE) for the endpoint X consists of the masked iden-
tifier, trapdoor and at least one cleartext global locator1 of X:
sm-global-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), GLX ].
In the LMS responsible for the local domain in which the endpoint X resides, a semi-masked
local mapping table entry (sm-local-MTE) for the endpoint X consists of X’s masked identifier,
trapdoor and local locator:
sm-local-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), LLX ].
Moreover, the LMS keeps the global locators of gateways connecting the local domain with
the global domain and the semi-masked address of the GMS. If the mapping registration
and lookup traffic does not have to be masked, the LMS can only hold GMS’s cleartext ad-
dress. Since the LMS and the gateways are under the control of the local domain provider,
the LMS can be simply configured with the global locators.
As proposed in GLI-Split, an enhanced DHCP server in a local network can maintain lo-
cators and the addresses of the GMS and the LMS responsible for the local domain to which
the local network belongs. Thus, the DHCP server holds the cleartext local locator of the edge
node responsible for the local network, and the cleartext global locators of gateways connect-
ing the global domain with the local domain in which the local network resides. In contrast
to GLI-Split, the DHCP server in BPF-GLI keeps the semi-masked addresses of the GMS
and LMS, if the mapping registration and lookup traffic also has to be masked. Otherwise,
the DHCP server can simply maintain their unmasked addresses, just like in GLI-Split. The
local network provider can get the above-quoted values from the local domain provider and
configure the DHCP server with them.
4.1.1.3 Semi-masked mapping registration
An endpoint D, which is newly connected to a local network, has to register the mapping of its
masked identifier to its global and local locator at the GMS and LMSD (mapping system in
the local domain to which the local network belongs). For that, the new endpoint D encrypts
its identifier IDD with its public key and generates the trapdoor T (IDD) for its identifier
1Because of multihoming possibility
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Figure 4.3: Semi-masked mapping registration in BPF-GLI.
with its private key by means of PEKS, and the same registration steps are performed as
defined in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.3):
1. The endpoint D asks for a local and global locator, and the addresses of the LMSD
and GMS by sending a request to the DHCP server in the local network to which the
endpoint is connected.
2. For an incoming request, the DHCP server responds with the local locator of the edge
node responsible for the local network, and with the global locator of a gateway respon-
sible for the local domain in which the endpoint is currently resides. In addition, the
reply message contains the semi-masked addresses of the LMSD and GMS:
sm-dhcp-reply{LLD, GLD, smLAddrLMSD , smGAddrGMS}.
3. The endpoint D compares the local locator from the reply message with its old local
locator. If both locators are different, or the endpoint did not have any local locator so
far, the endpoint caches the values from the reply message and sends its semi-masked
local mapping
sm-local-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ LLD} to the LMSD.
For the incoming semi-masked mapping, the LMSD performs Test(E(IDi), T (IDD))
for each entry i.
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 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. a mapping for D already exists, the entry
is updated with the local locator and masked identifier from the incoming map-
ping. Thus, the ciphertext for the identifier is updated with the ciphertext newly
generated by the registering endpoint.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry for D exists so far, a new entry is
created with the values from the incoming semi-masked mapping.
4. In case that the endpoint has got a new global locator or did not have any global
locator so far, the endpoint registers itself at the GMS by sending its semi-masked
global mapping
sm-global-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ GLD} to the GMS.
The GMS first checks whether it already maintains a mapping entry for the endpoint by
performing Test() with the trapdoor in the incoming mapping and the masked identifier
in each table entry as parameters. In case that an entry already exists, the entry is
updated with the global locator and masked identifier from the incoming mapping.
Otherwise, the GMS creates a new entry.
Here, the endpoint uses its newly configured semi-masked local and global addresses as the
source addresses of the network packets carrying the semi-masked local and global mappings.
Moreover, it is also possible that the DHCP server responds with the unmasked addresses
of the LMSD and GMS, and the endpoint uses them as the destination addresses of the
mapping registration messages, if the destinations of the mapping registration traffic do not
have to be masked.
4.1.1.4 Semi-masked mapping lookup
Before sending a semi-masked packet from the source endpoint S to the destination end-
point D, S has to resolve D’s actual locator. By means of PEKS, S first encrypts the
destination identifier IDD with D’s public key. After that, the same mapping lookup steps
are performed as defined in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.4):
1. The source endpoint S generates a request message for E(IDD) and sends it to the
mapping system at which S is registered, namely to the LMSS . Here, S sets its own
semi-masked local address as the source address of the semi-masked local mapping
lookup request:
sm-local-ml-req{E(IDD), smLAddrS}.
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Figure 4.4: Semi-masked mapping lookup in BPF-GLI.
2. For the incoming request message, the LMSS performs Test(E(IDD), T (IDi)) for each
entry i.
(a) If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. S and D are connected to the same edge node
or to different edge nodes in the same local domain, the LMSS responds with D’s
semi-masked local address (see Figures 4.4a and 4.4b).
(b) If Test() returns 0 for all entries, the LMSS replaces the local locator from the
semi-masked local address of the requesting endpoint with the global locator of
a gateway responsible for the local domain and forwards the semi-masked global
mapping lookup request to the GMS (see Figure 4.4c):
sm-global-ml-req{E(IDD), smGAddrS}
3. For the forwarded request message, the GMS performs Test(E(IDD), T (IDi)) for each
mapping table entry i, and it thus determines D’s actual global locator. Finally, the
GMS responds with D’s semi-masked global address.
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The endpoint S can cache the locator so that it does not have to perform a mapping lookup
for each packet.
For a packet, which is coming from the global domain and contains GLD as its destina-
tion global locator, the gateway GLD has to resolve D’s masked identifier to its local locator
(see Figure 4.4c):
1. The gateway node queries the mapping system responsible for the local domain, namely
the LMSD, forD’s actual local locator by sending a request message containing E(IDD).
2. For the request message, the LMSD performs Test() with D’s masked identifier and
the trapdoor in each mapping table entry, and it responds with D’s semi-masked local
address containing the local locator mapped in the entry for which Test() returns 1.
The gateway GLD can temporally cache the locator for further packets addressed to the
endpoint D.
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Figure 4.5: Semi-masked packet delivery in BPF-GLI.
4.1.1.5 Semi-masked packet delivery
The endpoint S wants to send a packet to the endpoint D. We assume that the endpoints
have already registered their semi-masked local and global mappings at the mapping systems
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as explained in Section 4.1.1.3. First, S encrypts D’s identifier with the public key Dpub by
means of PEKS. After that, S resolves D’s masked identifier to its actual locator as described
in Section 4.1.1.4.
 In case of intra-domain communication, S gets the semi-masked local address smLAddrD,
and it thus generates the semi-masked packet < smLAddrD | smLAddrS >.
 If both endpoints possess the same local locator, i.e. they are connected to the
same local network (see Figure 4.5a), the masked destination identifier is resolved
to the MAC address of the destination endpoint as described in Section 4.1.1.1.
Finally, the packet is forwarded to this MAC address.
 Otherwise, i.e. the endpoints are connected to different edge nodes in the same local
domain (see Figure 4.5b), the semi-masked packet is locally forwarded to the edge
node responsible for the local network to which D is connected. After receiving the
packet, the edge node performs the resolution for the masked destination identifier,
and it forwards the packet to the destination endpoint.
 If the endpoints reside in different local domains, the GMS responds with D’s semi-
masked global address smGAddrD, and the source endpoint generates the semi-masked
packet < smGAddrD | smLAddrS >. The packet is forwarded in three steps as defined
in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.5c):
1. The source endpoint S sends the packet to its edge node LLS , and the packet is
forwarded to the gateway node GLS by using the default route.
2. Upon receiving the packet, GLS substitutes smLAddrS with smGAddrS by re-
placing LLS with GLS , and it forwards the packet < smGAddrD | smGAddrS >
within the global domain.
3. When the packet arrives at the gateway node GLD, it gets the local locator mapped
to D’s masked identifier from the LMS responsible for the local domain as de-
scribed in Section 4.1.1.4. After substituting smGAddrD by smLAddrD, the gate-
way node locally forwards the packet < smLAddrD | smGAddrS >. Eventually,
the packet arrives at the edge node LLD, which resolves D’s masked identifier to
its MAC address. Finally, the packet is delivered to D’s MAC address.
4.1.2 Fully blind packet forwarding
In order to achieve a full blindness, we mask both locators and identifiers in this mode. Thus,
the fully masked global and local addresses of the endpoint X with the identifier IDX are
fmGAddrX : E(GLX).E(IDX) and (4.5)
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fmLAddrX : E(LLX).E(IDX), where (4.6)
• E(IDX) = PEKS(Xpub, IDX) is the masked identifier of the endpoint, which is en-
crypted with its public key Xpub.
• E(GLX) = PEKS(GLXpub , GLX) is X’s masked global locator generated with the
public key of the gateway node responsible for the local domain in which X resides.
• E(LLX) = PEKS(LLXpub , LLX) is X’s masked local locator generated with the public
key of the edge node responsible for the local network to which X is connected.
If the source endpoint S and the destination endpoint D are connected to edge nodes in the
same local domain, the fully masked address fields in a packet from S to D consist of
fmLAddrD | fmLAddrS | C(IDS). (4.7)
In case of inter-domain communication, the fully masked address fields consist of
fmGAddrD | fmLAddrS | C(IDS) in the source local domain,
fmGAddrD | fmGAddrS | C(IDS) in the global domain, and
fmLAddrD | fmGAddrS | C(IDS) in the destination local domain.
(4.8)
While the global and local addresses of the destination and source endpoints are fully masked
according to equations 4.5 and 4.6, the source identifier of the packet is additionally encrypted
(e.g., by means of RSA) with the corresponding public key of D.
The second and third address fields serve the same purposes as described in semi-blind pac-
ket forwarding. In case of intra-domain communication, the address fields contain the fully
masked local addresses of the communicating endpoints. Moreover, a packet transferred via
the global domain comprises the fully masked global or local addresses of the endpoints. Here,
it is crucial for the address fields, within which domain the packet is currently forwarded, as
is the case in the semi-blind mode.
Although the locators are handled in this mode in encrypted form, the source endpoint
itself has to encrypt only the identifier of the destination endpoint and its own identifier for
fully masked packet generation. Thus, the source endpoint needs only the public key of the
destination endpoint, just like in semi-blind packet forwarding. In order to achieve that, the
mapping registration and lookup have to be designed accordingly. Moreover, the routing
tables of nodes in the global domain and in local domains have to be restructured in a way
that the nodes can still correctly forward packets with masked locators.
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4.1.2.1 Masked routing
For a masked routing table setup, we redesign the Distance Vector Routing algorithm to a
blind one in the same manner as proposed in Section 3.1.3. The masked routing table entry
for the node N with the locator LocN is
mRTEN : [(E(LocN ), T (LocN )), PN , DN ], where
• E(LocN ) = PEKS(Npub, LocN ) is N ’s masked locator encrypted with its own public
key Npub.
• T (LocN ) = Trapdoor(Npriv, LocN ) is the trapdoor value for N ’s locator, which is gen-
erated with its own private key Npriv.
• PN is the number of the port via which the network node N can be reached.
• DN is the distance to the network node N .
The masked routing update and the link failure are handled in the same manner as described
in the basic BPF design. However, the masked global and local routing is performed separately
so that the changes in a local domain do not affect the global domain, and vice versa. Thus,
a gateway node maintains two masked routing tables. In the first table, the gateway node
holds masked routing information for the nodes in the global domain. Moreover, the second
table consists of the entries for the nodes in the local domain which is connected with the
global domain by the gateway node. Furthermore, each node in a local domain maintains at
least one routing table entry defining the default route to a gateway node responsible for the
local domain.
4.1.2.2 Fully blind mapping system
In this mode, BPF-GLI masks both identifiers and locators in the mapping tables of the
GMS and LMSs. As in the semi-blind mode, BPF-GLI in the fully blind mode adopts the
mapping system architecture of GLI-Split. In the GMS, a fully masked global mapping table
entry (fm-global-MTE) for the endpoint X consists of its masked identifier, trapdoor and
masked global locator:
fm-global-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), E(GLX)].
In each local domain, a LMS maintains the mappings of masked identifiers to masked local
locators for the endpoints residing in the local domain. In the LMS responsible for the local
domain in which the endpoint X is located, a fully masked local mapping table entry (fm-
local-MTE) for the endpoint X consists of the masked identifier, trapdoor and masked local
locator of X:
4.1. BPF USING A LOC/ID SPLIT APPROACH 79
fm-local-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), E(LLX)].
Additionally, the LMS holds the global locators and PEKS-key pairs of gateway nodes con-
necting the local domain with the global domain as well as the fully masked address of
the GMS. Since the gateways and the local mapping system are under the control of the
local domain provider, an additional system is not needed to certify the keys.
As in the semi-blind mode, an enhanced DHCP server in a local network keeps some values.
Here, the server maintains the local locator and PEKS-key pair of the edge node. Moreover,
the server obtains the masked global locators and trapdoors of the gateways responsible for
the local domain as well as the fully masked addresses of the GMS and LMS from the local
domain provider. If the mapping registration and lookup traffic does not have to be masked,
the server just has their unmasked addresses.
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Figure 4.6: Fully masked mapping registration in BPF-GLI.
4.1.2.3 Fully masked mapping registration
If the endpoint D is newly added to a local network, the mapping of its masked identifier
to its masked global and local locator has to be registered at the GMS and at the mapping
system responsible for the local domain to which the local network belongs (LMSD). After
encrypting the identifier of the endpoint and generating the trapdoor for the identifier by
means of PEKS, the same steps are performed as in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.6):
1. The new endpoint queries the DHCP server in the local network in order to configure
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itself with a masked global and local locator as well as the fully masked addresses of
the GMS and LMSD.
2. For a incoming request, the DHCP server responds with the masked local locator and
trapdoor of the edge node as well as the masked global locator and trapdoor of a gateway
responsible for the local domain. Moreover, the reply message contains the fully masked
addresses of the LMSD and GMS:
fm-dhcp-reply{(E(LLD), T (LLD)), (E(GLD), T (GLD)), fmLAddrLMSD , fmGAddrGMS}.
3. The endpoint performs Test(E(old-LL), T (LLD)). Here, E(old-LL) is the PEKS-
ciphertext for the old local locator of the endpoint. If Test() returns 0 (i.e., both
local locators are different), or the endpoint did not have any masked local locator so
far, the endpoint caches the values from the reply message and sends its fully masked
local mapping
fm-local-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ E(LLD)} to the LMSD.
For the incoming fully masked mapping, the LMSD performs Test(E(IDi), T (IDD))
for each mapping table entry i.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, the masked identifier and local locator in the entry
are updated with the values from the mapping message. In this way, the byte
values of the masked identifier and local locator are also updated.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, a new entry is created with values from the
incoming fully masked mapping.
4. By performing Test() with the PEKS-ciphertext for the old global locator and the trap-
door for the global locator from the DHPC reply message as parameters, the endpoint
checks whether it has got a new global locator. If this is the case, or the endpoint did
not have any masked global locator so far, the endpoint sends its fully masked global
mapping
fm-global-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ E(GLD)} to the GMS.
The GMS proceeds analogously and updates the already existing entry or creates a
new one for the endpoint.
For the registration messages, the endpoint uses its newly configured fully masked global and
local addresses. Moreover, if the destinations of the registration traffic do not have to be
masked, the endpoint gets the unmasked addresses of the mapping systems and uses them as
the destination addresses of the network packets carrying the registration messages.
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(c) Inter-domain communication.
Figure 4.7: Fully masked mapping lookup in BPF-GLI.
4.1.2.4 Fully masked mapping lookup
In this mode of the mapping lookup, a source endpoint has to resolve the masked destination
identifier to a masked locator before sending a fully masked packet. For that, the same
mapping lookup steps are performed as in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.7):
1. The source endpoint S first queries the local mapping system LMSS for a masked
local locator of the destination endpoint D by sending a request message containing the
masked destination identifier E(IDD). Here, the requesting endpoint sets its own fully
masked local address as the source address of the fully masked local mapping lookup
request:
fm-local-ml-req{E(IDD), fmLAddrS}.
2. For the incoming request, the LMSS performs Test() with the masked identifier from
the message and the trapdoor in each fully masked mapping table entry as parameters.
(a) If the source and destination endpoints reside in the same local domain, Test()
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returns 1 for an entry, and the LMSS responds with D’s fully masked local address
(see Figures 4.7a and 4.7b).
(b) Otherwise (i.e, Test() returns 0 for all entries), the LMSS replaces the masked
local locator from the fully masked local address of the requesting endpoint with
the masked global locator of a gateway responsible for the local domain. After that,
the LMSS sends the fully masked global mapping lookup request to the GMS (see
Figure 4.7c):
fm-global-ml-req{E(IDD), fmGAddrS}.
3. For the incoming request, the GMS proceeds analogously in order to determine the fully
masked mapping table entry for the requested identifier, and it thus responds with D’s
fully masked global address.
The source endpoint can cache the masked locator so that it does not have to perform a fully
masked mapping lookup for each packet.
If the gateway node GLD receives a packet, which comes from the global domain and con-
tains GLD’s masked global locator as its destination global locator, the gateway node has to
resolve D’s fully masked local address (see Figure 4.7c):
1. The gateway node sends a request message to the local mapping system responsible for
the local domain (LMSD). This request contains the masked destination identifier of
the packet.
2. For the request, the LMSD determines D’s masked local locator in the same manner as
described above. Finally, the mapping system responds with D’s fully masked address.
The gateway node can temporally cache the fully masked local address so that it does not
has to perform a mapping lookup for each packet addressed to D.
4.1.2.5 Fully masked packet delivery
The endpoint S wants to send a fully masked packet to the endpoint D. It is assumed that
both endpoints have already registered their fully masked global and local mappings at the
GMS and at their LMSs as proposed in Section 4.1.2.3. First, S queries the local mapping
system for a fully masked address of D as described in Section 4.1.2.4.
 If the local mapping system responds with a fully masked local address, the source and
destination endpoints reside in the same local domain. In this case, S generates the
fully masked packet < fmLAddrD | fmLAddrS >. After that, S performs
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(c) Inter-domain communication.
Figure 4.8: Fully masked packet delivery in BPF-GLI.
Test(E(LLD), T (LLS))
Here, E(LLD) is D’s masked local locator from its fully masked local address. More-
over, T (LLS) is the trapdoor value of the edge node responsible for the local network
to which S is connected. In this way, the source endpoint determines whether the
destination endpoint is connected to the same local network, as it does itself.
 If both endpoints are connected to the same local network (see Figure 4.8a), Test()
returns 1. Thus, the source endpoint resolves the masked destination identifier of
the packet to a MAC address as explained in Section 4.1.1.1, and it forwards the
packet to the destination endpoint.
 Otherwise (see Figure 4.8b), the packet is first forwarded to the source edge node.
For the incoming fully masked packet, a node in the local domain performs
Test(E(LLD), T (Loci))
for each routing table entry i. The packet is then forwarded via the port mapped
in the entry for which Test() returns 1. Eventually, the packet arrives at the
destination edge node. This node proceeds analogously, and it thus determines
that the packet is addressed to the local network for which the node is responsible.
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After the resolution of the masked destination identifier, the packet is forwarded
to the destination endpoint.
 In case of inter-domain communication, the source endpoint gets D’s fully masked global
address, and it thus generates the fully masked packet < fmGAddrD | fmLAddrS >. In
this case, the same packet delivery steps are performed as in GLI-Split (see Figure 4.8c):
1. The packet is forwarded to a gateway responsible for the local domain by using
the default route.
2. For the incoming packet from the local domain, the gateway node replaces the
masked local locator from the source address of the packet with its own masked
global locator, and it thus gets the packet < fmGAddrD | fmGAddrS >. After
that, the gateway node performs
Test(E(GLD), T (Loci))
for each entry i in its masked global routing table. In this way, the gateway node
determines the port via which the packet has to be forwarded. Each node in the
global domain forwards the packet in the same manner.
3. Eventually, the packet arrives at the destination gateway node. After getting
the fully masked local address of the destination endpoint as described in Sec-
tion 4.1.2.4, the gateway node substitutes fmGAddrD with fmLAddrD. Thus,
the gateway node gets the packet < fmLAddrD | fmGAddrS >. By performing
Test(E(LLD), T (Loci))
for each entry i in the masked local routing table, the gateway node determines
the next hop for the packet. Finally, the packet is forwarded within the destination
local domain as explained above.
4.1.3 Alternately blind packet forwarding
BPF-GLI in this mode applies the full blindness in the global domain and the semi-blindness
in local domains. Thus, a conventional (unmasked) routing table setup is performed in local
domains, while a masked routing table setup is accomplished in the global domain. Hence,
a gateway node maintains a masked routing table for the global domain, and an unmasked
routing table for the local domain for which the gateway node is responsible.
In case of intra-domain communication, the address fields of a packet from the source end-
point S to the destination endpoint D are constructed as in equation 4.3. If both endpoints
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resides in different local domains, the address fields consists of
fmGAddrD | smLAddrS | C(IDS) in the source local domain,
fmGAddrD | fmGAddrS | C(IDS) in the global domain, and
smLAddrD | fmGAddrS | C(IDS) in the destination local domain.
(4.9)
In this mode, only identifiers are masked in the mapping tables of LMSs as in the semi-blind
mode, while both identifiers and locators are encrypted in the mapping table of the GMS
as in the fully blind mode. Moreover, the mapping system in a local domain maintains the
global locators and PEKS-key pairs of gateways connecting the local domain with the global
domain and the fully masked address of the GMS as in the fully blind mode.
In the alternately blind mode, the DHCP server in a local network keeps the cleartext local
locator of the edge node responsible for the local network and the semi-masked address of
the LMS responsible for the local domain as in the semi-blind mode. In contrast to the semi-
blind mode, the server obtains the masked global locators and trapdoors of the gateways and
the fully masked address of the GMS from the local domain provider.
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Figure 4.9: Alternately masked mapping registration in BPF-GLI.
4.1.3.1 Alternately masked mapping registration
For the mapping registration in this mode, an endpoint D newly connected to a local network
encrypts its identifier with its public key and generates the trapdoor for its identifier with its
private key by means of PEKS, and the following steps are performed (see Figure 4.9):
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1. The endpoint sends a request to the DHCP server in the local network to which the
endpoint is connected.
2. For an incoming request, the DHCP servers responds with the cleartext local locator of
the edge node as well as the masked global locator and trapdoor of a gateway responsible
for the local domain. Additionally, the alternately masked DHCP reply contains the
semi-masked address of the local mapping system LMSD, and the fully masked address
of the GMS:
am-dhcp-reply{LLD, (E(GLD), T (GLD)), smLAddrLMSD , fmGAddrGMS}.
3. The semi-masked local mapping of the endpoint is registered at the LMSD in the same
manner as in the semi-blind mode (see step 3 in Section 4.1.1.3).
4. It is proceeded in the same manner as in the fully blind mode to register the fully
masked global mapping of the endpoint at the GMS (see step 4 in Section 4.1.2.3).
The endpoint uses its newly configured semi-masked local address for the semi-masked local
mapping registration. Moreover, the source network address of the fully masked global map-
ping message is the newly configured fully masked global address of the endpoint. Further-
more, the DHCP server can respond with the unmasked addresses of the mapping systems, if
the destinations of the registration traffic do not have to be masked. In this case, the endpoint
uses them as the destination addresses of the mapping messages.
4.1.3.2 Alternately masked mapping lookup
In order to resolve the masked identifier of the destination endpoint D in this mode, the
following steps are performed (see Figure 4.10):
1. The source endpoint S sends a semi-masked local mapping lookup request to the lo-
cal mapping system LMSS as in the semi-blind mode (see step 1 in Section 4.1.1.4).
The request contains D’s masked identifier E(IDD) and S’s semi-masked local ad-
dress smLAddrS .
2. For the incoming request, the LMSS performs Test() with the masked identifier from
the request message and the trapdoor in each mapping table entry.
(a) If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. both endpoints reside in the same local
domain, the mapping system responds with D’s semi-masked local address (see
Figures 4.10a and 4.10b).
(b) If Test() returns 0 for all entries, the mode of the lookup request is switched to
the fully masked one and the request is forwarded to the GMS (see Figure 4.10c).
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Figure 4.10: Alternately masked mapping lookup in BPF-GLI.
3. For the incoming fully masked global mapping request, the GMS proceeds in the same
manner as in the fully blind mode (see step 3 in Section 4.1.2.4) and responds with D’s
fully masked global address.
When a gateway receives a fully masked packet which comes from the global domain and
contains the masked global locator of the gateway as its destination global locator, the gateway
queries the local mapping system LMSD for the semi-masked local address of the destination
endpoint D (see Figure 4.10c). Here, the LMSD proceeds in the same manner as introduced
in Section 4.1.1.4. The gateway can temporally cache the locator for further packets addressed
to the endpoint D.
4.1.3.3 Alternately masked packet delivery
For sending a packet from S to D, the source endpoint S first performs a mapping lookup
as proposed in Section 4.1.3.2. If the endpoints reside in the same local domain, the source
endpoint gets the semi-masked local address of the destination endpoint. Thus, both end-
points pursue a semi-masked intra-domain communication. In this case, S generates the
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packet < smLAddrD | smLAddrS >, and the packet is locally forwarded in the semi-masked
manner as described in Section 4.1.1.5.
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Figure 4.11: Alternately masked packet delivery in BPF-GLI.
In case of inter-domain communication, S gets D’s fully masked global address, and it thus
generates the packet < fmGAddrD | smLAddrS >. The packet is forwarded in the following
steps (see Figure 4.11):
1. The packet is forwarded to the gateway node GLS by using the default route.
2. When the packet arrives at the gateway node, it replaces the unmasked local locator
from the semi-masked source address with its own masked global locator. Thus, the
gateway node gets the packet < fmGAddrD | fmGAddrS >. After that, the packet is
globally forwarded in the fully masked manner (see step 2 in Section 4.1.2.5).
3. Eventually, the packet arrives at the destination gateway node which first gets D’s semi-
masked local address from the LMS responsible for the local domain. After that, the
gateway node substitutes D’s fully masked global address with its semi-masked local
address, and gets the packet < smLAddrD | fmGAddrS >. Finally, the packet is
forwarded within the local domain in the semi-masked manner (see step 3 in 4.1.1.5).
4.1.4 Analysis
BPF-GLI hierarchically splits the network address of an endpoint into a global and local lo-
cator and an identifier, and it replaces the global locator with the local locator at the gateway
nodes. Thus, it is well-defined, how many parts an endpoint address has, and which part of
the address has to be encrypted with which public key. In this regard, BPF-GLI fulfils the
requirement for a hierarchical addressing structure.
Moreover, a source endpoint gets the masked local or global locator of a destination end-
point directly from the local or global mapping system so that the source endpoint needs only
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the public key of the destination endpoint in order to encrypt the destination identifier of the
packet. Here, the public key of an edge and a gateway node are maintained by the DHCP
server and the local mapping system, which are under the control of the local network and
domain provider. Thus, we do not need an additional infrastructure to exchange and certify
the public keys of network nodes, due to the DHCP server and the mapping system in BPF-
GLI.
Additionally, the architecture of BPF-GLI is split into a global domain and multiple local
domains so that the core and edge routing is performed separately from each other. Hence,
the local routing table entries at a gateway node are aggregated for the global domain by
design. However, a further super- or subnetting is not possible within the global domain
and local domains in the fully blind mode, while this is the case within all domains in the
semi-blind mode, and only within the local domains in the alternately blind mode.
In summary, we can state that BPF-GLI fulfils the architectural requirements for an adequate
BPF design with the exception of a fine-grained hierarchical architecture so that performing
of the super- and subnetting is not always possible in its entirety. Beside the architectural
features of BPF-GLI, this BPF extension supports three modes of blindness providing differ-
ent network address confidentiality (NAC) levels which can be flexibly adapted to certain use
cases. These three blindness modes are discussed in detail below.
4.1.4.1 Semi-blind packet forwarding
BPF-GLI masks the identifier and locator of a network address separately from each other.
The semi-blind mode of BPF-GLI encrypts only identifiers end-to-end by means of PEKS,
while global and local locators are handled in cleartext. Thus, NAC applies only to the iden-
tifier part of a network packet address. We call this semi-NAC property end-to-end network
identifier confidentiality, or shortly, network identifier confidentiality (NIC).
NIC classifies only the source and destination endpoints as the authorised entities having
access to the cleartext identifiers of the network packets transferred between them. However,
NIC does not consider the end-to-end confidentiality for the locator part of a network address
as its protection target. Thus, the locators of network packets are disclosed to any node on
the route as well as to third parties, e.g., potential attackers. Moreover, a network node holds
the cleartext locators of other nodes in its routing table entry.
By omitting the third address field in equation 4.3 and 4.4, the identifier of a source endpoint
can remain anonymous for the destination endpoint, since the PEKS encryption is not invert-
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ible. In this case, the destination endpoint uses the second address field in both equations as
the destination address of a reply packet.
While a network node knows the previous and next node of a network packet, the identi-
fiers of the packet are transferred as well as processed in encrypted form by each node on
the route of the packet. We discuss NAC’s deduced anonymity properties – sender/recipient
unlinkability and relationship unlinkability – against local, weak and strong global adversaries
in the semi-blind mode of BPF-GLI below.
Local adversary
Since the identifiers of a packet are handled end-to-end in encrypted form, a local adversary,
i.e. single network node participating in the transfer of the packet or eavesdropper on that
network node can not link the packet to an endpoint as its source/destination endpoint and
to a communicating endpoint pair. Hence, sender/recipient unlinkability and relationship
unlinkability with regard to endpoints are also the case in the semi-blind mode of BPF-GLI.
However, the adversary knows which local networks communicate with each other in
case of intra-domain communication. Thus, the unlinkability properties do not apply to
local networks in the semi-blind mode of BPF-GLI. Moreover, the adversary can restrict
the set of endpoints possibly communicating with each other to the set of the endpoints
connected to local networks which communicate with each other. Nonetheless, the packet still
cannot exactly be linked to endpoints. Because of a restricted set of possible communicating
endpoints, it is recommended to re-encrypt identifiers at random so that traffic flows between
endpoints still remain undistinguishable from each other.
If the communicating endpoints are connected to local networks in different local domains,
the local adversary can be located as follows:
 In the source local domain: If the adversary is a network node in the local domain
or gateway node responsible for the local domain, in which the source endpoint resides,
the adversary can link the packet to its source local network and to its destination local
domain, but not to its destination local network, since the adversary gets to see only
the destination global locator of the packet. Here, the set of possible communicating
endpoints can be restricted to the set of endpoints connected to the source local network
and residing in the destination local domain. This set is usually bigger than the set in
case of intra-domain communication.
 In the destination local domain: The same applies here as is the case in the source
local domain, but in reverse.
 In the global domain: If the adversary is a node in the global domain, it can link
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the packet to the communicating local domains as the source and destination local
domains of the packet. Thus, the set of possible communicating endpoints consists of
the endpoints residing in the local domains which communicates with each other. This
set is bigger than the sets above.
Weak global adversary
This kind of a adversary controls a part of network nodes participating in the transfer of a
packet. In case of intra-domain communication, the same unlinkability properties as for local
adversary apply to weak global adversary. In case of inter-domain communication, if at least
one node each in the source and destination local domain of the packet is under the control
of the adversary, the adversary knows which local domains as well as networks communicate
with each other. If these both nodes are the source and destination edge node of the packet,
the adversary knows the exact size of the set of possible communicating endpoints. However,
the packet is still not linkable to its source/destination endpoint. Thus, the unlinkability
properties with regard to endpoints also apply to weak global adversary.
Strong global adversary
If the adversary controls all nodes taking part in the transfer of a packet, it knows the source
and destination local domains and networks of the packet as is the case with weak global
adversary and, moreover, the entire route of the packet. Since however the packet identifiers
are encrypted end-to-end, the adversary still cannot link the packet to endpoints as its source
and destination endpoints.
Mapping system
In the semi-blind global and local mapping system, masked identifiers are mapped to global
and local locators in cleartext so that the mapping systems maintain identifiers in encrypted
form, and locators in cleartext. Thus, NIC is also the case at the semi-blind global and local
mapping systems.
Local mapping systems are under the control of local domain providers. Since identifiers
are maintained in local mapping systems in encrypted form, local domain providers do not
know which endpoints are connected to the edge nodes in their local domains. Moreover,
it is unknown in the global mapping system which endpoints are actually located in which
local domains. Furthermore, a mapping lookup request cannot be linked to an endpoint as
the requesting endpoint, since the identifier of the requesting endpoint is encrypted in the
request message. But due to the cleartext global and local locators of the requesting endpoint
in the request message, the global and local mapping systems know from which local domain
and network the mapping lookup request originates.
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Since the global and local locators are maintained in cleartext by the global and local
mapping systems, the current number of endpoints located in a local domain and network is
known. Additionally, the global and local locators can eventually disclose information about
local domains and networks, e.g., their geographic or organisational positions.
4.1.4.2 Fully blind packet forwarding
In this mode of BPF-GLI, identifiers as well as global and local locators are handled in en-
crypted form. Thus, NIC also applies here as is the case in the semi-blind mode. Since the
locator part of a network packet address is transferred as well as processed end-to-end in
encrypted form, NAC applies to the locator part of the network packet address. We call this
confidentiality property end-to-end network locator confidentiality, or shortly, network locator
confidentiality (NLC) which classifies only owners of locators of network packets transferred
between communicating endpoints as the authorised entities having access to the locators in
cleartext.
In case of intra-domain communication, the owners of local locators of packets transferred be-
tween two communicating endpoints are the edge nodes to which the endpoints are connected.
If the communicating endpoints are connected to local networks in different local domains,
packets transferred between them contain global and local locators according to the domain
within which the packets are currently forwarded. While the edge nodes responsible for the
source and destination local networks possess the local locators in cleartext, the owners of the
global locators are the gateway nodes responsible for the source and destination local domains.
While NIC is concerned with the identifier part of a network packet address, NLC handles
the locator part of the address. Together NIC and NLC cover the end-to-end transmission
and processing confidentiality of the entire network address, and thus offer NAC. Moreover,
locators in routing tables of network nodes are handled in encrypted form. Thus, only the
owner of a locator has access to the locator in cleartext. The unlinkability properties in the
fully blind mode of BPF-GLI are discussed below.
Local adversary
As in the semi-blind mode, sender/recipient unlinkability and relationship unlinkability apply
to endpoints against a local adversary. Due to NLC, these unlinkability properties also apply
to local domains and networks against the local adversary. Thus, the local adversary cannot
link a packet to an endpoint as its source/destination endpoint. Moreover, the packet cannot
be linked to a local domain and network as its source/destination local domain and network.
If the local adversary is the source edge or gateway node of a packet, i.e. the adversary is
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the owner of the source local or global locator in cleartext, the adversary knows from which
local network or domain the packet originates. The same with regard to packet’s destination
local network or domain applies, if the local adversary is the destination edge or gateway
node of the packet.
While a source endpoint itself encrypts the packet identifiers, the source endpoint gets its
own locator and the destination locator in encrypted form. If the endpoint always uses the
same masked locators for the communication, the network packets transferred between the
communicating endpoints can be correlated with each other on the basis of their locators,
although the byte values of the masked packet identifiers change by re-encrypting them. In
this way, the local adversary can detect a traffic flow between two local domains or networks,
while the flow still cannot be linked to a certain local domain or network pair, since the
locators of network packets belonging to the flow are encrypted.
In order also to make a traffic flow between local domains and networks indistinguishable,
it is recommended that the source and destination endpoints re-register themselves and the
source endpoint performs a new mapping lookup at random. Here, the DHCP servers in the
source and destination local networks re-encrypt the source and destination local locators
and query the local mapping systems in the source and destination local domains for re-
encrypted source and destination global locators. Thus, the communicating endpoints get
newly encrypted locators.
Weak global adversary
In case of intra-domain communication, if the adversary controls the source and destination
edge nodes of a network packet, i.e. the adversary is the owner of the source and destination
local locators in cleartext, it knows which local networks communicate with each other. If
the communicating endpoints reside in different local domains and, additionally to the edge
nodes, the source and destination gateway nodes of the packet are also under the control of
the adversary, it also knows which domains communicate with each other. Moreover, the
same considerations with regard to traffic flow confidentiality also apply here as are the case
with local adversary.
A local domain provider can be also classified as weak global adversary. If the links
from local nodes to the edge nodes responsible for the source and destination local networks
of a packet are manually configured and it is known which organisations manage the local
networks, the local domain provider can link the packet to the local networks in case of intra-
domain communication by identifying the route of the packet inside its own domain. Here, the
provider monitors all ports of all nodes (in particular, the ports via which the edge nodes can
be reached) and compares the masked addresses of all incoming and outgoing packets byte by
byte with each other. But the provider still cannot link the packet to endpoints as its source
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and destination endpoints, since the identifiers are masked and separated from the masked
locators in the packet addresses. In case of intra-domain communication, we can thus state
that the unlinkability properties with regard to local networks do not apply against a local
domain provider, if the links at the local nodes to the edge nodes are configured manually.
Strong global adversary
This kind of adversary controls all nodes taking part in the transfer of a packet between
two communicating endpoints. Since the adversary possesses all locators in cleartext, it can
readily link the packet to local domains and networks as its source/destination local domain
and network. Moreover, the adversary knows the entire route of the packet. However, the
packet is still not linkable to endpoints. Thus, we can state that the unlinkability properties
with regard to local domains and networks do not apply against strong global adversary, while
these properties are the case for endpoints.
Mapping system
In the fully blind global and local mapping systems, identifiers are handled in encrypted
form. Thus, considerations for the semi-blind mapping systems also apply to the fully blind
mapping systems with regard to identifiers. In the fully blind global mapping system, global
locators are maintained in encrypted form so that information about a local domain is masked
from the other local domain providers. Moreover, since local locators are masked in a local
mapping system, information about a local network is masked from the provider of the local
domain to which the local network is connected. Furthermore, a mapping lookup request
cannot be linked to an endpoint as well as to a local network and domain as the requester,
since the identifier as well as the local and global locators of the requesting endpoint are
encrypted in the request message.
In case of intra-domain communication, a source endpoint gets the fully masked local
address of a destination endpoint. Since the local locator of the address is encrypted by
means of PEKS which is not invertible, the source endpoint does not know to which local
network the destination endpoint is actually connected, and vice versa. In this way, the
provider of a local network masks information about its network from the endpoints which
aim to communicate with the endpoints connected to the local network. The same applies to
inter-domain communication, since the source endpoint gets the fully masked global address
of the destination endpoint. Thus, the local domain provider can mask domain information
from the endpoints being located in other local domains.
Information about a local domain and network is also masked from the endpoints residing
in the local domain and network, since the DHCP server responds with a masked global and
local locator generated by the non-invertible PEKS encryption. In summary, NLC and NIC
are also the case at the fully blind global and local mapping systems.
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4.1.4.3 Alternately blind packet forwarding
In this mode of BPF-GLI, identifiers and global locators of network packets are transferred
and processed in encrypted form, while local locators of the network packets are handled in
cleartext. Thus, the alternately blind mode provides NIC and supplies NLC only for the
global locators of the network packets, while this mode of BPF-GLI is not concerned with
the local locators of the packets.
In case of intra-domain communication, only NIC and the same unlinkability properties are
provided as in the semi-blind mode. If the communicating endpoints reside in different local
domains, NIC and a domain-to-domain NLC apply to the network packets transferred be-
tween the endpoints, while only NIC is the case in the local domains. In case of inter-domain
communication, the unlinkability properties in this mode are as follows.
Local adversary
The adversary controlling a single network node can be located as follows:
• In the source local domain: The adversary can link the packet to its source local
network, since the source local locator of the packet is transferred in cleartext. Due to
the encrypted destination global locator of the packet, the adversary can however not
link the packet to a local domain and network as its destination. Thus, recipient unlink-
ability with regard to local domains and networks is the case, while sender unlinkability
does not apply to local networks. Since recipient unlinkability implies relationship un-
linkability, BPF-GLI in this mode supplies relationship unlinkability with regard to local
domains and networks against local adversary in the source local domain. Moreover,
the packet is not linkable to an endpoint as its source/destination endpoint, since the
source and destination identifiers are handled in encrypted form.
• In the destination local domain: The same applies here as is the case in the source
local domain, but in reverse.
• In the global domain: If the adversary controls a node in the global domain, it gets
to see only the fully masked source and destination addresses of the packet. Thus, the
packet is not linkable to endpoints as well as local domains and networks.
Weak global adversary
If the source and destination gateway nodes of a packet are under the control of the adversary,
the adversary possesses the cleartext source and destination global locators of the packet and
has access to the source and destination local locators of the packet in cleartext. Thus, the
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adversary can link the packet to its source and destination local domains and networks, but
still not to an endpoint as its source/destination endpoint.
A local domain provider can readily link a packet to a local network in its domain as
the source/destination local network of the packet, since the local locators of the packet are
handled in cleartext. Due to encrypted global locators, the provider does not know from
which local domain an incoming packet originates and to which local domain an outgoing
packet is addressed.
To provide the indistinguishability of traffic flows between local domains, the communicat-
ing endpoints can re-register their re-encrypted global locators at the global mapping system
and the source endpoint can perform a new global mapping lookup at random as already
discussed in 4.1.4.2.
Strong global adversary
If the adversary controls all nodes on the route of a packet, the adversary has access to the
source and destination global and local locators of the packet in cleartext. Thus, the adversary
can readily link the packet to its source/destination local domain and network. Since however
the source and destination identifiers of the packet are encrypted end-to-end, the adversary
does not have access to the identifiers in cleartext. Hence, sender/recipient and relationship
unlinkabilities with regard to endpoints are the case against strong global adversary.
Mapping system
In the alternately blind mode of BPF-GLI, local mapping systems map encrypted identifiers
to cleartext locators, while the global mapping system maintains both identifiers and locators
in encrypted form. Thus, only NIC is the case at local mapping systems as in the semi-blind
mode, while both NIC and NLC are supplied at the global mapping system as in the fully
blind mode.
4.1.4.4 Asymmetric masking
In BPF-GLI, it is also possible to mask the source and destination address of a packet in
different modes. For example, if the source address is semi-masked and the destination ad-
dress is fully masked, the security level of the semi-blindness applies to the source endpoint,
while the destination endpoint gets the full blindness. In case of intra- and inter-domain
communication, it is disclosed from which local network and domain the packets originate,
but it is not known to which local network and domain the packets are addressed. Thus, we
do not only support a symmetric NAC with multiple levels, but also an asymmetric NAC for
two communicating endpoints.
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In this regard, up to nine different masking combinations are possible for a packet between
two communicating endpoints residing in different local domains. This means that BPF-GLI
provides up to nine various levels of NAC. For example, in a client-server communication,
the network address of the server can be semi-masked, if the server (i.e., its global locator) is
globally well-known. But if the server (i.e., its local locator) is only locally well-known, the
alternate masking of its network address is sufficient for an acceptable NAC level. In case of a
private server, performing the full masking for the network address of the server is advisable,
especially if the server resides in an unprotected local domain. For the masking mode choice
on the client side, beside the sensitivity of the service requested by the client, it is also crucial
whether the client resides in a well protected local domain.
The mapping registration mode of an endpoint is crucial for the destination address masking
type of a packet to be sent to this endpoint. In this way, the endpoint signals implicitly, in
which mode packets have to be forwarded to itself. By means of the mapping lookup, the
source endpoint thus learns the requested masking mode for the destination endpoint. Hence,
the mapping registration and lookup are also a masking type registration and lookup for an
endpoint. The masking mode for a reply packet is determined on the basis of the source
address masking type of the packet lastly received. Thus, the source endpoint also signals
its masking mode implicitly so that we do not need an additional infrastructure to signal the
masking modes requested by endpoints.
4.1.4.5 Network address integrity
Since BPF-GLI does not aim to provide integrity of network packet addresses, the network
addresses of a packet can be manipulated unnoticeably. In order also to provide integrity of
packet addresses, the network packet header can be expanded by integrity check values for
the addresses as proposed in the basic BPF design (see Section 3.2.2).
Due to NIC and its deduced unlinkability properties in the semi-blind mode, an adversary
cannot manipulate the addresses of a specific packet on the basis of its source and destination
endpoints. But the adversary can target specific local domains and networks, since the packet
global and local locators are handled in cleartext. In contrast to that, the adversary can also
not specify local domains and networks as attack targets in the fully blind mode, since this
mode supplies NIC as well as NLC. The alternately blind mode provides NIC and domain-
to-domain NLC so that local domains and endpoints are protected in this regard, while the
adversary can still target specific local networks. The same applies to mapping registration
and lookup reply messages as well as routing update messages.
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A DHCP reply message contains a global and local locator and the addresses of the global
and local mapping systems. These values can be also manipulated unnoticeably. Thus, an
endpoint can be induced to use manipulated locators, and even to perform mapping registra-
tion and lookup at corrupt mapping systems. Therefore, it is recommended also to protect
integrity of DHCP reply message values. This can be achieved by integrity check values for
these values.
4.1.5 Implementation
In the realisation of BPF-GLI, we have defined two address structures for semi- and full mask-
ing. In each of them, a flag defines whether the address contains a global or local locator.
Moreover, we have implemented a new network packet header structure (see Figure 4.12)
which contains the semi- or fully masked global or local destination and source address fields
according to the masking mode choice of the communicating endpoints. Here, two flags define
the current masking type of the destination and source address. Additionally, two further
flags determines whether the masking type of the destination and source addresses has to
alternate for domain crossing. Furthermore, a flag in our header structure states whether
the packet has to be forwarded by using the default route. In our implementation, we have
omitted the third address field as is the case in the implementation of the basic BPF design.
Multiple new packet structures have been implemented to realise the BPF-GLI function-
alities such as mapping registration and lookup, masked identifier resolution, and masked
routing. For the link layer discovery, we have extended the packet structure implemented
for the basic BPF design by a further flag. This flag defines whether a node sending a link
layer discovery packet is a global or local node. In this way, a gateway node can dynamically
determine which ports are connected with global or local nodes. Each of these packet types
gets a new Ethernet payload type in our implementation. For encryption of locators and
identifiers as well as for generation of key pairs and trapdoors we have leveraged the PEKS
library [ALPK07].
4.1.5.1 Network side
For realising the BPF-GLI functionalities on the network side, we have expanded the Open-
Flow controller NOX by the component BPF GLI which is a subclass of the class Compo-
nent from NOX. The functionalities of a network node are implemented in the C++ class
BPF GLI Node, while the C++ class BPF GLI Gateway realises the functionalities of a gate-
way node. An UML diagram of both classes and the associated data structs is given in Fig-
ure 4.12. Here, we have omitted the data structures whose UML diagram is already presented
in Figure 3.9.
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BPF_GLI_Node
+datapath_id:uint64_t
-mode:uint8_t
-locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_locator:Masked_Data
-trapdoor: uint8_t[65]
-ports: map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-neighbour_table: map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_id_res_table:vector<Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry*>*
-mapping_system:BPF_GLI_Mapping_System*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet()
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update()
-send_masked_routing_update()
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-add_unmasked_flow(entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_masked_flow(entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-forward_packet(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-default_forward_packet(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward_packet(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-masked_id_res(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-send_masked_id_res_packet(id:Masked_Data*)
-handle_masked_id_res_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_ID_Res_Packet*)
-handle_dhcp_request()
+datapath_id: uint64_t
-mode:uint8_t
-local_locator: uint8_t[16]
-global_locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_local_locator:Masked_Data
-masked_global_locator:Masked_Data
-local_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-global_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-ports:map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-local_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-global_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_local_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_local_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-unmasked_global_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_global_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-mapping_system:BPF_GLI_Mapping_System*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet(domain:uint8_t)
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update(domain:uint8_t)
-send_masked_routing_update(domain:uint8_t)
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-add_unmasked_flow(entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_masked_flow(entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-handle_network_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_global_domain(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_local_domain(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet)
-semi_masked_forward_packet_in_global_domain(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet_in_global_domain(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward_packet_in_local_domain(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet_in_local_domain(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
BPF_GLI_Gateway
-mode:uint8_t
-domain:uint8_t
-semi_masked_mapping_table:vector<Semi_Masked_Mapping_Table_Entry*>*
-fully_masked_mapping_table:vector<Fully_Masked_Mapping_Table_Entry*>*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_mapping_reg(packet:MR_Packet*)
+handle_mapping_lookup_req(packet:ML_Req_Packet*):ML_Reply_Packet*
BPF_GLI_Mapping_System
<<struct>>
BPF_GLI_Network_Packet
+default_routing:uint8_t
+alternate_dst_addr_masking:uint8_t
+alternate_src_addr_masking:uint8_t
+dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t
+src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t
+dst_addr_size:uint16_t, +src_addr_size:uint16_t
+header_size:uint16_t
+payload_type:uint16_t, +payload_size:uint16_t
+dst_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+src_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+payload():uint8_t*
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_Addr
+locator_type:uint8_t
+unmasked_locator:uint8_t[16]
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_Addr
+locator_type:uint8_t
+masked_locator:Masked_Data
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
MR_Packet
+mode:uint8_t 
+masking_type:uint8_t
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65] 
+size:uint16_t
+addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
ML_Req_Packet
+masking_type:uint8_t
+alternating:uint8_t,
+size:uint16_t
+masked_id:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
ML_Reply_Packet
+masking_type:uint8_t
+alternating:uint8_t,
+size:uint16_t
+addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_Mapping_Table_Entry
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Semi_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_Mapping_Table_Entry
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Fully_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Masked_ID_Res_Packet
+sender_eth_addr:uin8_t[6]
+target_eth_addr:uin8_t[6]
+sender_masked_id:Masked_Data
+target_masked_id:Masked_Data
+sender_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+target_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
<<struct>>
Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
X
X X X X
X X
X
X X
X
Figure 4.12: UML diagram of BPF GLI Node and BPF GLI Gateway.
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BPF-GLI splits the entire infrastructure into the global domain and multiple local domains.
In principle, the global domain consists of gateway nodes responsible for the existing local
domains. Here, each local domain including its local and gateway nodes is under control
of a single provider. For each local domain, its own controller component is started in the
realisation of BPF-GLI. Thus, the global domain is managed by the controller components
for the local domains in a distributed manner. Each controller component maintains a list
of objects instantiated from the classes BPF GLI Gateway and BPF GLI Node. Moreover,
a controller component identifies as well as manages the objects representing gateway and
network nodes in the same manner as proposed for the implementation of the basic BPF
design in Section 3.3.1.
SDN-like realisation
To realise the network functionalities in BPF-GLI, we have leveraged a SDN-like approach by
implementing these functionalities at the controller component. Thus, this relocation of the
functionalities, which are usually realised on separate endpoints (i.e., DHCP and mapping
servers), to the controller makes it possible that the networks and functionalities are bundled
together. In this way, the hosts requiring the functionalities do not interact with separate
servers anymore, but rather with the network itself directly. This SDN-like approach improves
the performance and makes the network configuration more flexible and dynamic.
Routing: In the implementation of the basic BPF design, the object representing a
network node generates a routing update message if necessary. The object then orders the
associated OpenFlow datapath to broadcast the message. After a neighbour node receives
the message, the node sends it to the controller component which handles the message. Thus,
the routing process runs needlessly via the datapaths, although the routing functionalities
and tables are implemented at the controller component.
In this regard, we have opted for the SDN-like realisation to implement the routing
functionalities in BPF-GLI. Here, after the object representing a network node generates
a routing update message, the object calls the function handle unmasked routing update()
or handle masked routing update() on the objects which represent the neighbour nodes of
the network node. Thus, the entire routing process runs on the controller, which improves
the performance (see Table 4.3). If a neighbour node is managed by another controller, the
routing update message is sent via the associated OpenFlow datapath as described above.
Mapping: The mapping functionalities are also implemented at the controller by the
C++ class BPF GLI Mapping System (see Figure 4.12). Here, the controller component
responsible for a local domain creates an object from this class, which represents the local
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mapping system in the local domain. Each object representing a gateway or local node in
the local domain holds a pointer to this BPF GLI Mapping System instance. Moreover, the
mapping instance at the controller component has access to the global locators and PEKS-
key pairs of gateways of the local domain, which are kept by the objects representing the
gateways.
For an Ethernet incoming frame with the type for mapping registration and mapping
lookup request, an edge node sends them to the controller. The BPF GLI Node instance
realising the edge node at the controller then calls the functions handle mapping reg() and
handle mapping lookup req() on the BPF GLI Mapping System object pointer. Thus, the
requesting endpoint does not need the network address of the mapping system anymore.
To send a mapping lookup reply back to the requesting endpoint, the controller component
orders the OpenFlow datapath from which the request came. Here, the destination Ethernet
address of the reply message is the Ethernet address which is cached as the source Ethernet
address of the request message. Thus, the requesting endpoint does not need to put its
network address into the request message.
If a gateway node receives a packet which comes from the global domain and contains
the gateway node’s global locator as its destination locator, the gateway node performs a
mapping lookup for the destination identifier of the packet. Here, after sending the packet to
the controller, the object representing the gateway node at the controller calls the function
handle mapping lookup req() on the BPF GLI Mapping System object pointer.
DHCP: The functionalities of a DHCP server are implemented by the function han-
dle dhcp request() in the class BPF GLI Node. Thus, a DHCP server does not have to be
realised as a separate endpoint. In this way, an edge node receiving a broadcasted DHCP
request sends the request to the controller. The object representing the edge node at the
controller generates the reply message, and it orders the associated OpenFlow datapath to
send the reply message to the requesting endpoint.
Since the endpoint does not need the addresses of the mapping system, the reply message
contains only the cleartext locators in the semi-blind mode and the masked locators and
trapdoors in the other modes. The unmasked and masked local and global locators as well as
the trapdoors of the edge node and the gateways can be obtained from the object representing
the edge node and from the mapping system instance at the controller.
Flow-based packet forwarding
In the implementation of the basic BPF design, packets have been handled by the controller
component hop-by-hop, since the flow match field types implemented currently in an Open-
Flow switch rely on the IP packet structure. However, this approach for packet handling
causes a considerable overhead. In order to utilise the benefits of flow-based packet forward-
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ing for our implementation, we reinterpret the field type for IPv4-SRC so that the controller
component can still define flows for its own purposes. Here, a conventional IPv4 header is
added to a BPF-GLI network packet between the Ethernet header and network header. In the
IPv4 header, the IPv4-SRC field contains the last four bytes of the destination locator, while
the other fields are set to zero. Below, we discuss the setup of flows reflecting routing table
entries and the flow-based packet handling and forwarding in case of intra- und inter-domain
communication.
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Figure 4.13: Unmasked and masked flows at nodes in semi- and fully blind mode.
Flow setup: After a cold start of the routing table setup at a node, the controller
component orders the associated OpenFlow datapath to define a flow for the node itself (see
Figure 4.13). If the node operates in the fully masked mode, the object representing the node
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uses the last four bytes of node’s masked locator as IPv4-SRC in the match field and sets the
action Controller-Output so that the matching packets are sent to the controller. In case of
the semi-blind mode, the last four bytes of node’s locator in cleartext is taken for the match
field. Since a gateway node maintains two routing tables, the associated datapath holds two
flow tables.
During handling a masked routing update message at a node by means of the function
handle masked routing update(), the function add masked flow() is called on the object rep-
resenting the node for each updated and newly created routing table entry i. This function
commands the associated OpenFlow datapath to set up a new flow or to update the flow for
the node Ni whose masked routing information is kept by the entry passed as parameter to
the function. Here, the function takes the last four bytes of Ni’s masked locator E(Ni) as
IPv4-SRC in the match field and sets the action Output with the port number via which to
route to Ni. Defining the unmasked flows is analogous to the masked ones, where the last four
bytes of Ni’s locator in cleartext are used as IPv4-SRC in the match field. In both modes, a
further flow at each local node is defined, which is responsible for default routing. Thus, after
the routing has converged, the OpenFlow datapaths hold flow tables reflecting the routing
tables of the nodes, which is illustrated in Figure 4.13 for a linear topology consisting of three
nodes operating in semi- and fully blind mode.
In the unlikely case that the last four bytes of two masked or unmasked locators are
identical, the controller component can take the next to last four bytes. If they are also
identical, the controller component takes the third-last four bytes, and so on. However,
collisions cannot be avoided completely, since it is tried to compress an entire locator into
a field of four bytes. In principle, this test setup serves to demonstrate the possibility of
leveraging the flow-based forwarding to a certain extent.
Intra-domain communication: For an incoming BPF-GLI network packet at an edge
node, the following steps are performed:
1. The edge node sends the packet to the controller. The object representing the edge
node first checks in the function forward packet() (see Figure 4.14) whether the flag for
default routing is set. If this is not the case, i.e. the source and destination endpoints
reside in the same local domain, the object checks the current masking type of the
destination address.
 In case of full masking, the function fully masked forward packet() is called. This
function determines the masked routing table entry i for which Test() returns 1.
 If i = 0, i.e. the communicating endpoints are connected to the same local
network, masked id res() is called to resolve the masked destination identifier
to the Ethernet address of the destination endpoint.
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Figure 4.14: Flowchart for packet forwarding at network node.
 Otherwise, a conventional IPv4 header is added to the packet. Here, the last
four bytes of E(Ni) is written into the IPv4-SRC field, while the remaining
fields are set to zero.
 The object calls the function semi masked forward packet() in the semi-blind mode.
This function performs the conventional longest prefix matching for the destination
locator.
 If it is determined that the packet is addressed to the local network for which
the edge node is responsible, the masked destination identifier is resolved to
the Ethernet address of the destination endpoint.
 Otherwise, the last four bytes of Ni are set analogously.
After handling the packet, the packet becomes an IPv4 packet, and the controller com-
ponent asks the edge node to forward the updated packet via the port mapped in the
entry i. Figure 4.15 illustrates the interaction between an OpenFlow datapath and the
controller to handle a semi- and fully masked packet.
2. From then on, the packet is forwarded using the flows defined at the nodes on the
route. For an incoming IPv4 packet, an OpenFlow datapath compares the IPv4-SRC
4.1. BPF USING A LOC/ID SPLIT APPROACH 105
NOX Controller
BPF_GLI
:BPF_GLI_Node
OpenFlow-ID=OF-DP-j
Unmasked Routing Table
Locator Port Dist.
… … …
… … …
OF-DP-j
𝑁"
Masked Routing Table
Locator Port Dist.
… … …
… … …
(𝐸(𝑁"),𝑇(𝑁"))𝑃)* 𝐷)* 𝑃)* 𝐷)*
Semi-blind mode
Masked Locator: E(Nj)Locator: Nj
Fully blind mode
OpenFlow-Packet-In{OF-DP-j, packet} OpenFlow-Packet-Out{PNi, packet’}
𝐿𝑜𝑐/.𝐸(𝐼𝐷/) ...... last4Byte(Ni) ...
IPv4-Header𝐿𝑜𝑐/.𝐸(𝐼𝐷/) ...Semi-masked packet
𝐸(𝐿𝑜𝑐/). 𝐸(𝐼𝐷/) ...Fully masked packet 𝐸(𝐿𝑜𝑐/). 𝐸(𝐼𝐷/) ...... last4Byte(E(Ni)) ...
IPv4-Header
Figure 4.15: Flow-based packet handling in semi- and fully blind modes.
OF-DP-j
𝐿𝑜𝑐$.𝐸(𝐼𝐷$) ...... last4Byte(Ni) ...
IPv4-Header
𝐸(𝐿𝑜𝑐$). 𝐸(𝐼𝐷$) ...... last4Byte(E(Ni)) ...
IPv4-Header
𝐿𝑜𝑐$.𝐸(𝐼𝐷$) ...... last4Byte(Ni) ...
IPv4-Header
𝐸(𝐿𝑜𝑐$). 𝐸(𝐼𝐷$) ...... last4Byte(E(Ni)) ...
IPv4-Header
Flow Table
Type Length Value Action
… … … …
IPv4-SRC 4 last4byte(Ni) Output via port PNi
… … … …
Masked Flow Table
Type Length Value Action
… … … …
IPv4-SRC 4 last4byte(E(Ni)) Output via port PNi
… … … …
Figure 4.16: Flow-based packet forwarding in semi- and fully blind modes.
field of the packet with the match fields of the flows defined in its flow table. If the
packet matches a flow, the action defined in the flow is performed so that the packet is
forwarded via the port defined in the action. Figure 4.16 shows flow-based forwarding
of a semi- and fully masked packet. If the packet does not match any flow, it is sent to
the controller to handle the packet as described in step 1.
3. Eventually, the destination edge node receives the packet matching the flow defined
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for the edge node itself. Thus, the edge node sends the packet to the controller. After
removing the IPv4 header and performing the masked identifier resolution, the controller
component orders the destination edge node to forward the updated packet to the
resolved MAC address.
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Figure 4.17: Flow-based packet forwarding in inter-domain communication.
Inter-domain communication: If the flag for default routing is set in step 1 above,
i.e. the source and destination endpoints reside in different local domains, it is proceeded as
follows (see Figure 4.17):
1. The object representing the source edge node adds a conventional IPv4 header to the
packet and determines the routing table entry for default routing to a gateway node
(source gateway node) responsible for the local domain to which the edge node belongs.
 In the fully blind mode, the object looks for such an entry in its masked routing
table and writes the last for bytes of the masked locator mapped in that entry into
the IPv4-SRC field.
 If the destination address is semi-masked, the objects writes the last four bytes of
the cleartext locator mapped in the entry for default routing.
After that, the controller component orders the associated OpenFlow datapath to for-
ward the packet via the port through which the gateway node can be reached.
2. Until the packet arrives at the source gateway node, it is forwarded using the flows
defined at the nodes on the route.
3. At the source gateway node, the packet matches the flow defined for sending the packet
to the controller. The object representing the gateway node gets the packet and uses the
function handle network packet() to determine whether the packet comes from the local
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Figure 4.18: Flowchart for packet handling at gateway node.
or global domain (see flowchart in Figure 4.18). Since the first one is the case here, the
function handle network packet from local domain() is called, which checks the type of
the destination locator. Since the destination locator of the received packet is a global
locator, i.e. the packet has to be forwarded within the global domain, the source locator
of the packet has to be replaced with the global locator of the gateway node. Here, the
current masking type of the source address has to be checked first.
 If the source address is fully masked, the masked source local locator is replaced
with the masked global locator of the gateway node.
 In case of semi-masking, the flag for alternating the masking type of the source
address is checked.
 If this flag is set, the unmasked source local locator is replaced with the masked
global locator of the gateway node.
 Otherwise, the unmasked global locator of the gateway node is written into
the source locator field.
After that, the masking type of the destination address is checked.
 The function fully masked forward packet in global domain() is called in the fully
blind mode. This function performs Test() for each entry in the masked global
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routing table and writes the last four bytes of the masked locator mapped in the
entry, for which the method returns 1, into IPv4-SRC field.
 The function semi masked forward packet in global domain() is called in case of
semi-masking. This function performs the conventional longest prefix matching
for the destination locator and sets the last four bytes of the unmasked locator in
the matched entry analogously.
Finally, the flag for default routing is set to zero, and the associated OpenFlow datapath
is ordered to forward the updated packet.
4. From then on, the packet is flow-based forwarded within the global domain.
5. Eventually, the packet arrives at the gateway node responsible for the local domain in
which the destination endpoint resides. Since the packet matches the flow defined for
the gateway node itself, the packet is sent to the controller. Here, after determining that
the packet comes from the global domain, the object representing the gateway node calls
the function handle network packet from global domain() to check the current masking
type of the destination address (see flowchart in Figure 4.18).
 If the destination address is fully masked, the flag for alternating the masking type
of the destination address is checked.
 In the fully blind mode, i.e. the flag is not set, the object generates a fully
masked mapping lookup request for the masked destination identifier. Af-
ter that, the function handle mapping lookup req() is called on the mapping
system object pointer to perform a fully masked mapping lookup. After de-
termining the masked local locator of the destination endpoint, the controller
component writes this locator into the destination locator field of the packet.
 If the masking type of the destination address has to alternate, a semi-masked
mapping lookup is performed. After getting the destination endpoint’s un-
masked local locator, this locator is written into the destination locator field.
 If the destination address of the incoming packet is semi-masked, the controller
component finds out the unmasked local locator of the destination endpoint. After
that, the controller component writes this locator into the destination locator field
of the packet in the same way as described above.
After updating the destination address of the packet, Test() or the conventional longest
prefix matching is performed depending on the masking type of the updated destination
address. After that, the controller component updates the IPv4-SRC field of the packet
accordingly, and it orders the associated OpenFlow datapath to forward the updated
packet within the local domain.
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6. Until the packet arrives at the destination edge node, it is forwarded flow-based.
7. At the destination edge node, the packet matches the flow defined for the edge node
itself. Thus, the edge node sends the packet to the controller which first removes the
IPv4-SRC field and subsequently performs the masked identifier resolution. Finally, the
object representing the destination edge node orders the associated OpenFlow datapath
to forward the packet to the resolved MAC address.
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Figure 4.19: BPF-GLI-BNS.
4.1.5.2 Host side
For realisation of the BPF-GLI functionalities on the host side, we have extended the blind
network stack (BNS) to BPF-GLI-BNS (see Figure 4.19) which is also implemented as a
C++ singleton class whose UML diagram is given in Figure 4.20. Here, we have omitted
the data structures whose UML diagram is already presented in Figures 3.15 and 4.12. This
framework sends and receives Ethernet frames and interacts with applications in the same
manner as BNS. For interaction with applications, the interface Basic BNS Socket has been
extended to BPF GLI BNS Socket which operates in the same way as the first one.
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BPF_GLI_BNS
-instance:BPF_GLI_BNS*
-bns_unix_socket:int, -bns_raw_socket:int
-bns_unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un, -bns_raw_socket_addr:sockaddr_ll
-eth_addr:uint8_t[6]
-identifier:uint8_t[16]
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-masked_local_locator:Masked_Data
-masked_global_locator:Masked_Data
-edge_node_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-masking_types:map<uint8_t, Masking_Type_Data*>*
-masked_id_res_table: vector<Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry*>*
-semi_masked_ML_cache_table:vector<Semi_Masked_ML_Cache_Entry*>*
-fully_masked_ML_cache_table:vector<Fully_Masked_ML_Cache_Entry*>* 
+get_instance():Basic_BNS*
-init(endpoint_id:uint8_t, eth_if_index:char*)
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
-send_dhcp_request()
-masking_registration(masking_type:uint8_t)
-mapping_registration(masking_type:uint8_t, masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
-udp_send(dst_port_no:uint16_t, src_port_no:uint16_t, dst_id:uint8_t*, masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_masking_type:uint8_t,
payload_type:uint16_t, payload_size:uint16_t, payload:uint8_t*)
-udp_send_with_dst_loc(dst_port_no:uint16_t, src_port_no:uint16_t, dst_addr:uint8_t*, dst_addr_size:uint16_t, n_dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, 
payload_type:uint16_t, payload_size:uint16_t, payload:uint8_t*)
-masking_type_shim(dst_id:uint8_t*, masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-semi_masked_mapping_lookup(dst_id:uint8_t*, masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-fully_masked_mapping_lookup (dst_id:uint8_t*, masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-alternately_masked_mapping_lookup (dst_id:uint8_t*, masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-bpf_gli_network_send(n_dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_dst_addr:uint8_t*, n_dst_addr_size:uint16_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
-masked_identifier_resolution(network_packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-eth_send(dst_eth_addr:uint8_t*, payload_type:uint16_t, payload_size:uint16_t, payload:uint8_t*)
-eth_receive(eth_frame:uint8_t*)
-dhcp_reply_receive(packet:DHC_Packet*)
-masked_identifier_resolution_packet_receive(packet:Masked_ID_Res_Packet*)
-mapping_lookup_reply_receive(packet:ML_Reply_Packet*)
-bpf_gli_network_receive(packet:BPF_GLI_Network_Packet*)
-udp_receive(n_dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t, src_addr:uint8_t*, src_addr_size:uint16_t, udp_packet:BNS_UDP_Packet*)
<<struct>>
BPF_GLI_BNS_Socket
+identifier:uint8_t[16]
+unix_socket:int
+unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un, +bns_unix_socket_addr:sockaddr_un
+bpf_gli_bns_socket_create()
+bpf_gli_bns_socket_masking_type_register(type:uint8_t)
+bpf_gli_bns_socket_send(dst_port_no:uint16_t, dst_id:uint8_t*, 
masked_dst_id:Masked_Data*, n_dst_masking_type:uint8_t, 
n_src_masking_type:uint8_t, payload_type:uint16_t, payload_size:uint16_t, 
payload:uint8_t*)
+bpf_gli_bns_socket_send_with_dst_loc(dst_port_no:uint16_t, dst_addr:uint8_t*, 
dst_addr_size:uint16_t, n_dst_masking_type:uint8_t, n_src_masking_type:uint8_t, 
payload_type:uint16_t, payload_size:uint16_t, payload:uint8_t*)
+bpf_gli_bns_socket_receive(size:uint16_t, buffer:uint8_t*)
<<struct>>
Masking_Type_Data
+masking_type:uint8_t
+key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_ML_Cache_Entry
+identifier:uint8_t[16]
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+addr:Semi_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_ML_Cache_Entry
+identifier:uint8_t[16]
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+addr:Fully_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
DHC_Packet
+local_locator:uint8_t[16]
+global_locator:uint8_t[16]
+masked_local_locator:Masked_Data
+masked_global_locator:Masked_Data
+edge_node_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
X
Figure 4.20: UML diagram of BPF-GLI-BNS.
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After the initialisation by means of the function init(), the BPF-GLI-DHCP module gener-
ates a request which is broadcasted in the local network to which the endpoint is connected.
For the incoming request, the edge node responsible for the local network responds with its
trapdoor value, unmasked and masked local locator, the unmasked and masked global locator
and trapdoor of a gateway node responsible for the local domain to which the local network
belongs. In this way, the endpoint gets all of the information required to operate in all blind-
ness modes.
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BPF_GLI_
BNS_Socket
Application-
Interface
BPF-GLI-
Masking-
Registration Ethernet
Ethernet-
Interface
bpf_gli_bns_socket_
masking_type_register() 
BPF-GLI-BNS
BPF-GLI-
Mapping-
Registration 
eth_send()
sendto()
masking_registration() 
mapping_registration() 
sendto()
Figure 4.21: Message sequence chart for masking & mapping registration.
To register a masking type requested by an application, it is proceeded as follows (see Fig-
ure 4.21):
1. By means of the function bpf gli bns socket masking type register(), the application re-
quests BPF-GLI-BNS to register the masking type.
2. The masking registration request is passed to BPF-GLI-Masking-Registration module
by calling the function masking registration(). This module first checks whether the
requested masking type is already registered. If this is not the case, the module generates
a new key pair and trapdoor for the endpoint identifier, and it encrypts the identifier
with the new public key by means of the PEKS library.
3. Via the function mapping registration(), the masked identifier and trapdoor are passed
to the BPF-GLI-Mapping-Registration module which is requested to generate a corre-
sponding mapping registration message depending on the specified masking type.
4. The message is delivered to the Ethernet module for sending it. Thus, the specified
mapping is directly registered at the network on the top of the MAC layer.
If an application only possesses the destination identifier, the following processing sequence
is performed to send an user payload (see Figure 4.22):
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BNS-UDP Ethernet
Ethernet-
Interface
bpf_gli_bns_
socket_send() 
BPF-GLI-BNS
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mapping_lookup() 
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Mapping
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no eth_send()
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eth_send()
sendto()
masked_identifier_
resolution()
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network send() 
eth_send()
sendto()
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resolution()
bpf_gli_
network send() 
yes
Figure 4.22: Message sequence chart for sending user payload.
1. After masking the destination identifier by means of PEKS, the user application calls
the function bpf gli bns socket send(). This function takes the destination BNS-UDP
port number, the unmasked and masked destination identifier, the masking type of the
source and destination addresses, and the user payload.
2. By calling the function udp send(), the parameters are passed the BPF-GLI-BNS-UDP
module. This module generates a BNS-UDP datagram with the received parameters and
delivers the datagram to the BPF-GLI-Masking-Shim module via the function mask-
ing type shim().
3. Depending on the requested masking type for the destination address, the BPF-GLI-
Masking-Shim module calls the according function of the BPF-GLI-Mapping-Lookup
module.
4. For the incoming parameters, the BPF-GLI-Mapping-Lookup module proceeds as fol-
lows:
 If a mapping for the destination identifier is already cached, the module calls
the function bpf gli network send() which takes the cached destination address,
the masking types of the source and destination addresses, and the BNS-UDP
datagram.
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 If no mapping for the destination identifier is found in the mapping cache table,
the following steps are performed:
(a) The BNS-UDP datagram is queued, and the module afterwards generates a
mapping lookup request message which is sent by the Ethernet module. For
the mapping lookup request, the endpoint thus interacts with the network
directly.
(b) After receiving the mapping lookup reply by the Ethernet module, it delivers
the reply to the BPF-GLI-Mapping-Lookup module.
(c) The BPF-GLI-Mapping-Lookup module first checks whether the masking types
in the mapping lookup request and reply match each other. If this is not the
case, i.e. the destination endpoint has registered itself in another masking
mode, the module adopts the actual masking type of the destination address
and caches the mapping.
(d) The module finds the queued BNS-UDP datagram and passes it including
the destination address, and the masking types of the source and destination
address to the BPF-GLI-Network module. Before that, the application can be
informed about the actual masking mode of the destination endpoint.
5. For the incoming parameters, the BPF-GLI-Network module creates a BPF-GLI net-
work packet header according to the specified masking types of the source and destina-
tion addresses and puts it in front of the BNS-UDP datagram. After that, the module
checks whether the destination locator is a global or local locator.
 If it is a global locator, i.e. the destination endpoint resides in a different local
domain, the module sets the flag for default routing and delivers the network
datagram to the Masked-Identifier-Resolution module in order to resolve the edge
node’s Ethernet address.
 If the destination locator is a local locator, i.e. the destination endpoint resides
in the same local domain as the source endpoint, the module checks whether the
source and destination endpoint has the same local locator.
 If the source and destination addresses have the same local locator, i.e. both
endpoints are connected to the same local network, the network datagram
is passed to the Masked-Identifier-Resolution module in order to resolve the
destination identifier to an Ethernet address.
 Otherwise, the network datagram is handed to the Masked-Identifier-Resolution
module for resolving the Ethernet address of the edge node.
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6. For the incoming network datagram, the Masked-Identifier-Resolution module proceeds
as follows:
 If an Ethernet address is already cached for the specified identifier, the network
datagram and the cached Ethernet address are given over to the Ethernet module.
 Otherwise, the module first queues the network datagram and afterwards generates
a masked identifier resolution packet which is sent by the Ethernet module. After
the resolution, the module finds out the network datagram and passes it to the
Ethernet module which puts an Ethernet header in front of the network datagram
and afterwards sends the Ethernet frame.
If the user application possesses the destination identifier as well as the destination locator,
e.g., a packet is already received from the endpoint to which the user payload has to be sent,
the following steps are performed:
1. The application calls the function bpf gli bns socket send with dst loc(). This function
takes the entire destination address, the masking type of the source and destination
addresses, and the user payload.
2. Via the function udp send with dst loc(), the parameters are sent to the BPF-GLI-BNS-
UDP module which generates a BNS-UDP datagram with the received parameters and
delivers the datagram to the BPF-GLI-Network module. From then on, it is proceeded
in the same manner as above (steps 5 and 6).
An Ethernet frame carrying a BPF-GLI network datagram is handled as follows:
1. Via the function eth receive(), the frame is passed to the Ethernet module. After remov-
ing the Ethernet header, the network datagram is given over to the BPF-GLI-Network
module by calling the function bpf gli network receive().
2. The BPF-GLI-Network module first checks the masked destination identifier of the
received packet by means of the function Test(). After that, the module removes the
header and calls the function udp receive() in order to pass the masking types of the
source and destination addresses, the source address, and the payload to the BPF-GLI-
BNS-UDP module.
3. Finally, the BPF-GLI-BNS-UDP module sends the source BNS-UDP port number, the
masking types of the source and destination addresses, the source address, and the user
payload to the application listening on the BNS-UDP port whose number is specified
in the destination BNS-UDP port number field.
Handling of a DHCP reply packet, a mapping lookup reply packet, and a masked identifier
resolution packet is already described above.
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Figure 4.23: Testbed topology for BPF-GLI.
4.1.6 Testbed
The real hardware testbed, in which the implementation of BPF-GLI has been deployed,
consists of the same hardware devices, i.e. two PCs and three HP 3800-24G-2SFP+ switches
used for the deployment of the basic BPF design (see Section 3.4). On these three HP Open-
Flow switches, we have also created 16 OpenFlow instances that are interconnected with each
other according to the testbed topology.
The topology for our deployment consists of a global domain and two local domains. Each
local domain containing four nodes is connected with the global domain containing six nodes
via a gateway node. The nodes in each domain are linearly connected with each other as
illustrated in Figure 4.23. Thus, each node in each local domain maintains five routing table
entries, while each global node holds eight routing table entries. Moreover, each gateway node
has a global and local routing table with eight and five entries. In this topology, we have
two endpoints, i.e. S and D that are connected to edge nodes belonging to different local
domains. These two endpoints are represented by two instances of BPF-GLI-BNS running
on the PC with an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU. Thus, a packet from S to D, or vice
versa, takes 16 hops.
For each local domain, its own controller component instance runs on the PC with an Intel
Core 2 Extreme 3.06 GHz CPU. In principle, a new instance of the controller component has
to be started for each gateway node group which is under the control of another local domain
provider. In our deployment, six global nodes are however managed just by a single controller
component instance in order to simplify the deployment. In summary, three instances of
BPF GLI run on this PC (see Figure 4.24).
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Figure 4.24: OpenFlow testbed for BPF-GLI.
The controller component instance managing the global domain creates an object from the
class BPF GLI Mapping System. Moreover, each BPF GLI Node object representing a global
node holds a pointer to this BPF GLI Mapping System object which represents the global
mapping system in this way.
For an incoming global mapping registration, a controller component instance managing a
local domain orders the gateway node responsible for that local domain to forward the map-
ping registration via a global interface. A global node receiving the mapping registration
sends it to the controller component which calls the function handle mapping reg() on the
BPF GLI Mapping System object.
A global mapping lookup request is handled in a similar manner as a mapping registration.
Here, the controller component records the OpenFlow-specific ID of the global node which
has received the lookup request, and the number of its port via which the request has come.
After resolving the requested identifier to a global locator, the BPF GLI Mapping System
object generates a mapping lookup reply, and the controller component orders the associated
OpenFlow datapath to forward the reply via the recorded port. This port is connected to
4.1. BPF USING A LOC/ID SPLIT APPROACH 117
a port of the gateway node responsible for the local domain from which the lookup request
has come. Thus, this gateway node receives the lookup reply and sends it to the controller
component managing that local domain. Finally, the local controller component sends the
lookup reply to the requesting endpoint as described in Section 4.1.5.1.
4.1.7 Evaluation
In our implementation, a cleartext identifier/locator consists of 16 bytes corresponding to the
size of an IPv6 address, while a masked identifier/locator has 193 bytes, and a trapdoor for
an identifier/locator has 65 bytes. Up to 256 bytes, the size of a word in cleartext does not
impact the execution times and the output sizes of the operations from the PEKS library used
for our implementation. Thus, the benchmarks for the cryptographic operations on the PC
with an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU are the same ones already presented in Table 3.1.
Size in bytes Increase by factor
Unmasked Semi-masked Fully masked Semi-masked Fully masked
Address 33 210 387 6.36 11.72
Network header 81 435 789 5.37 9.74
Mapping reg.
packet
37 279 456 7.54 12.32
Mapping lookup
req. packet
20 197 197 9.85 9.85
Mapping lookup
rep. packet
37 279 456 7.54 12.32
Mapping table
entry
33 275 452 8.33 13.69
Mapping lookup
cache entry
57 494 671 8.66 11.77
Table 4.1: Sizes of unmasked, semi-, and fully masked structures.
Table 4.1 shows the sizes of unmasked, semi-, and fully masked structures implemented
for BPF-GLI. The structure sizes for unmasked and masked routing as well as identifier
resolution are presented in Table 4.2. Moreover, both tables present the size increasing fac-
tors in comparison with the unmasked structures. Thus, BPF-GLI introduces a size overhead
increase by a factor 7.66 and 11.63 in average for semi- and full masking.
In the testbed topology described in Section 4.1.6, the convergence times for the unmasked
and masked routing table setups which are implemented conventional and SDN-like, are given
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Size in bytes Increase
Unmasked Masked by factor
Routing update entry 18 260 14.44
Identifier resolution packet 46 530 11.52
Routing table entry 28 272 9.71
Identifier resolution table entry 22 264 12
Table 4.2: Structure sizes for unmasked and masked routing and identifier resolution.
in Table 4.3. Here, we can see that the SDN-like realisation can achieve a significant per-
formance increase for the routing table setup. Moreover, this table demonstrates the benefit
of the routing separation in terms of the convergence time (compare with Table 3.2). The
same table also shows the execution times for resolving an unmasked and a masked identifier
to a MAC address in case of an empty neighbour cache. Furthermore, this table shows the
time increasing factors for the masked functionalities in comparison with the unmasked ones.
Time in milliseconds Increase
Unmasked Masked by factor
Conventional global 53.60 3620.31 67.54
routing table setup local 35.16 1501.15 42.69
SDN-like global 34.43 3195.44 92.80
routing table setup local 14.45 1041.64 72.08
Identifier resolution 1.30 4.78 3.67
Table 4.3: Execution times for routing and identifier resolution.
We have evaluated the performance of the controller component BPF GLI and the network
stack BPF-GLI-BNS in a ping-pong scenario in the testbed topology. By means of the con-
ventional as well as the semi-, fully, and alternately blind packet forwarding, the endpoint S
pings the endpoint D ten times for each case, while D responds by sending a pong packet
back to S for every ping packet received.
Figures 4.25 and 4.26 show the individual RTTs for the unmasked, semi-, fully, and alter-
nately masked ping and pong packets which are handled hop-by-hop and flow-based. Because
only the identifiers are masked, the semi-blind mode performs better than the fully blind one.
Moreover, the same applies for the alternate masking, since the packet addresses are fully
masked only in the global domain.
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Figure 4.26: Round trip times for packets handled flow-based.
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In each case, the round trip for the first packet takes more time than for the remaining
packets, since the source endpoint S and the destination gateway node GLD have first to re-
solve D’s global and local locator. These RTT differences thus represent the execution times
for mapping lookups in the semi-, alternately, and fully blind modes. S and GLD cache the
locators so that they do not need to perform a mapping lookup for the remaining packets.
This basic experiment demonstrates the benefits of the flow-based packet forwarding com-
pared to hop-by-hop packet handling by the controller. Here, we especially want to point
out that the flow-based alternately BPF-GLI is just about two times slower than hop-by-
hop unmasked GLI-Split. Thus, flow-based alternately BPF-GLI, which provides NIC and
domain-to-domain NLC, seems to be promising to be realised in practice.
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Figure 4.27: Average round trip times for masking combinations.
As already discussed in Section 4.1.4.4, the communicating endpoints do not necessarily have
to mask their addresses symmetrically. Figure 4.27 shows the average RTTs of ten packets
that are transferred flow-based between the endpoints S and D in the testbed topology. Here,
we have applied nine possible masking combinations to each ten packets. In this figure, 1, 2,
and 3 denote the semi-, alternate, and full masking of the destination or source address. For
example, (1 | 3) thus denotes that the destination address is semi-masked, while the full mask-
ing is applied for the source address. The dashed line in Figure 4.27 represents the individual
overheads introduced by the respective masking combinations. Here, similar average RTTs
apply to the reversed masking combinations such as (1 | 2) and (2 | 1). In summary, we can
state that the stronger the NAC level applied to the packets, the higher is the average RTT
for these packets.
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Figure 4.28: HAIR’s n-level-based hierarchical scheme.
4.2 BPF in a hierarchical Architecture
The Hierarchical Architecture for Internet Routing (HAIR) [FCM+09] is a FNA approach
which relies on the Loc/ID Split principle and has been sketched in Section 2.2.2. This ap-
proach defines a n-level-based hierarchical scheme which reflects the current Internet structure
(see Figure 4.28). There, local networks placed at level n are called Edges. At levels n − 1
to 2 we have the so called Intermediate (INT) networks which consist only of routers and
ensure the reachability between the attached Edges and INTs of the next higher level. We can
conceive the INTs as access providers or enterprise networks. The top level of the hierarchy is
the so called Core providing routing reachability between the INTs at level 2. Each router in
the Core belongs to one administrative domain and is under the control of a single ISP, just
like in the today’s Internet backbone. The organisation of hierarchy levels is not restricted to
be globally symmetrical. Domain providers can independently organise their own domains in
various hierarchy levels.
Levels 1 to n are connected via so called Level Attachment Points (LAPs) acting as gate-
way nodes. A routing domain at level k is connected to a routing domain at level k + 1
via LkAP . The address of an endpoint consists of its identifier and actual locator sequence.
This sequence defines the LAPs to be traversed for forwarding a packet from the Core to the
destination Edge, which is similar to loose source routing. At the Edge, the destination iden-
tifier is resolved to the MAC address of the destination endpoint, and the packet is forwarded
to the destination endpoint.
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In order to bind the actual locator sequence to the identifier of an endpoint, HAIR defines
a hierarchical mapping system consisting of a Core Mapping Service (CMS) and multiple
INT Mapping Services (IMSs). While an IMS holds the actual mappings for the endpoints
belonging to that INT, the CMS keeps a pointer to the IMS maintaining the current map-
ping for each identifier. Here, an IMS is under the control of a Ln−1(INT ) provider, and
the CMS can be maintained by the L2(INT ) providers in a distributed manner. A new
endpoint at an Edge has to register the mapping of its identifier to its locator sequence at the
mapping system. Before sending a packet, a source endpoint has to resolve the identifier of
the destination endpoint to its actual locator sequence. For that, the source endpoint queries
the mapping system.
In this section, we adopt the addressing structure and architectural features of HAIR and
extend the basic BPF design to a new design called Blind Packet Forwarding in Hierarchi-
cal Architecture for Internet Routing (BPF-HAIR). This BPF extension defines two modes,
namely semi- and fully blind modes which perform the same processes as defined in HAIR for
packet delivery. After presenting the construction, Section 4.2.3 analyses BPF-HAIR. The
implementation and evaluation of BPF-HAIR are discussed in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.6.
For the construction, we assume that all network nodes, communicating endpoints, and map-
ping systems have already generated a key pair using PEKS. Moreover, it assumed that the
public keys of the communicating endpoints are already exchanged and bound to their own-
ers. Furthermore, we make the assumption that the communicating endpoints have already
found the identifiers of each other, e.g., via DNS.
4.2.1 Semi-blind packet forwarding
This mode of BPF-HAIR only masks identifiers. Thus, the semi-masked address of the
endpoint X with the identifier IDX is
smAddrX : L1APX |...|Ln−1APX | E(IDX), where (4.10)
• E(IDX) = PEKS(Xpub, IDX) is X’s masked identifier generated with X’s own public
key Xpub.
• LocX = L1APX |...|Ln−1APX is X’s actual locator sequence in cleartext.
The semi-masked address fields in a packet from the source endpoint S to the destination
endpoint D consist of their semi-masked addresses generated according to equation 4.10 and
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the ciphertext generated by conventionally encrypting (e.g., with RSA) IDS with the corre-
sponding public key of D:
smAddrD | smAddrS | C(IDS). (4.11)
Here, the last field serves the same purpose as described in BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.1),
namely getting the source identifier in cleartext. For semi-masking a packet, the source end-
point encrypts the source identifier with its own public key and the destination identifier with
the public key of the destination endpoint. The semi-masked source address of a packet is used
as the destination address of a corresponding destination unreachable message, if the packet
cannot be forwarded to the destination endpoint. The destination endpoint uses the second
address field as the destination address of a reply packet. The communicating endpoints can
cache the masked identifiers so that they do not have to encrypt the identifiers for each packet.
Due to handling locators in cleartext, a conventional (unmasked) routing algorithm such
as Distance Vector Routing algorithm suffices to set up routing tables. But here the un-
masked routing is performed domain-wise so that a network node in a routing domain at
level k maintains routing entries only for the network nodes in the same domain at level k,
1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Moreover, a LAP connecting the routing domains at level k and k + 1 holds
a routing table for each of the domains. For resolving a masked identifier to a MAC address,
we adopt the masked identifier resolution approach from BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.1.1). The
redesigning of mapping functionalities and packet delivery are presented below.
4.2.1.1 Semi-blind mapping system
The mapping system architecture of HAIR is adopted by the semi-blind mode of BPF-HAIR.
In this mode, only identifiers are encrypted in the mapping tables of the CMS and IMSs,
while locators are handled in cleartext. In the IMS responsible for the INT in which the
endpointX resides, a semi-masked mapping table entry (sm-MTE) for the endpoint X consists
of its masked identifier, trapdoor, and locator sequence:
sm-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), L1APX |...|Ln−1APX ].
In HAIR, an enhanced DHCP server at an Edge holds the locators of LAPs via which the
Edge can be reached from the Core. In contrast to that, the DHCP server keeps only the
cleartext locator of the edge node in BPF-HAIR. Moreover, the IMS in the INT to which the
Edge is attached maintains the cleartext locators of remaining LAPs (i.e., LAPs at levels 1
to n − 2) via which the IMS can be reached from the Core. This entry can be manually
configured or dynamically set up by running an enhanced traceroute, e.g., for the CMS.
Furthermore, the DHCP server keeps IMS’s semi-masked address, and the IMS holds the
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semi-masked address of the CMS. If the destinations of the mapping registration and lookup
request messages do not have to be masked, only the cleartext addresses are maintained.
The CMS maintains mapping pointers to IMSs holding the actual mappings for endpoints.
In the CMS, a semi-masked mapping pointer entry (sm-MPE) for the endpoint X consists of
its masked identifier, trapdoor, and the semi-masked address of the IMS keeping the mapping
for the endpoint X:
sm-MPEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), smAddrIMSX ].
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Figure 4.29: Semi-masked mapping registration in BPF-HAIR.
4.2.1.2 Semi-masked mapping registration
The identifier of an endpoint newly connected to an Edge has to be reported to the IMS
responsible for that Edge and to the CMS so that the identifier is bound to a locator se-
quence. HAIR does not specify how this process has to be performed. In order to register
the mapping of the masked identifier of the new endpoint D to its cleartext locator sequence,
BPF-HAIR proceeds as follows (see Figure 4.29):
1. The endpoint D encrypts its identifier with its public key and generates the trapdoor
value for its identifier with its private key by means of PEKS. After that, D sends its
masked identifier and trapdoor to the DHCP server.
2. The DHCP server first responds with the semi-masked address of the IMS responsible
for the INT to which the Edge is attached (IMSD). Here, it is also possible that the
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endpoint gets the cleartext address of the IMSD. Next, the DHCP server maps the
edge-locator Ln−1APD toD’s masked identifier and trapdoor and sends the semi-masked
edge-mapping to the IMSD:
sm-edge-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ Ln−1APD}.
For the incoming edge-mapping, the IMSD performs Test(E(IDi), T (IDD)) for each
entry i.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. a mapping for the endpoint D already exists,
the last locator in the sequence in the entry is replaced with the edge-locator sent
from the DHCP server. Moreover, the masked identifier in the entry is replaced
with the masked identifier from the edge-mapping in order to update the byte value
of the ciphertext for the identifier.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, i.e. no entry for the endpoint D exists so far, a
new entry is created with the part of the locator sequence held already at the IMSD
and the edge-locator sent from the DHCP server.
3. If a new entry for the endpoint is created at the IMSD, it sends the entire loca-
tor sequence back to D’s semi-masked edge-address Ln−1APD | E(IDD). Moreover,
the IMSD sends the semi-masked mapping pointer consisting of the masked identifier
and trapdoor of the endpoint as well as IMSD’s semi-masked address to the CMS:
sm-map-pointer{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ smAddrIMSD}.
WhenD’s semi-masked mapping pointer arrives at the CMS, it performs Test() withD’s
trapdoor and the masked identifier in each entry as parameters. If Test() returns 1 for
an entry, the CMS updates the masked identifier and the semi-masked address in the
entry with the values from the mapping pointer message. Otherwise, a new entry is
created for the endpoint.
Here, we want to point out that the DHCP server, IMSD and CMS can communicate with
each other by using their cleartext or semi-masked addresses. Moreover, the semi-masked
mapping pointer of the endpoint D can contain the cleartext address of the IMSD.
4.2.1.3 Semi-masked mapping lookup
For sending a packet to the destination endpoint D, the source endpoint S needs D’s actual
locator sequence. As in the mapping registration, HAIR does not specify how to proceed for
that. In order to resolve D’s masked identifier to its actual locator sequence in cleartext, the
following steps are performed in BPF-HAIR (see Figure 4.30):
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(c) Inter-domain communication.
Figure 4.30: Semi-masked mapping lookup in BPF-HAIR.
1. After masking D’s identifier by means of PEKS, the source endpoint generates a semi-
masked mapping lookup request. This message contains D’s masked identifier E(IDD)
and S’s semi-masked address as the source address of the request message. After that,
the endpoint S sends the request message to the IMS at which it is registered (IMSS):
sm-ml-req{E(IDD), smAddrS}.
2. For the incoming request, the IMSS performs Test(E(IDD), T (IDi)) for each mapping
table entry i.
(a) If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. the endpoints S and D are located in
the same INT, the IMSS responds with D’s semi-masked edge-address (see Fig-
ures 4.30a and 4.30b). Here, the locator sequence in this edge-address consists only
of D’s edge locator.
(b) Otherwise, the IMSS forwards the request to the CMS (see Figure 4.30c).
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3. For the incoming request, the CMS performs Test() with the masked identifier from
the request message and the trapdoor in each mapping pointer entry as parameters. In
this way, the CMS finds the address of the INT mapping system (IMSD) holding D’s
semi-masked mapping. Subsequently, the request message is forwarded to the IMSD.
4. After receiving the request, the IMSD determines D’s mapping by performing Test()
and responds with D’s semi-masked address.
The source endpoint can cache the locator sequence so that it does not have to perform a
mapping lookup for each packet. Moreover, the source endpoint, IMSS , and CMS can use
the cleartext addresses of the IMSS , CMS, and IMSD, if the destinations of the request
message do not have to be masked.
4.2.1.4 Semi-masked packet delivery
The endpoint S wants to send a semi-masked packet to the endpoint D. It is assumed that
both endpoints have already registered their semi-masked mappings at the mapping services
as described in Section 4.2.1.2. First, the source endpoint encrypts the destination identifier
with the public key of the destination endpoint by means of PEKS. After that, S resolves
the masked destination identifier to the actual locator sequence of the destination endpoint
as introduced in Section 4.2.1.3. After getting D’s semi-masked address, the source endpoint
generates the packet < smAddrD | smAddrS > (see Figure 4.31).
 In case that the destination locator sequence has a length of one, i.e. both endpoints
reside in the same INT, the source endpoint puts only its edge-locator into the source
locator sequence field. After that, the source endpoint checks whether the destination
endpoint possesses the same edge-locator as itself.
 If both endpoints have the same edge-locator, the endpoints are connected to the
same Edge (see Figure 4.31a). In this case, the source endpoint resolves the masked
destination identifier to a MAC address and forwards the packet to the destination
endpoint as explained in Section 4.1.1.1.
 Otherwise, the packet is locally forwarded on the basis ofD’s edge locator Ln−1APD
(see Figure 4.31b). After receiving the packet, the destination edge node resolves
the masked destination identifier of the packet to a MAC address and forwards the
packet to this MAC address.
 In case of inter-domain communication, i.e. the length of the destination locator se-
quence is more than one, the semi-masked packet delivery consists of three steps as
defined in HAIR (see Figure 4.31c):
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Figure 4.31: Semi-masked packet delivery in BPF-HAIR.
1. The packet is forwarded up to the Core either by using the default route or by
utilising LocS in the semi-masked source address.
2. The packet is forwarded domain-wise so that Lk−1APD acts as an ingress node
(and LkAPD as an egress node) of the destination routing domain at level k with
2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Here, LkAPD is taken as the basis locator for packet forwarding in
a routing domain at level k.
3. Eventually, the packet arrives at Ln−1APD which resolves D’s masked identifier to
its MAC address. Finally, the packet is forwarded to D’s MAC address.
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4.2.2 Fully blind packet forwarding
We mask both identifiers and locators in this BPF-HAIR mode. Thus, the fully masked
address of the endpoint X with the identifier IDX is
fmAddrX : E(L1APX)|...|E(Ln−1APX)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mLocX
| E(IDX), where (4.12)
• E(IDX) = PEKS(Xpub, IDX) is the masked identifier of the endpoint X, which is
encrypted with its own public key.
• E(LkAPX) = PEKS((LkAPX)pub, LkAPX) is the masked locator of LkAPX , which is
encrypted with its own public key.
A fully masked packet from the source endpoint S to the destination endpoint D has the
following address fields:
fmAddrD | fmAddrS | C(IDS). (4.13)
Here, fmAddrD and fmAddrS are D’s and S’s fully masked addresses generated according
to equation 4.12. Moreover, the source identifier IDS is additionally encrypted with the cor-
responding public key of D by means of a conventional encryption, e.g., RSA. The last two
address fields in a fully masked packet serve the same purposes as in the semi-blind packet
forwarding.
Since the locators are masked in this mode, the routing table setup has to be redesigned.
For that, we adopt the masked routing approach from BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.2.1). How-
ever, the masked routing is performed domain-wise so that a network node in a domain
maintains masked routing information only for the nodes in the same domain. Moreover,
a LAP holds at least two masked routing tables for the domains connected with each other
by this LAP. In order that the source endpoint requires only the public key of the desti-
nation endpoint for fully masked packet generation, the mapping functionalities have to be
redesigned accordingly, which we discuss below.
4.2.2.1 Fully blind mapping system
As in the semi-blind mode, this BPF-HAIR mode also adopts HAIR’s mapping system archi-
tecture. In this mode, both identifiers and locators are encrypted in the CMS and IMSs. In
the IMS responsible for the INT in which the endpoint X is located, a fully masked mapping
table entry (fm-MTE) consists of X’s masked identifier, trapdoor and actual locator sequence
in encrypted form:
fm-MTEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), E(L1APX)|...|E(Ln−1APX)].
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Moreover, the IMS keeps the masked locators of LAPs at levels 1 to n−2, via which to reach
the IMS from the Core. It can be dynamically resolved by running an enhanced masked
traceroute, e.g., for the CMS. Here, each LAP puts its masked locator into the message
to be sent back to the IMS. Additionally, the DHCP server at an Edge holds the masked
locator and trapdoor of the edge node. Furthermore, the IMS and DHCP server keep the
fully masked addresses of the CMS and IMS. If the destinations of the mapping registration
and lookup traffic do not have to be masked, these addresses are maintained in cleartext.
The CMS holds a table consisting of mapping pointers to IMSs keeping the actual map-
pings for endpoints. A fully masked mapping pointer entry (fm-MPE) for the endpoint X
consists of its masked identifier, trapdoor, and the fully masked address of the IMS which
maintains X’s actual mapping:
fm-MPEX : [(E(IDX), T (IDX)), fmAddrIMSX ].
4.2.2.2 Fully masked mapping registration and lookup
In order to bind the masked identifier of the new endpoint D to its actual masked locator se-
quence, the following steps are performed as defined in the semi-blind mode (see Figure 4.32):
1. The endpoint D sends the tuple (E(IDD), T (IDD)) to the DHCP server.
2. The DHCP server responds with edge node’s trapdoor T (Ln−1APD) and the fully
masked address of the IMS responsible for the INT in which the endpoint resides
(IMSD). After that, the DHCP server maps the tuple to the masked edge loca-
tor E(Ln−1APD) and sends the fully masked edge-mapping to the IMSD:
fm-edge-map{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ E(Ln−1APD)}.
For the incoming edge-mapping, the IMSD proceeds in the same manner as in the
semi-blind mode in order to create a new entry or to update an already existing one for
the endpoint D.
3. If a new entry is created for the endpoint, the IMSD sends the entire masked locator
sequence E(L1APD)|...|E(Ln−1APD) back to the endpoint D. Moreover, the IMSD
sends the fully masked mapping pointer
fm-map-pointer{(E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ fmAddrIMSD} to the CMS.
For the incoming mapping pointer, the CMS works analogously to the semi-blind mode.
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Figure 4.32: Fully masked mapping registration in BPF-HAIR.
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Figure 4.33: Fully masked mapping lookup in BPF-HAIR.
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If the destination addresses of the edge-mapping and mapping pointer messages do not have
to be masked, the cleartext addresses of the IMSD and CMS can be used as proposed in the
semi-blind mode. In contrast to the semi-blind mode, the mapping pointer of the endpoint
may not contain the cleartext or semi-masked address of the IMSD, since it can thus reveal
information about the INT in which the endpoint resides.
The fully masked lookup is analogous to the semi-masked one except that the source end-
point S gets a fully masked address containing the actual masked locator sequence mLocD
of the destination endpoint D (see Figure 4.33). Additionally, S sets its own fully masked
address as the source address of the request message. Moreover, the cleartext addresses of
the mapping services can be used, if the destination addresses of the mapping lookup request
do not have to be masked.
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Figure 4.34: Fully masked packet delivery in BPF-HAIR.
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4.2.2.3 Fully masked packet delivery
We assume that the source and destination endpoints S and D have already registered their
fully masked mappings at the mapping services as described in Section 4.2.2.2. After get-
ting D’s fully masked address by means of a fully masked mapping lookup as introduced in
Section 4.2.2.2, the source endpoint generates the packet < fmAddrD | fmAddrS > (see
Figure 4.34).
 If the destination address is an edge-address, i.e. the destination locator sequence con-
sists of a single masked locator, namely of E(Ln−1APD), it means that the destination
endpoint resides in the same INT as the source endpoint. In this case, the source end-
point puts only its masked edge-locator into the source locator sequence field. After
that, the source endpoint performs
Test(E(Ln−1APD), T (Ln−1APS)).
Here, the source endpoint has already got T (Ln−1APS) during the mapping registration,
and this value is the trapdoor for the locator of the edge node responsible for the Edge
to which the source endpoint is connected.
 If Test() returns 1, i.e. both endpoints are connected to the same Edge (see
Figure 4.34a), the source endpoint resolves the masked destination identifier to
a MAC address and forwards the packet to this MAC address as described in
Section 4.1.1.1.
 Otherwise (see Figure 4.34b), the packet is forwarded to the edge node. For the
incoming fully masked packet, a network node in the INT performs
Test(E(Ln−1APD), T (Loci))
for each masked routing table entry i. The packet is then forwarded via the port
mapped in the entry for which Test() returns 1. Eventually, the packet arrives
at the destination edge node which resolves the masked destination identifier to a
MAC address and forwards the packet to the destination endpoint.
 In case that the destination locator sequence consists of more than one masked locator,
i.e. the source and destination endpoints reside in different INTs, the fully masked
packet is delivered in three steps (see Figure 4.34c). These three steps are analogous to
the steps in the semi-blind mode except step 2. In this step, for the incoming packet
with mLocD = ...|E(LkAPD)|..., a node in routing domain at level k takes k-th masked
locator in the sequence as basis for packet forwarding. Here, the node performs
Test(E(LkAPD), T (Loci))
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for each masked routing table entry i. If Test() returns 1 for an entry, the packet is
then forwarded via the port mapped in that entry. Otherwise, the node can send a
destination unreachable message back to S, or it just drops the packet.
4.2.3 Analysis
In BPF-HAIR, the address of an endpoint consists of its actual locator sequence and its
identifier. Here, the locator sequence contains the locators of LAPs which have to be tra-
versed for forwarding a packet to the endpoint. Moreover, the identifier is encrypted with
the public key of the endpoint, while the locator of a LAP is encrypted with the public key
of the LAP. Thus, it is well-defined, which public key has to be taken for which part of the
address in order to mask it. Hence, we can state that BPF-HAIR fulfils the requirement for
a hierarchical addressing structure. However, the length of the cleartext/masked locator se-
quence of an endpoint is proportional to the deepness of its level. Thus, the address fields in a
packet alone can use a huge part of the packet size, which we discuss in Section 4.2.6 in detail.
BPF-HAIR defines a system which maintains the mappings of the masked identifiers of the
endpoints to their actual masked/cleartext locator sequences. By means of mapping lookup,
a source endpoint gets the masked locator sequence of the destination endpoint directly from
the mapping system. For a semi- and fully masked packet generation, the source endpoint
thus requires only the public key of the destination endpoint. The last masked locator in the
locator sequence of an endpoint is maintained by the DHCP server at the Edge to which the
endpoint is connected. Moreover, the remaining masked locators are held by the mapping
system of the INT to which the Edge belongs. Here, the mapping system leverages an en-
hanced traceroute in order to get these masked locators. Thus, BPF-HAIR does not require
an additional infrastructure for exchanging and certifying the public keys of LAPs.
BPF-HAIR’s hierarchical scheme reflecting the current Internet structure interprets the en-
tire infrastructure on the basis of multiple levels. Here, the Edges at level n are aggregated
to INTs at level n− 1. Moreover, INTs at level k aggregate into INTs at level k− 1. In addi-
tion, INTs at level 2 are connected to each other via the Core. Thus, the entire infrastructure
is accordingly super- and subnetted by design so that an additional process is not required
to aggregate and partition the networks. This means that routing table entries in the semi-
as well as fully blind modes are already aggregated accordingly. However, this scheme does
not define attachment of endpoints to nodes at an arbitrary level. In summary, we can state
that BPF-HAIR fulfils the architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design, while the
length of a locator sequence for an endpoint is dependent on the level of the domain in which
the endpoint is located.
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BPF-HAIR defines two modes of blindness, which provide the same NAC levels and unlinka-
bility properties as in BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.4.1 and 4.1.4.2). In BPF-HAIR, the blindness
mode of packet addresses cannot, however, alternate during the transmission. Moreover, BPF-
HAIR also allows asymmetric masking of the source and destination addresses of a packet.
Thus, a packet can be masked by means of up to four different masking combinations which
support various NAC levels, as already discussed in Section 4.1.4.4.
4.2.4 Implementation
In the implementation of BPF-HAIR, two data structures realise semi- and fully masked
addresses. Here, the cleartext/masked locator sequence is implemented as a vector of ar-
bitrary length so that we can realise an infrastructure with an arbitrary number of levels.
In a cleartext locator sequence, each vector entry is a byte array, while a vector entry in a
masked locator sequence is a Masked Data consisting of two byte arrays (see Figure 3.9). The
data structure implementing a cleartext/masked locator sequence contains a further attribute
which specifies the actual cleartext/masked locator to be taken for packet forwarding.
Beside the semi- or fully masked addresses of the source and destination endpoints, the
network packet header structure for BPF-HAIR contains two flags which define the masking
types of the communicating endpoints (see Figure 4.35). By means of a further flag in the
header structure, it is stated whether the packet has to be forwarded using the default route.
In our implementation, we have omitted the third address field as is the case in the imple-
mentation of BPF-GLI.
We have implemented multiple packet structures to realise the BPF-HAIR functionalities
such as mapping registration and lookup. For the link layer discovery, masked identifier res-
olution and unmasked/masked routing, the same packet structures have been used as in the
implementation of BPF-GLI. For encryption of locators and identifiers as well as for genera-
tion of key pairs and trapdoors, we have leveraged the PEKS library [ALPK07].
The BPF-HAIR functionalities on the host side have been realised by BPF-HAIR-BNS imple-
mented as a C++ singleton class in the same manner as BPF-GLI-BNS. The framework BPF-
HAIR-BNS interacts with applications via the interface BPF HAIR BNS Socket operating
in the same way as BPF GLI BNS Socket.
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BPF_HAIR_Node
+datapath_id:uint64_t
-mode:uint8_t
-locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_locator:Masked_Data
-trapdoor: uint8_t[65]
-ports: map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-neighbour_table: map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_id_res_table:vector<Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry*>*
-int_mapping_system:BPF_HAIR_INT_Mapping_System*
-core_mapping_system:BPF_HAIR_Core_Mapping_System*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet()
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update()
-send_masked_routing_update()
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-add_unmasked_flow(entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_masked_flow(entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-forward_packet(packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-default_forward_packet(packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward_packet(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-masked_id_res(packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-send_masked_id_res_packet(id:Masked_Data*)
-handle_masked_id_res_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_ID_Res_Packet*)
-handle_mapping_reg_packet(packet:MR_Packet*) 
+datapath_id: uint64_t
-mode:uint8_t
-upper_level_locator: uint8_t[16]
-lower_level_locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_upper_level_locator:Masked_Data
-masked_lower_level_locator:Masked_Data
-upper_level_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-lower_level_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-ports:map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-upper_level_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-lower_level_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_upper_level_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_upper_level_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-unmasked_lower_level_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_lower_level_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-int_mapping_system:BPF_HAIR_INT_Mapping_System*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet(domain:uint8_t)
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update(domain:uint8_t)
-send_masked_routing_update(domain:uint8_t)
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-add_unmasked_flow(entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_masked_flow(entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-handle_network_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_upper_level(packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_lower_level(packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet)
-semi_masked_forward_packet_in_upper_level(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet_in_upper_level(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward_packet_in_lower_level(dst_locator:uint8_t*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_packet_in_lower_level(dst_locator:Masked_Data*, packet:BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet*)
BPF_HAIR_Gateway
-mode:uint8_t
-semi_masked_mapping_table:vector<Semi_Masked_MTE*>*
-fully_masked_mapping_table:vector<Fully_Masked_MTE*>*
-semi_masked_mapping_pointer_table:vector<Semi_Masked_MPE*>*
-fully_masked_mapping_pointer_table:vector<Fully_Masked_MPE*>*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_mapping_reg(packet:MR_Packet*)
+handle_mapping_lookup_req(packet:ML_Req_Packet*):ML_Reply_Packet*
BPF_HAIR_INT/Core_Mapping_System
<<struct>>
BPF_HAIR_Network_Packet
+default_routing:uint8_t
+dst_addr_masking_type:uint8_t
+src_addr_masking_type:uint8_t
+dst_addr_size:uint16_t, +src_addr_size:uint16_t
+header_size:uint16_t
+payload_type:uint16_t, +payload_size:uint16_t
+dst_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+src_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+payload():uint8_t*
<<struct>>
MR_Packet
+mode:uint8_t 
+masking_type:uint8_t
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65] 
+size:uint16_t
+addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
ML_Reply_Packet
+masking_type:uint8_t
+size:uint16_t
+addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_MTE
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Semi_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_MTE
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Fully_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Unmasked_Loc_Seq
+length:uint8_t
+act_loc_num:uint8_t
+at(i:uint8_t):uint8_t[16]
<<struct>>
Masked_Loc_Seq
+length:uint8_t
+act_loc_num:uint8_t
+at(i:uint8_t):Masked_Data*
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_Addr
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
+unmasked_loc_seq:Unmasked_Loc_Seq
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_Addr
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
+masked_loc_seq:Masked_Loc_Seq
<<struct>>
ML_Req_Packet
+masking_type:uint8_t
+size:uint16_t
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+req_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_MPE
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Semi_Masked_Addr
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_MPE
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+addr:Fully_Masked_Addr
X X
X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X X
Figure 4.35: UML diagram of BPF HAIR Node and BPF HAIR Gateway.
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4.2.4.1 Network side
The NOX component BPF HAIR realises the BPF-HAIR functionalities on the network side.
Here, the C++ classes BPF HAIR Node and BPF HAIR Gateway implement the function-
alities of a network node and LAP. An UML diagram of both classes and the associated data
structs is given in Figure 4.35. Here, we have omitted the data structures whose UML dia-
gram is already presented in Figure 3.9 and 4.12.
The entire infrastructure in BPF-HAIR is split into the Core and multiple INTs. While
the Core is handled as the current Internet backbone, each INT is under the control of
a single provider as is the case with ISPs. In the realisation of BPF-HAIR, the network
nodes and LAPs of each INT are thus managed by the controller component started for
that INT. For each network node and LAP in an INT, a new object is created from the
classes BPF HAIR Node and BPF HAIR Gateway. Moreover, the controller component for
that INT maintains a list of these objects which are managed and identified in the same
manner as in the implementation of BPF-GLI.
The routing, mapping and DHCP functionalities in BPF-HAIR have been implemented in
the SDN-like manner as already introduced in Section 4.1.5.1. Thus, the routing table setup
in each INT takes place at the controller. Moreover, each controller component managing
an INT at level n− 1 creates an instance of the C++ class BPF HAIR INT Mapping System
which realises the IMS functionalities. Each object representing a node and LAP in an INT
at level n − 1 holds a pointer to this mapping system instance maintaining a sequence
of cleartext and masked locators via which the Core can be reached. Additionally, the
class BPF HAIR Node also implements the functionalities of the DHCP server. Furthermore,
our implementation also leverages the flow-based forwarding in the same way as proposed to
realise BPF-GLI. After routing table setup, the OpenFlow datapaths thus hold flow tables
reflecting the routing tables of network nodes and LAPs in BPF-HAIR.
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Figure 4.36: SDN-like implementation of mapping registration in BPF-HAIR.
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Mapping registration and lookup
A mapping registration packet received by an edge node is handled as follows (see Figure 4.36):
1. The packet matches the flow defined to send mapping registration messages to the
controller. Thus, the packet is sent to the controller.
2. The mapping system instance creates a new mapping table entry or updates the already
existing one for the registering endpoint. In case of a new entry, the object for the edge
node gets the cleartext/masked locator sequence from the mapping system instance and
asks the associated OpenFlow datapath to send the sequence back to the requesting
endpoint.
3. If a new mapping table entry is created for the endpoint, the controller component
orders an OpenFlow datapath acting as a LAP in the INT to send the mapping pointer
for the endpoint to the CMS.
4. The message containing the mapping pointer is conventionally forwarded via the Open-
Flow datapaths on the route to the CMS.
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Figure 4.37: SDN-like implementation of mapping lookup in BPF-HAIR.
For a mapping lookup request message arriving at an edge node, it is proceeded as follows
(see Figure 4.37):
1. The edge node sends the request message to the controller.
2. The function handle mapping lookup req packet() is called on the mapping system in-
stance.
(a) If a mapping entry is found for the requested identifier, the edge node object
tells the associated OpenFlow datapath to send the mapping lookup reply to the
requesting endpoint.
(b) Otherwise, the controller component instructs one of the OpenFlow datapaths
acting as LAPs in the INT to forward the mapping lookup request to the CMS.
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3. The request message is conventionally forwarded via the OpenFlow datapaths on the
route to the CMS.
4. After the CMS determines the IMS holding the actual locator sequence for the re-
quested identifier, the mapping lookup request is conventionally forwarded to that IMS.
5. If the request arrives at a LAP responsible for the INT in which the destination IMS
resides, the OpenFlow datapath representing this LAP sends the request to the con-
troller.
6. After finding the mapping table entry for the requested identifier, the object representing
the LAP tells the associated OpenFlow datapath to send the mapping lookup reply back
to the requesting endpoint.
7. The reply message is forwarded via the OpenFlow datapaths on the route to the re-
questing endpoint.
In this way, an endpoint sending a mapping lookup request message does not need the address
of the IMS responsible for the INT in which the endpoint resides. However, the reply message
is conventionally forwarded via the OpenFlow datapaths on the route between the requesting
endpoint and the IMS holding the actual mapping for the requested identifier. Hence, the
endpoint has still to put its own address into the mapping lookup request message as the
address of the requesting endpoint. The implementation of the CMS and the handling of
mapping registration and lookup request messages at the CMS are given in Section 4.2.5
Intra-domain communication
If the source and destination endpoints are connected to Edges in the same INT, it is proceeded
as given in the implementation of BPF-GLI. Thus, the packet is sent to the controller at the
source edge in order to add a conventional IPv4 header. Until the packet arrives at the
destination edge node, the packet is forwarded by means of the flows defined at the nodes on
the route. Upon receiving the packet, the destination edge node sends it to the controller in
order to remove the IPv4 header and to perform masked identifier resolution.
Inter-domain communication
If the communicating endpoints reside in different INTs, a BPF-HAIR network packet is
handled as follows (see Figure 4.38):
1. Since the packet matches the flow defined to send BPF-HAIR network packets to the
controller, the source edge node sends the packet to the controller. The object repre-
senting the source edge node at the controller checks whether the flag for default routing
is set. Since this is the case here, a conventional IPv4 header is added to the packet,
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Figure 4.38: Flow-based packet forwarding in inter-domain communication.
and the last four bytes of the unmasked and masked locator of the next LAP for default
routing are written into the IPv4-SRC field in the semi- and fully blind mode. Thus, the
packet becomes an IPv4 packet. The object orders the associated OpenFlow datapath
to forward the updated packet via the specified port.
2. Until the packet arrives at a LAP, it is forwarded using the flows at the nodes on the
route.
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Figure 4.39: Flowchart for packet handling at LAP.
3. If a LAP receives the packet, it sends the packet to the controller component which calls
the function handle network packet() on the object representing the LAP (see flowchart
in Figure 4.39). After determining that the packet comes from the INT at the lower
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level, the function handle network packet from lower level() checks whether the flag for
default routing is set.
 If this is not the case, the packet is forwarded back within the INT at the lower
level according to the masking type of the destination address.
 Otherwise, the upper level of the LAP is checked.
 If the LAP connects an INT at level 2 with the Core, step 5 is performed.
 Otherwise, the controller component writes the last four bytes of the unmasked
and masked locator of the next LAP for default routing into the IPv4-SRC
field in the semi- and fully blind mode. After that, the associated OpenFlow
datapath is asked to forward the updated packet via the specified port.
4. The steps 2 and 3 are repeated until the packet arrives at a LAP connecting an INT at
level 2 with the Core.
5. If the packet arrives at an LAP connecting an INT at level 2 with the Core, the object
representing the LAP checks the destination address masking type after setting the flag
for default routing to zero.
 In case of semi-masking, the function semi masked forward packet in upper level()
is called. This function takes the actual unmasked locator (i.e., the first unmasked
locator) from the destination locator sequence to perform the conventional longest
prefix matching. After that, the function writes the last four bytes of the locator
mapped in the matched entry into the IPv4-SRC field.
 The function fully masked forward packet in upper level() is called, if the destina-
tion address is fully masked. Here, the actual masked locator (i.e., the first masked
locator) from the destination locator sequence is taken to perform Test(), and the
value in the IPv4-SRC field is updated accordingly.
The LAP object orders the associated OpenFlow datapath to forward the packet within
the Core.
6. From then on, the packet is flow-based forwarded within the Core.
7. For the incoming packet, a LAP sends it to the controller. Since the packet comes from
the domain at the upper level, the function handle network packet from upper level() is
called on the object representing the LAP. After incrementing the actual locator number
by one, this function first checks the masking type of the destination address.
 The function semi masked forward packet in lower level() is called, if the destina-
tion address is semi-masked. This function takes the actual unmasked locator
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from the destination locator sequence and performs the conventional longest prefix
matching. After that, the last four bytes of the unmasked locator in the matched
entry are written into the IPv4-SRC field.
 In case of full masking, the function fully masked forward packet in lower level()
is called. This function performs Test() with the actual masked locator and the
trapdoor in each routing table entry as parameters. Thus, the function updates
the value in the IPv4-SRC field with the last four bytes of the masked locator
mapped in the entry for which Test() returns 1.
The object representing the LAP instructs the associated OpenFlow datapath to forward
the updated packet within the domain at the lower level. The packet is then forwarded
using the flows at the nodes on the route to the next LAP.
8. Step 7 is repeated until the packet arrives at the destination edge node.
9. Eventually, the destination edge node receives the packet and sends it to the controller.
The object representing the edge node removes the IPv4 header from the packet and
resolves the masked destination identifier to a MAC address. After that, the object tells
the associated OpenFlow datapath to send the updated packet via the specified port.
While the packet is thus forwarded by means of the flows at the nodes between LAPs, the
packet is sent to the controller at each LAP in order to update its IPv4-SRC field.
4.2.5 Testbed
To deploy the implementation of BPF-HAIR, we have used the same hardware devices, i.e.
two PCs and three HP 3800-24G-2SFP+ switches as in the deployment of BPF-GLI’s imple-
mentation. Here, 16 OpenFlow instances run on these three HP OpenFlow switches. The
OpenFlow instances are interconnected with each other according to the testbed topology
consisting of four levels.
In this topology, we have the Core, four INTs, and two Edges. Here, the Core and each INT
consist of two nodes. Moreover, the domains are connected with each other by a single LAP
as illustrated in Figure 4.40. Thus, each node in each domain maintains four routing table
entries. Furthermore, each LAP (except L3APS and L3APD) has two routing tables holding
four entries for each level. In this topology, the communicating endpoints S and D are con-
nected to the edge nodes belonging to different INTs. Thus, a packet from S to D, or vice
versa, takes 16 hops. For these two endpoints, we have started two instances of BPF-HAIR-
BNS running on the PC with an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU.
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Figure 4.40: Testbed topology for BPF-HAIR.
For each INT, its own controller component instance runs on the PC with an Intel Core 2
Extreme 3.06 GHz CPU. In order to simplify the deployment, two nodes in the Core are
managed by a single controller component as is the case in the deployment of BPF-GLI’s
implementation. Thus, five instances of the controller component run on this PC (see Fig-
ure 4.41).
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Figure 4.41: OpenFlow testbed for BPF-HAIR.
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In our deployment, the core mapping service is realised by an instance of the C++ class
BPF HAIR Core Mapping System, which is created by the controller component managing
the Core. Here, each node in the Core holds a pointer to this mapping system instance.
Moreover, the mapping system object keeps the ID of an OpenFlow datapath acting as a
Core node to send packets via this datapath.
For an incoming mapping pointer registration, a Core node sends it to the controller which
calls the function handle mapping pointer reg() on the mapping system object. If a Core
node receives a packet holding a mapping lookup request, it sends the packet to the controller
component. Here, the function handle mapping lookup req() is called on the mapping system
object. After determining the INT mapping service holding the locator sequence for the re-
quested identifier, the mapping system object orders the OpenFlow datapath (whose ID is
kept by the object) to send the request to the INT mapping service.
4.2.6 Evaluation
In the implementation of BPF-HAIR, an endpoint and a node has a cleartext identifier and
locator of 16 bytes. Thus, the benchmarks for the cryptographic operations on the PC with
an Intel Core2 Duo 3.33 GHz CPU are the same ones as in the implementation of BPF-GLI,
which are already presented in Table 3.1. For masked identifier resolution and umasked/-
masked routing in BPF-HAIR, we have used the same structures as in BPF-GLI’s implemen-
tation. The sizes of these structures are already given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.4 shows the sizes of unmasked, semi-, and fully masked structures implemented for
BPF-HAIR which has been deployed in the topology illustrated in Figure 4.40. In this topol-
ogy, the address of an endpoint contains three locators. Thus, the address structure and the
other structures containing the address structure have a huge size, and their sizes are highly
dependent on the number of the levels. Moreover, this effect is more reflected in case of
full masking. In summary, BPF-HAIR introduces a size overhead increase by a factor 5.55
and 12.16 in average for semi- and full masking implemented in a topology consisting of four
levels.
Table 4.5 presents the convergence times of conventional and SDN-like routing table setups in
a domain. By means of the SDN-like realisation, we have also achieved a performance increase
here similar to the implementation of BPF-GLI. However, the routing table setup in a domain
converges much faster than in BPF-GLI (compare with Table 4.3). The cause of this is that
BPF-HAIR splits the entire infrastructure into more fine-grained domains. Thus, BPF-HAIR
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Size in bytes Increase by factor
Unmasked Semi-masked Fully masked Semi-masked Fully masked
Address 66 243 774 3.68 11.72
Network header 145 499 1561 3.44 10.76
Edge mapping
reg. packet
17 259 259 15.23 15.23
Mapping pointer
reg. packet
83 325 1033 3.91 12.44
Mapping lookup
req. packet
86 440 971 5.11 11.29
Mapping lookup
rep. packet
69 311 842 4.50 12.20
Mapping table
entry
70 314 845 4.48 12.07
Mapping pointer
table entry
86 330 1037 3.83 12.05
Mapping lookup
cache entry
90 527 1058 5.85 11.75
Table 4.4: Size of unmasked, semi-, and fully masked structures.
Time in milliseconds Increase
Unmasked Masked by factor
Conventional
routing table setup
15.27 642.94 42.10
SDN-like
routing table setup
5.05 495.15 98.04
Table 4.5: Routing convergence times.
nodes have to maintain smaller routing tables than in BPF-GLI. In this regard, we can state
that BPF-HAIR’s architecture is more scalable than the architecture in BPF-GLI. The exe-
cution times for resolving an unmasked and a masked identifier to a MAC address in case of
an empty neighbour cache are already given in Table 4.3.
The performance of the controller component and network stack for BPF-HAIR has been
evaluated in the same ping-pong scenario as in the evaluation of BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.7).
Figures 4.42 and 4.43 show the individual RTTs for the unmasked, semi-, and fully masked
ten ping and pong packets which are handled hop-by-hop and flow-based.
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Figure 4.43: Round trip times for packets handled flow-based.
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Since the source endpoint has first to find out the actual locator sequence of the destina-
tion endpoint, the RTT for the first packet in each case is more than for the remaining
packets. The RTT differences between the first packet and the remaining packets represent
the execution times for mapping lookups in each case. Here, the mapping lookups take more
time than in BPF-GLI, since the mapping lookup requests are forwarded to the mapping
system in the INT in which the destination endpoint resides.
While the unmasked and semi-masked packets have similar RTTs as in BPF-GLI, the round
trip for fully masked packets take more time than in BPF-GLI. This is because the packets
are sent to the controller at each LAP, and the controller component performs Test() for
each incoming packet, which is a costly process. This means that BPF-HAIR with four levels
runs more Test() calls than BPF-GLI. Thus, the RTT differences between semi- and fully
BPF-HAIR are huge, while these differences in BPF-GLI are smaller. Although flow-based
semi-BPF-HAIR providing NIC and its unlinkability properties is almost as performant as
unmasked HAIR, fully BPF-HAIR cannot satisfactorily be put into practice due to its size
and execution time overheads.
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Figure 4.44: Average round trip times for masking combinations.
In BPF-HAIR, the packet addresses can be also masked asymmetrically. Figure 4.44 shows
the average RTTs of ten packets to which four masking combinations are applied. Here, every
ten packets are handled flow-based. In Figure 4.44, we have used the same denotation as in the
evaluation of BPF-GLI (see Section 4.1.7). Thus, 1 denotes the semi-masking, while 3 stands
for the full masking. The reversed maskings (1 | 3) and (3 | 1) obtain similar average RTTs
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as is the case in BPF-GLI, and both asymmetric maskings achieve smaller RTTs than the
symmetric full masking. Instead of symmetric full masking, which introduces huge size and
time overheads, both asymmetric maskings could thus be leveraged in case of a client-server
communication, where the server is well-known. Here, the client sends packets masked in the
combination (1 | 3), and the server responds with packets masked in the combination (3 | 1).
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter has defined the requirements to be fulfilled by a suitable architecture for BPF.
In order to achieve the features for an adequate BPF design, we have used the Loc/ID split
principle which supports scalability, mobility and multihoming by design and is regarded as
the de facto addressing standard for FNA. Here, we have chosen the approaches GLI-Split
and HAIR relying on this principle and extended the basic BPF design to BPF-GLI and BPF-
HAIR.
BPF-GLI fulfils the architectural requirements with the exception of a fine-grained hierar-
chical architecture so that performing of the super- and subnetting is not always possible in
its entirety. This BPF extension supports three modes of blindness providing different NAC
levels which can be flexibly adapted to certain use cases.
While the semi-blindness only supplies NIC, the full blindness provides both NIC and NLC.
In case of intra-domain communication, the alternately blind mode only offers NIC as in the
semi-blind mode, while NIC and domain-to-domain NLC are supplied in case of inter-domain
communication. The sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability properties of these three
blindness modes have been discussed against local, weak and strong global adversaries.
In BPF-GLI, it is also possible to mask the source and destination address of a packet
in different modes. Thus, BPF-GLI does not only support a symmetric NAC with multiple
levels, but also an asymmetric NAC for two communicating endpoints. In this regard, up
to nine different masking combinations are possible for a packet between two communicating
endpoints residing in different local domains. This means that BPF-GLI provides up to nine
different NAC levels. Moreover, endpoints signal their masking modes implicitly so that an
additional infrastructure is not needed for signalling the masking modes of the endpoints.
BPF-HAIR fulfils all architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design, while the length
of a locator sequence for an endpoint is dependent on the level of the domain in which the
endpoint is located. Moreover, attaching endpoints to nodes at an arbitrary level is not de-
fined in BPF-HAIR. This BPF extension also defines semi- and full blindness modes which
provide the same NAC levels as in BPF-GLI. In BPF-HAIR, the blindness mode of packet
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addresses cannot, however, alternate during the transmission. Moreover, BPF-HAIR also
allows asymmetric masking of the source and destination addresses of a packet. Thus, a
packet can be masked by means of up to four different masking combinations which support
various NAC levels.
This chapter has also presented the prototype implementations of both BPF extensions. For
the implementations on the network side, we have utilised the SDN protocol OpenFlow 1.3
by expanding the OpenFlow controller NOX by two further components. Here, we have lever-
aged the SDN-like realisation and flow-based forwarding for the implementations of BPF-GLI
and BPF-HAIR. On the host side, we have extended the framework BNS to BPF-GLI-BNS
and BPF-HAIR-BNS. The prototype implementations of both BPF extensions have been de-
ployed in a real hardware testbed to demonstrate their feasibilities for practical deployment
capability.
In our evaluations, we have compared the sizes of the unmasked, semi-, and fully masked
structures. Moreover, we have evaluated the convergence times for the unmasked and masked
routing table setups which are implemented conventionally and in the SDN-like manner. Here,
it has been demonstrated that the SDN-like realisation can achieve a not inconsiderable per-
formance increase for the routing table setup. In addition, the performances of the controller
components and the extended blind network stacks have been evaluated in a ping-pong sce-
nario. These basic experiments have demonstrated that the flow-based forwarding can obtain
a substantial improvement of packet round trip times in comparison with the hop-by-hop
handling of packets. In two further experiments, we have evaluated the average RTTs of ten
packets that are transferred flow-based between the communicating endpoints. Here, nine
masking combinations from BPF-GLI and four masking combinations from BPF-HAIR have
been applied to every ten packets. In both experiments, it has been stated that the stronger
the NAC level applied to the packets, the higher is the average RTT for these packets.
In summary, we can state that BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR demonstrate that BPF can prin-
cipally be realised by means of the existing FNA approaches and introduce significant im-
provements on the security with tolerable overheads. However, each of both BPF extensions
cannot alone achieve all of the properties required for an adequate BPF design. In the next
chapter, both BPF designs are thus combined in a way that we only adopt the beneficial
aspects of both designs.
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Chapter 5
BPF in hierarchical level-based
Loc/ID Split
The basic Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF) design demonstrates the general feasibility to
simultaneously establish the packet forwarding service and to provide network address con-
fidentiality (NAC) and its unlinkability properties. However, this design is not suitable to
be deployed in the current Internet architecture. Therefore, we have defined requirements
to be fulfilled by an adequate BPF design. In order to achieve the features for a suitable
BPF architecture, the basic BPF design has been extended to the Blind Packet Forwarding
in Global Locator, Local Locator, and Identifier Split (BPF-GLI) and to the Blind Packet
Forwarding in Hierarchical Architecture for Internet Routing (BPF-HAIR). Both extensions
rely on the Loc/ID split principle which is regarded as the de facto addressing standard for
Future Network Architecture (FNA).
BPF-GLI fulfils the architectural requirements with the exception of a fine-grained hierarchi-
cal architecture so that performing the conventional super- and subnetting is not possible in
the fully blind mode. Moreover, BPF-GLI enables that the blindness modes of packet ad-
dresses can alternate at domain borders due to locator substitutions on gateways. BPF-HAIR
fulfils all architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design, while it, however, introduces
its own issues. Since BPF-HAIR forwards packets by means of a loose source routing, the
locator sequence of an endpoint address defines the Level Attachment Points (LAPs) to be
traversed for forwarding a packet to the endpoint. Thus, the deeper the level, the longer are
the locator sequences of a packet. Hence, the address fields in a packet use a huge part of
the packet size, and their sizes are highly dependent on the number of the levels. Moreover,
attaching endpoints to nodes at an arbitrary level is not defined in BPF-HAIR. Furthermore,
the blindness modes of packet addresses cannot alternate because of the loose source routing
in BPF-HAIR.
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This chapter combines the beneficial aspects of both BPF extensions into a new design,
which we call Blind Packet Forwarding in Hierarchical Level-based Locator/Identifier Split
(BPF-HiLLIS). It does not only fulfil the requirements for an adequate BPF design but also
introduces a fine-grained, flexible and dynamic blindness. In BPF-HiLLIS, we adopt the hier-
archical scheme from BPF-HAIR and extend it such that endpoints can be attached to nodes
at an arbitrary level. Instead of the loose source routing, LAPs substitute upper and lower
level locators with each other for incoming and outgoing packets as is the case in BPF-GLI.
Thus, BPF-HiLLIS allows to flexibly alternate from the semi- to the fully blind mode, or vice
versa, at domain crossings at arbitrary levels.
In BPF-HiLLIS, endpoints can flexibly state their masking requests by defining masking
vectors. Masking vectors in a packet determine which blindness mode has to be applied to
the packet addresses at which level. The blindness level provided by a masking vector is
specified by a masking rank. Thus, up to 2k masking ranks can be established for the address
of an endpoint connected to an edge node at level k. Additionally, the source and destina-
tion addresses of a packet can be masked asymmetrically. Thus, up to 2s+d masking rank
combinations are possible for the addresses of a packet from a source endpoint at level s to a
destination endpoint at level d. Here, certain masking ranks providing different NAC levels
are classified into two blindness taxonomies having different purposes.
If both the semi- and the fully blind mode in BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR are applied in a
domain, i.e nodes in the domain maintain both the unmasked and the masked routing tables,
the nodes can make void the effect of the full blindness by exploiting their unmasked routing
tables. This chapter resolves this issue and makes it possible to apply both blindness modes
in a domain in a way that the full blindness is still effective. Moreover, the fully blind mode
in BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR requires to set up and maintain masked routing tables in entire
domain, which is a costly process as evaluated in Sections 4.1.7 and 4.2.6. In principle, only
network nodes on the route between two communicating endpoints need to maintain accord-
ing masked routing table entries to enable the fully blind packet forwarding for these two
endpoints. This chapter also presents an approach which enables a selective masked routing
table entry setup so that the fully blind packet forwarding can be performed on demand.
In the implementations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR, we have reinterpreted one of the al-
ready existing flow match field types in order to be able to define flows which make it possible
that packets do not have to be handled hop-by-hop by the controller. In our evaluations, it
has been demonstrated that we can obtain a substantial improvement on packet round trip
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times in this way. However, packets still have to be sent to the controller at certain nodes,
since the flows, which we could define, are not able to realise the required operations at these
nodes. For the implementations of our clean-slate architectures, we thus could not leverage
the benefits of OpenFlow in its entirety.
In principle, it is generally possible to extend OpenFlow accordingly by flow match field
types required by clean-slate architectures. But the extensions would be highly architecture
specific, and each extension would introduce huge implementation costs. Essentially, the main
reason why clean-slate approaches cannot leverage OpenFlow in its entirety is that OpenFlow
is based on TLV format, and the types defined in OpenFlow rely on the IP packet structure.
In this regard, we replace the TLV-based mechanism in OpenFlow with an Offset-Length-
Value (OLV)-based proceeding, which we call OLV-OpenFlow. By means of this OpenFlow
version, we intend that not each packet has to be sent to the controller at certain nodes, but
rather only the first packet. On the basis of the first packet, the required flows can be set up
for two communicating endpoints so that the remaining packets can be forwarded flow-based
without sending them to the controller.
After describing the basic idea of BPF-HiLLIS in Section 5.1, its formal construction is
presented in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we discuss the architectural features of BPF-HiLLIS
as well as the NAC levels and their unlinkability properties provided by the masking ranks
which are classified into two blindness taxonomies. After introducing the construction and
implementation of OLV-OpenFlow in Section 5.4, we present BPF-HiLLIS’s implementation
and its deployment in a software testbed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. Finally, we evaluate the
implementation in Section 5.7.
5.1 Basic idea
BPF-HiLLIS combines BPF-HAIR’s hierarchical scheme and BPF-GLI’s locator-substitution
on gateways with each other. Instead of either semi- or full masking at all levels, it is thus
possible to mask packet addresses in the semi- and fully blind modes level by level. In this
way, endpoints can flexibly define blindness scopes with regard to security properties (e.g., pri-
vate/public, or protected/insecure) of domains in which they are located or via which to reach
them. In BPF-HiLLIS, a masking vector for a packet address defines which masking mode
has to be applied at which level. A masking vector is realised as a bit vector in big-endian
order. The first most-significant bit is for level 1, the second one is for level 2, and so on.
Here, “0” stands for semi-masking, and “1” stands for full masking. For example, if the first
bit of a masking vector for a packet address is equal to 1, the address is fully masked at level 1.
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The blindness level provided by a masking vector for a packet address is represented by
a natural number called masking rank. Masking ranks are assigned to PEKS public keys
used for encrypting the identifier part of endpoint addresses (see Section 5.2.2). A masking
rank specifies how many bits have to be set in the associated masking vector. Thus, the more
bits that are set in a masking vector, the higher blindness level provided by the masking
vector. Here, multiple taxonomies can be defined to specify the order for the bit-setting, e.g.,
beginning with the most-significant or most-least bit. Figure 5.1 illustrates both taxonomies
used by an endpoint being located at level 3.
Level 2
Level 1
Level 3
X Masking ranks:
Masking vectors:
: Semi-blindness0,
: Full blindness1,
0
(0,0,0)
1
(1,0,0)
2
(1,1,0)
3
(1,1,1)
Taxonomy 1
0
(0,0,0)
1
(0,0,1)
2
(0,1,1)
3
(1,1,1)
Taxonomy 2
5
(1,0,1)
2
(0,1,0)
Unordered
Figure 5.1: Masking ranks and vectors for an endpoint at level 3.
By applying higher masking ranks in the first taxonomy, the scope of the full blindness
for the endpoint begins within the Core and expands in the direction of the endpoint. In a
semi-blind domain, the endpoint reveals its relative location and can thus be vulnerable to
active attacks performed against the entire domain, e.g., manipulating all packets originating
from a certain domain. In this regard, the endpoint can select the semi-blindness within a
domain, if the domain is protected against such attacks. Hence, the radius of domains re-
garded as secure becomes smaller by applying higher masking ranks in this taxonomy. On
that score, this taxonomy is comparable with the security taxonomy in IPsec-VPN [YS01],
where IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) tunnel length becomes longer.
In contrast to the first taxonomy, the endpoint can also begin with the most-least bit (see
Figure 5.1). By applying higher masking ranks in the second taxonomy, the radius of domains
becoming fully blind grows in the direction of the Core, beginning with the domain in which
the endpoint is located. In this way, the endpoint can mask its respective location and thus
protect itself against domain-based attacks within higher domains.
BPF-HiLLIS also enables that the endpoint can freely select semi- or full masking at an
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arbitrary level (see Figure 5.1). In this case, a masking rank is the decimal value of the binary
number represented by the associated masking vector, e.g., 5 ≡ (1, 0, 1), or 2 ≡ (0, 1, 0). In
this way, the endpoint can select full masking only within the intermediate domain regarded
as unprotected by applying the masking vector (0, 1, 0). The endpoint can perform the selec-
tion either implicitly during the mapping registration (see Section 5.2.3) or on demand by a
masking setup request (see Section 5.2.8).
𝐷𝑠𝑡 . 𝑚𝑟. : 2𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑚𝑟. : 1𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑚𝑣. : (1,1,0)𝑆𝑟𝑐.𝑚𝑣. : (1,0)𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸 𝐿5 .𝐸(𝐼𝐷7)𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐿89.𝐸(𝐼𝐷8)
𝐷𝑠𝑡 . 𝑚𝑟. : 2𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑚𝑟. : 1𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑚𝑣. : (1,1,0)𝑆𝑟𝑐.𝑚𝑣. : (1,0)𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸 𝐿5 .𝐸(𝐼𝐷7)𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸(𝐿:5).𝐸(𝐼𝐷8 )
𝐷𝑠𝑡 . 𝑚𝑟. : 2𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑚𝑟. : 1𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑚𝑣. : (1,1,0)𝑆𝑟𝑐.𝑚𝑣. : (1,0)𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸 𝐿9 . 𝐸(𝐼𝐷7)𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸(𝐿:5).𝐸(𝐼𝐷8 )
𝐷𝑠𝑡 . 𝑚𝑟. : 2𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑚𝑟. : 1𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑚𝑣. : (1,1,0)𝑆𝑟𝑐.𝑚𝑣. : (1,0)𝐷𝑠𝑡. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐿7; .𝐸(𝐼𝐷7)𝑆𝑟𝑐. 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟. : 𝐸(𝐿:5).𝐸(𝐼𝐷8 )
𝐿𝐴𝑃> 5 𝐿𝐴𝑃5 𝐿𝐴𝑃9Src. edge node Level 1Level 2 Level 2
Level 3
Dst. edge node
𝑑𝑜𝑚5 𝑑𝑜𝑚9 𝑑𝑜𝑚;𝑑𝑜𝑚@9
𝐿:5 𝐿5 𝐿9 𝐿7;𝐿89S
D
1
2
3
4
Figure 5.2: Example scenario.
We describe the basic idea of BPF-HiLLIS by means of the following scenario (see Fig-
ure 5.2). The topology in our scenario consists of a domain at level 1 (dom1), two domains at
level 2 (d˜om2 and dom2), and a domain at level 3 (dom3). The level attachment points (gate-
ways) L˜AP 1 and LAP 1 connect d˜om2 and dom2 to dom1, and dom3 is connected to dom2
by LAP 2. Within the domain dom3, a default route exists for forwarding packets to LAP 2.
Moreover, packets can be forwarded to L˜AP 1 and LAP 1 by using a default route within
each of the domains d˜om2 and dom2. Thus, dom2 is a parent domain of dom3, and dom1
is a parent domain of all other domains. In this regard, d˜om2 is a sibling domain of dom2
and dom3, where dom1 is their common parent domain. The locators L˜1 and L1 describe the
positions of L˜AP 1 and LAP 1 within dom1, and the locator L2 describes the position of LAP 2
within dom2. The endpoint S with the identifier IDS is connected to an edge node in d˜om
2.
The position of S’s edge node within d˜om2 is described by the locator L2S . The endpoint D
with the identifier IDD resides within dom
3, and the locator L3D describes the position of D’s
edge node within dom3.
156 CHAPTER 5. BPF IN HIERARCHICAL LEVEL-BASED LOC/ID SPLIT
In BPF-HiLLIS, the address of an endpoint consists a locator and its identifier. The ad-
dress locator describes the position of the endpoint within the domain in which the endpoint
is addressed. Table 5.1 gives the semi- and fully masked addresses of the endpoints S and D
that are addressed within the four domains. Here, the masked locator of a LAP or an edge
node is generated with its own public key by means of PEKS. Moreover, the identifiers of the
endpoints are encrypted with their own public keys by means of PEKS.
S’s address D’s address
Semi-masked Fully masked Semi-masked Fully masked
dom1 L˜1.E(IDS) E(L˜
1).E(IDS) L
1.E(IDD) E(L
1).E(IDD)
d˜om2 L2S .E(IDS) E(L
2
S).E(IDS) L
1.E(IDD) E(L
1).E(IDD)
dom2 L˜1.E(IDS) E(L˜
1).E(IDS) L
2.E(IDD) E(L
2).E(IDD)
dom3 L˜1.E(IDS) E(L˜
1).E(IDS) L
3
D.E(IDD) E(L
3
D).E(IDD)
Table 5.1: Semi- and fully masked addresses.
The endpoint S wants to send a packet to the endpoint D. We choose the masking rank “1”
for the source address and the masking rank “2” for the destination address. For the bit-
setting in the source and destination masking vectors, we begin with the most-significant bit.
Thus, the masking vector for the source address is (1, 0) which specifies full masking at level 1
and semi-masking at level 2. The endpoint S encrypts its own identifier with its public key
assigned to the masking rank 1, and the destination identifier with D’s public key assigned
to the masking rank 2 (see Section 5.2.1). By means of the masked destination identifier, the
endpoint S queries BPF-HiLLIS’s mapping system for an appropriate destination address and
for a destination masking vector whose blindness level is specified by the masking rank 2 (see
Section 5.2.4). The endpoint S cannot itself generate the destination masking vector, since S
does not know at which level the destination endpoint is located, and thus, the length of the
destination masking vector. The mapping system responds with the masking vector (1, 1, 0)
and the address E(L1).E(IDD). The destination masking vector specifies full masking at
levels 1 and 2, and semi-masking at level 3. The endpoint S generates the packet
< 2 | 1 | (1, 1, 0) | (1, 0) | E(L1).E(IDD) | L2S .E(IDS) >.
The LAPs on the route need the masking ranks for mapping lookups (see Section 5.2.2). In
principle, the LAPs can determine the masking ranks by means of the masking vectors. For
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that, the LAPs count the bits in the masking vectors and tries to discover the order of the
bit-setting, which is a costly process. Therefore, the masking ranks are transferred in the
packet. The packet is forwarded in the following steps (see Figure 5.2):
1. The packet is forwarded to L˜AP 1 by using the default route.
2. L˜AP 1 replaces the unmasked source locator L2S with its masked locator E(L˜
1), since
the source masking vector tells that the source address has to be fully masked at level 1.
Thus, the LAP gets the packet
< 2 | 1 | (1, 1, 0) | (1, 0) | E(L1).E(IDD) | E(L˜1).E(IDS) >.
The packet is forwarded to LAP 1 in the fully masked manner on the basis of the masked
destination locator E(L1).
3. LAP 1 queries the mapping system for a fully masked address which is valid for the desti-
nation endpoint in dom2. The mapping system responds with the address E(L2).E(IDD).
After replacing the destination address with the address from the mapping system,
the LAP gets the packet
< 2 | 1 | (1, 1, 0) | (1, 0) | E(L2).E(IDD) | E(L˜1).E(IDS) >.
On the basis of the new destination locator, the packet is forwarded to the next LAP
in the fully masked manner.
4. Since the destination masking vector specifies semi-masking at level 3, LAP 2 queries
the mapping system for a semi-masked address and gets the address L3D.E(IDD). The
fully masked destination address is replaced with the semi-masked address from the
mapping system, and the LAP gets the packet
< 2 | 1 | (1, 1, 0) | (1, 0) | L3D.E(IDD) | E(L˜1).E(IDS) >.
The packet is forwarded to the destination edge node in the semi-masked manner on
the basis of the unmasked destination locator L3D. Eventually, the packet arrives at
the destination edge node which resolves the masked destination identifier to a MAC
address and forwards the packet to the MAC address.
5.2 Construction
BPF-HiLLIS adopts the level-based hierarchical scheme from BPF-HAIR and extends it so
that endpoints can be attached to nodes at an arbitrary level. The top level of the hierarchy
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is called Core. Each node in the Core belongs to one administrative domain and is under
the control of a single ISP, just like in the today’s Internet backbone. Nodes responsible for
local networks are called edge nodes. For an endpoint connected to an edge node at level k,
routing domains at levels 2 to k can be conceived as access providers or enterprise networks.
The organisation of hierarchy levels is not restricted to be globally symmetrical. Domain
providers can independently organise their own domains in various hierarchy levels.
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Figure 5.3: Level-based hierarchical scheme in BPF-HiLLIS.
A routing domain at level k is denoted by domk (see Figure 5.3). Each node in domk has a
k-level locator Lk describing the level and location of the node in domk. Levels are connected
via Level Attachment Points (LAPs) acting as gateway nodes. LAP k denotes a LAP which
connects domk and domk+1 with each other. LAP k has a k- and (k + 1)-level locator Lk
and Lk+1, which describe LAP’s location in domk and domk+1. We call domp a parent do-
main of domk with p < k, if a default route via domains at levels k − 1,...,p + 1 exists for
forwarding the packets from domk to domp.
For a node at level k, its k-level masked locator and trapdoor are E(Lk) and T (Lk) which
are generated with its own public and private key by means of PEKS. Analogously, E(IDX)
and T (IDX) denote the masked identifier and trapdoor of the endpoint X. We assume that
all network nodes, communicating endpoints, and mapping systems have already generated
a key pair using PEKS. Moreover, it is assumed that the public keys of the communicating
endpoints are already exchanged and bound to their owners. Furthermore, we make the as-
sumption that the communicating endpoints have already found the identifiers of each other,
e.g., via DNS.
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5.2.1 Addressing and masking
A masking vector mvxX for the endpoint X connected to an edge node in dom
x determines
which masking mode has to be applied to its address at which level:
mvxX = (mt
1
X , ...,mt
x
X), where mt
i
X =
0 ⇒ Semi-masking in domi1 ⇒ Full masking in domi . (5.1)
In domk, which is a child domain of domx with x < k, the address of the endpoint X is masked
according to the masking type mtxX . The blindness level provided by a masking vector of the
endpoint X is specified by its masking rank mrX which is a natural number. In principle,
up to 2x masking ranks can be defined for the endpoint X. In Section 5.3.3, we define two
blindness taxonomies into which certain masking ranks are classified.
It is decisive for the address of an endpoint, in which domain the endpoint has to be ad-
dressed (see Figure 5.4). For a given masking vector mvxX of the endpoint X connected to an
edge node in domx, the k-level (semi- or fully masked) address of the endpoint is
addrkX :
smAddrkX : Loc.E(IDX) if mtkX = 0fmAddrkX : E(Loc).E(IDX) if mtkX = 1 . (5.2)
 If the endpoint X has to be addressed in a parent domain domk of domx with 1 ≤ k < x,
Loc = Lk and E(Loc) = E(Lk) are k-level unmasked and masked locators of LAP k via
which domx can be reached (see Figure 5.4a).
 In domx and in a child domain domk of domx with x < k, Loc = LxX andE(Loc) = E(LxX)
are the unmasked and masked locators of the edge node to which the endpoint X is
connected (see Figure 5.4b).
 In case that domk is a sibling domain of domx, where domp is their next common parent
domain, Loc = Lp and E(Loc) = E(Lp) are p-level unmasked and masked locators of
LAP p connecting domp with domp+1 via which domx can be reached (see Figure 5.4c).
The masking vector associated with X’s address determines level by level whether the ad-
dress contains an unmasked or a masked locator. Moreover, the masking rank specifying
the blindness level provided by the masking vector is assigned to the PEKS public key with
which X’s identifier has to be encrypted. For each masking rank, its own PEKS key pair is
thus generated. The reason for that is discussed in Section 5.2.2.
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Figure 5.4: Addressing and masking in BPF-HiLLIS.
In domk, the header fields in a network packet from the source endpoint S in doms to the
destination endpoint D in domd consist of
mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrkD | addrkS | C(IDS). (5.3)
Both endpoints define their masking vectors according to equation 5.1, while the k-level
addresses of the communicating endpoints are generated according to equation 5.2. More-
5.2. CONSTRUCTION 161
over, C(IDS) is the ciphertext generated by conventionally encrypting (e.g., with RSA) IDS
with the corresponding public key of the endpoint D. Here, C(IDS) serves the same purpose
as in the previous BPF designs.
For packet generation, the source endpoint gets the cleartext identifier as well as the available
masking ranks and the associated public keys of the destination endpoint, e.g., via DNS. The
source endpoint chooses one of the masking ranks and encrypts the destination identifier with
the associated public key. Moreover, the source endpoint selects one of its masking ranks as
well as the associated masking vector already registered and encrypts its identifier with the
public key assigned to the selected masking rank. The mapping and masking registration
is discussed in detail below. The source endpoint gets the appropriate locator and masking
vector of the destination endpoint by means of mapping and masking lookup also presented
in detail below.
5.2.2 Mapping system
BPF-HiLLIS defines a hierarchical mapping system distributed at multiple levels (see Fig-
ure 5.5). MSk denotes the mapping system in domk and is under the control of the domain
provider. The mapping system at level 1 can be maintained by the providers of domains
at level 2 in a distributed manner. MSk maps k-level locators to the masked identifiers of
endpoints connected to edge nodes at levels up to k, and maintains their masking ranks and
vectors. The mappings are classified according to their masking ranks.
In MSk with k ≤ x, a k-level (semi- or fully masked) mapping table entry (MTEkX) for
the endpoint X connected to an edge node in domx consists of a masking rank and vector
as well as the masked identifier, trapdoor, and k-level unmasked or masked locator of the
endpoint X:
MTEkX :

smMTEkX : [mrX ,mv
x
X , (E(IDX), T (IDX)), L
k] if mtkX = 0
fmMTEkX : [mrX ,mv
x
X , (E(IDX), T (IDX)), E(L
k)] if mtkX = 1
.
 In case of k < x, Lk and E(Lk) are the k-level unmasked and masked locators of LAP k
connecting domk with domk+1 via which domx can be reached.
 If k = x, both locators are the x-level unmasked and masked locators LxX and E(LxX)
of the edge node to which the endpoint X is connected.
In contrast to the encryption function of PEKS, its trapdoor function is deterministic. This
means that the function always outputs the same trapdoor value for a pair of a cleartext
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and a private key (see Section 2.1). If MSk maintains X’s semi- and fully masked mappings
whose trapdoors are generated with the same private key, their byte values are the same, and
thus, MSk can find out that both mappings belong to the same endpoint. In this way, MSk
can disclose that E(Lk) signifies Lk. Thus, the mapping system can make void the effect of
the full blindness (see Section 5.3.2.2). With regard to the discussion above, trapdoors in
mappings for different masking ranks belonging to the endpoint X have to be generated with
different private keys in order to maintain multiple mappings for X without making void the
effect of the full blindness. Hence, the endpoint X generates a new key pair for each masking
rank. To register a mapping for the masking rank mrX , the endpoint uses its masked iden-
tifier and trapdoor which are generated with the public/private key assigned to the masking
rank (see Section 5.2.3). In this way, the byte values of trapdoors in the mapping entries for
the endpoint X differ from each other.
Test(E(IDX), T (IDX)) outputs 1, if and only if E(IDX) and T (IDX) are generated with the
same key pair (Xpub, Xpriv). Therefore, a mapping lookup request for the masking rank mrX
contains X’s masked identifier which is generated with X’s public key assigned to the masking
rank mrX (see Section 5.2.4). Moreover, upon receiving an mapping lookup request for the
masking rank mrX , the mapping system performs Test() with the masked identifier from the
request and the trapdoor in each mapping entry with the same masking rank as parameters.
Thus, the mapping system tries to find an entry containing the trapdoor which is generated
with X’s private key assigned to the masking rank mrX , and Test() outputs 1, if such an
entry exists. Due to that reason, network packets have to contain the masking ranks for the
source and destination endpoints, and the source and destination masked identifiers have to
be generated with the public keys assigned to the source and destination masking ranks.
Except the mapping system at level 1, MSk keeps the (k − 1)-level unmasked locators and
the PEKS key pairs of LAPs connecting domk with domk−1. Since these LAPs are under
the control of the domain provider which also services the mapping system, an additional
system is not needed to certify the keys. Moreover, MSk holds the semi- and fully masked
addresses of MSk−1 in domk−1 which is a parent domain of domk, if the mapping/masking
registration and lookup traffic has to be masked. These addresses can be obtained from the
provider of domk−1.
An enhanced DHCP server in a local network keeps the unmasked locator, the PEKS key pair,
and the level of the edge node responsible for the local network. Moreover, the DHCP server
holds the semi- and fully masked addresses of the mapping system responsible for the domain
to which the local network belongs. The local network provider can get these addresses from
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the domain provider and configure the DHCP server with them. If the destinations of the
mapping/masking registration and lookup messages do not have to be masked, the DHCP
server maintains only the cleartext address of the mapping system.
d-th level Mapping Table
Rank, vector Identifier Locator𝑚𝑡#$ = 0 ⟹ 𝐿#$𝑚𝑡#$ = 1 ⟹ 𝐸(𝐿#$ )(𝑚𝑟#, 𝑚𝑣#$) (𝐸 𝐼𝐷# ,𝑇(𝐼𝐷#))
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Figure 5.5: Mapping and masking registration in BPF-HiLLIS.
5.2.3 Mapping and masking registration
A new endpoint in a local network has to register the mapping of its identifier to its actual
locator at the mapping system. By means of the registration, the endpoint also defines in
which masking mode at which level a packet addressed to itself has to be forwarded. For
mapping and masking registration of the endpoint D newly connected to a local network
in domd, it is proceeded as follows (see Figure 5.5):
1. The endpoint D broadcasts a request in its local network.
2. The DHCP server in the local network responds with the trapdoor, d-level unmasked
and masked locators of the edge node responsible for the local network. Moreover, the
reply message contains the d-level semi- and fully masked addresses of the mapping
system MSd which is responsible for domd:
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dhcp-reply{LdD, E(LdD), T (LdD), smAddrdMSd , fmAddrdMSd}.
3. The endpoint defines a masking rank and vector (mrD,mv
d
D) and generates a new key
pair by means of PEKS. After that, the endpoint encrypts its identifier with the new
public key and generates the trapdoor for its identifier with the new private key by
means of PEKS. Thus, the endpoint gets the tuple (E(IDD), T (IDD)). Finally, the
endpoint sends its d-level (semi- or fully masked) mapping to MSd:
MapdD :

smMapdD : {mrD,mvdD, (E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ LdD} if mtdD = 0
fmMapdD : {mrD,mvdD, (E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ E(LdD)} if mtdD = 1
.
In case of semi-masked mapping, the endpoint uses its own semi-masked address newly
configured and the semi-masked address of the mapping system. Otherwise, the desti-
nation and source addresses of the mapping message are the fully masked addresses of
the mapping system and endpoint.
4. For the incoming k-level mapping of the endpoint D with k ≤ d, MSk performs
Test(E(IDi), T (IDD))
for each mapping table entry i which contains the same masking rank as mrD.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, i.e. an entry for the endpoint D already exists,
the entry is updated with the locator and masked identifier from the incoming
mapping message.
 If such an masking rank is not registered so far, or Test() returns 0 for all entries
with the same masking rank, a new entry is created with the values from the
message. Moreover, MSk sends the (k − 1)-level mapping of the endpoint D
to MSk−1:
Mapk−1D :

smMapk−1D : {mrD,mvdD, (E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ Lk−1} if mtk−1D = 0
fmMapk−1D : {mrD,mvdD, (E(IDD), T (IDD))⇒ E(Lk−1)} if mtk−1D = 1
.
Here, Lk−1 and E(Lk−1) are the (k−1)-level unmasked and masked locators of one
of the LAPs connecting domk with domk−1 which is the parent domain of domk.
As in step 3, the semi- or fully masked addresses of MSk−1 and MSk are used as
the destination and source addresses of the mapping message in case of semi- or
fully masked mapping.
This process is performed analogously up to MS1.
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By repeating the steps 3 and 4 with another masking rank and vector tuples, the endpoint D
can register multiple masking ranks and vectors. The masking vector (0, .., 0) is registered
by default. This masking vector corresponds to the lowest masking rank. By means of an
additional parameter in the registration message, the endpoint D can specify up to which
level a masking rank has to be registered. If the mapping registration message arrives at a
mapping system at the specified level, the message is not forwarded to the mapping system
in the parent domain anymore. Thus, only endpoints at up to the specified level can commu-
nicate with the endpoint D according to the registered masking rank. This feature is needed
for the approach in Section 5.2.8.
If the mapping registration traffic does not have to be masked, the endpoint D gets the
cleartext address of MSd and uses it as the destination address of the edge mapping message.
Moreover, MSk can use its own cleartext address and the unmasked address of MSk−1 as
the source and destination addresses of mapping messages transferred between them.
The endpoint D periodically sends its mappings serving as keep-alive messages. If a keep-alive
message is missing, e.g., because of moving to another domain, the mapping entries for D are
deleted by the mapping system. Due to change of security properties in domains, the end-
point can intend to delete a masking rank and vector tuple (mrD,mv
d
D) already registered.
For that, the endpoint sends a delete message
Delete MapD : {mrD,mvdD, T (IDD)} to MSd.
Here, T (IDD) is the trapdoor created with the private key which the endpointD has generated
for the registration of this masking rank and vector tuple. For the incoming masking delete
message with k ≤ d, MSk determines the entry holding the mapping and masking information
for the endpoint D by performing Test(). Here, the trapdoor from the delete message and the
masked identifier in each entry with the same masking rank as mrD are taken as parameters.
After finding the entry, MSk deletes the entry and forwards the delete message to the mapping
service in domk−1 which is the parent domain of domk. This proceeding is repeated up to MS1
analogously.
5.2.4 Mapping and masking lookup
To send a packet from the source endpoint S in doms to the destination endpoint D in domd,
the source endpoint chooses a masking rank specifying the blindness level to be applied for the
destination address. After encrypting the destination identifier with D’s public key assigned
to the selected masking rank mrD, the source endpoint has to find an appropriate locator of
the destination endpoint and the masking vector providing the selected blindness level. For
that, it is proceeded as follows (see Figure 5.6):
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Figure 5.6: Mapping and masking lookup in BPF-HiLLIS.
1. The source endpoint sends a s-level mapping and masking lookup request to the mapping
system MSs in doms:
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mml-reqs : {mrD, E(IDD),mrS ,mvsS , addrsS}.
Here, addrsS is the s-level address of the requesting endpoint S. Moreover, the mask-
ing rank mrS specifies the blindness level provided by the masking vector mv
s
S which
is selected to mask the source address of the packets for the communication with the
endpoint D. These values are required to address the requesting endpoint and to ac-
cordingly mask its address in a reply message.
2. For the incoming request, MSs performs
Test(E(IDD), T (IDi))
for each mapping table entry i with the same masking rank as mrD.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, it means that either s = d, i.e. both endpoints
are connected to edge nodes in the same domain (see Figure 5.6a) , or doms is a
parent domain of domd with s < d (see Figure 5.6b). Thus, MSs sends the s-level
mapping and masking lookup reply back to the endpoint S:
mml-replys : {mvdD, addrsD}
 In case of s = d, addrsD contains the unmasked or masked locator of the edge
node to which D is connected.
 Otherwise (i.e, s < d), the address in the reply message contains the s-level
unmasked or masked locator of LAP s via which domd can be reached.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, the locator in the address of the requesting
endpoint is updated with the (s − 1)-level locator of LAP s−1 connecting doms
with doms−1 which is the next parent domain of doms. Here, mts−1S determines
whether the (s− 1)-level unmasked or masked locator of LAP s−1 is taken for up-
dating the locator. Thus, the s-level address of S is updated with its (s − 1)-
level address. After that, the (s − 1)-level mapping and masking lookup re-
quest mml reqs−1 is forwarded to the mapping system in the next parent domain.
3. For the incoming p-level mapping and masking lookup request mml reqp with p < s,
the mapping system MSp in domp, which is a parent domain of doms, performs Test()
analogously in oder to find an entry holding the mapping and masking information for
the requested masking rank and masked identifier.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry, it means that either d = p and domd is a parent
domain of doms (see Figure 5.6c), or domd is a sibling domain of doms and domp
is the next common parent domain of doms and domd (see Figure 5.6d). Thus,
MSp responds with D’s masking vector and p-level address addrpD.
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 In case of d = p, addrpD contains the unmasked or masked edge locator of the
endpoint D according to mtpD.
 If the endpoint D resides in a sibling domain of doms, the locator of addrpD
is the p-level unmasked or masked locator of LAP p via which domd can be
reached.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries in MSp, the address of the requesting endpoint is
updated, and the request is forwarded to the mapping system in the next parent
domain in the same manner as described above.
4. Step 3 is analogously performed until Test() returns 1 in a parent domain of doms.
If Test() also returns 0 for all entries in MS1, the requesting endpoint S gets an ”un-
registered” message.
If the endpoint S gets an unregistered message, it tries to perform a new lookup with another
masking rank or with the lowest masking rank which is registered by default. The endpoint S
can cache the values from the reply message so that it does not have to perform a lookup for
each packet. Moreover, the endpoint S can use the unmasked address of MSs, if the mapping
lookup traffic does not have to be masked. Furthermore, MSk can also use its own unmasked
address and the unmasked address of MSk−1 as the source and destination addresses of an
forwarded request message.
For a packet, which comes from the domain at the upper level and contains Lk or E(Lk) as its
k-level destination locator, LAP k queries MSk+1 for the (k+ 1)-level address of the destina-
tion endpoint D. The request message contains the masked destination identifier as well as the
destination masking rank and vector of the packet. For the lookup request, MSk+1 performs
Test() with the masked identifier from the request message and trapdoor in each mapping
table entry containing the requested masking rank as parameters. Thus, the mapping system
determines the entry holding the mapping and masking information for the endpoint D and
responds with D’s (k+ 1)-level address addrk+1D . LAP
k can cache the locator from the reply
message for further packets addressed to the endpoint D.
5.2.5 Enhanced masked routing
If both the unmasked and masked routing in Section 4.1.2.1 are performed in a domain, the
network node M has the following unmasked and masked routing table entries for the network
node N with the locator LocN :
umRTEN : [LocN , PN , DN ] and mRTEN : [(E(LocN ), T (LocN )), PN , DN ]
Here, PN is the number of the port via which the network node N can be reached, and DN
is the distance to the network node N . Moreover, E(LocN ) and T (LocN ) are N ’s masked
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Figure 5.7: Enhanced masked routing in BPF-HiLLIS.
locator and trapdoor which are generated with its public and private key by means of PEKS.
For an incoming fully masked packet containing E(LocN ) as its destination locator, the net-
work node M performs Test() with the masked destination locator and the trapdoor in each
masked routing table entry as parameters in order to determine the port via which the packet
has to be forwarded. Thus, Test() returns 1 for the entry mRTEN . But the network node M
can compare the tuple (PN , DN ) from mRTEN with the tuple (Pi, Di) in each unmasked
routing table entry umRTEi. Eventually, the tuples in mRTEN and umRTEN match each
other. Thus, the network node M finds out that E(LocN ) signifies LocN . This means that the
network node discloses the destination locator of the incoming packet. In this way, network
nodes can make void the effect of the full blindness by exploiting their unmasked routing
tables.
In order to resolve this issue, we enhance the masked routing (see Figure 5.7). Here, a
170 CHAPTER 5. BPF IN HIERARCHICAL LEVEL-BASED LOC/ID SPLIT
masked routing table entry for the network node N is
mRTEN : [(E(LocN ), T (LocN )), PN , (RSDN +DN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
RDN
].
Here, RDN is a random distance to the network node N , which is the sum of N ’s random start
distance RSDN and real distance DN . For the cold start in the enhanced masked routing,
the network node N puts the random start distance RSDN ≥ 2 (instead of 0) as the distance
to its local network into the first masked routing table entry. A masked routing update entry
for the network node N contains its masked locator, trapdoor, and random distance:
mRUEN : [(E(LocN ), T (LocN )), RDN ].
For the masked routing update, network nodes proceed in the same manner as described in
Section 3.1.3. Figure 5.7 visualises the enhanced masked routing for a basic topology con-
sisting of three network nodes. Thus, a network node cannot state with certainty that the
masked locator in a masked routing table entry signifies the cleartext locator in an unmasked
routing table entry, if the port-distance tuples in both entries match each other.
The unmasked and masked routing is performed domain-wise as in BPF-HAIR. Thus, a
network node in domk keeps unmasked and masked routing information only for the nodes
in domk. Moreover, LAP k maintains two unmasked and masked routing tables for domk
and domk+1. Furthermore, each node in domk holds an unmasked and a masked routing
table entry defining the default route to LAP k−1 connecting domk with domk−1.
5.2.6 Selective masked routing table entry setup
Masked routing table setup in an entire domain is a costly process as evaluated in Sec-
tions 4.1.7 and 4.2.6. In principle, only network nodes on the route between two commu-
nicating endpoints need to maintain according masked routing table entries to enable the
fully blind packet forwarding for these two endpoints. While unmasked routing is performed
by default, we propose multiple approaches for different cases to selectively set up masked
routing table entries.
5.2.6.1 Case 1
If a masked routing table entry for a single network node A has to be set up at each node in
a domain, it is proceeded as follows (see Figure 5.8):
1. The network node A encrypts its locator with its public key and generates the trapdoor
for the locator with its private key by means of PEKS. After that, A chooses a random
start distance RSDA as the distance to its local network and creates a masked routing
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Figure 5.8: Selective masked routing table entry setup in case 1.
table entry with its masked locator, trapdoor, random distance, and port number for
its local network. Finally, A broadcasts a undirected masked routing table entry setup
(undrct-mRTE-set) message for itself:
undrct-mRTE-setA : {(E(LocA), T (LocA)), RDA}.
2. For the incoming setup message, each network performs
Test(E(LocA), T (Loci))
for each masked routing table entry i.
 If Test() returns 1 for an entry i, it means that an entry is already set up for the
network node A. In this case, the distances in the entry and setup message are
compared with each other:
 If the distance1 in the entry is greater than (RDA + 1), the entry is updated
with the masked locator E(LocA), the distance (RDA + 1), and the number
of the port via which the setup message has been received.
 Otherwise, only the masked locator in the entry is updated with the masked
locator from the setup message.
 If Test() returns 0 for all entries, a new entry is created with E(LocA), T (LocA),
(RDA + 1), and the number of the port via which the network node has received
the setup message.
1Hop count
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If a new entry is created, or the distance in an entry is updated, the network node sends
the updated setup message
undrct-mRTE-setA : {(E(LocA), T (LocA)), (RDA + 1)}
to all of the neighbours except the neighbour that the setup message has arrived from.
After the setup has terminated, endpoints can send packets to the endpoints connected to
the network node A in the fully masked manner.
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Figure 5.9: Selective masked routing table entry setup in case 2.
5.2.6.2 Case 2
If a network node A intends to set up masked routing table entries for itself only at the nodes
on the route to a selected network node F for which masked routing table entries are already
set up at each node, it is proceeded as follows (see Figure 5.9):
1. The network node A first creates a masked routing table entry for itself as described
in step 1 in Section 5.2.6.1. Next, A performs Test() with F ’s masked locator and the
trapdoor in each masked routing table entry as parameters. Finally, A sends a directed
masked routing table entry setup (drct-mRTE-set) message via the port mapped in the
entry for which Test() returns 1:
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {E(LocF ), (E(LocA), T (LocA)), RDA}.
2. For the incoming setup message, a network node N performs
Test(E(LocF ), T (LocN ))
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in order to determine whether it is the target node of the setup message.
 If Test() returns 1, it means that N is addressed as the network node at which the
setup has to terminate. In this case, N creates a new entry or updates an already
existing one for the network node A as proposed in step 2 in Section 5.2.6.1.
 Otherwise, the network node proceeds in the same manner in order to create a new
entry or to update an already existing one for the network node A. After that, N
performs Test() with F ’s masked locator and the trapdoor in each masked routing
table entry as parameters. Finally, the updated setup message is sent via the port
mapped in the entry for which Test() returns 1:
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {E(LocF ), (E(LocA), T (LocA)), (RDA + 1)}.
In this way, a blind route is set up between the network nodes A and F so that the endpoints
connected to both network nodes can communicate with each other in the fully blind mode.
5.2.6.3 Case 3
Here, it is the same case as in Section 5.2.6.2, but no masked routing table entries are set up
for the selected network node F . In this case, a unidirectional blind route is first set up, and
after that, the route is made bidirectional. For that, we propose two approaches:
Approach 1
1. After creating a masked routing table entry for itself, the network node A broadcast a
directed setup message containing a time-to-live value (see Figure 5.10):
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {E(LocF ), (E(LocA), T (LocA)), RDA, TTL}.
2. For the incoming setup message, a network node N checks whether it is addressed in the
message by proceeding in the same manner as introduced in step 2 in Section 5.2.6.2.
 If this is the case, N creates a new entry for the network node A and goes on to
step 3.
 Otherwise, N creates a temporary entry for A including the time-to-live value and
starts a countdown timer for the temporary entry. After that, the updated setup
message is sent via all ports except the port via which the setup message has
arrived:
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {E(LocF ), (E(LocA), T (LocA)), (RDA + 1), TTL}.
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Figure 5.10: Selective masked routing table entry setup by means of approach 1 in case 3.
3. If the setup message arrives at the network node F , which is specified in the message, the
network node F creates entries for A and itself. Thus, a unidirectional blind route is set
up between the network nodes A and F . Now, the route has to be made bidirectional.
For that, the network node F sends a directed setup message for itself via the port
specified in the entry for the network node A:
drct-mRTE-setF→A : {E(LocA), (E(LocF ), T (LocF )), RDF }.
4. For the incoming setup message, a network node N performs Test() with A’s masked
locator and its own trapdoor as parameters.
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 If Test() returns 0, N performs Test() with A’s masked locator and the trap-
door in each temporary masked routing table entry as parameters. The entry for
which Test() returns 1 is made permanent. After that, N creates a new entry or
updates an already existing one for the network node F as introduced in step 2
in Section 5.2.6.1. Eventually, the updated setup message is sent via the port
specified in the entry which is made permanent:
drct-mRTE-setF→A : {E(LocA), (E(LocF ), T (LocF )), (RDF + 1)}.
If Test() returns 0 for all temporary entries, the setup message is dropped.
 Otherwise (i.e., the message has arrived at the network node A), a new masked
routing table entry for F is created, and the setup terminates.
5. If the countdown timer for a temporary entry fires at a node, the node deletes the entry.
Approach 2
The flooding in approach 1 can be avoided by revealing only the one end-node of the blind
route between the network nodes A and F . Here, we leverage the unmasked routing tables
entries which are set up by default (see Figure 5.11):
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Figure 5.11: Selective masked routing table entry setup by means of approach 2 in case 3.
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1. The network node A creates a masked routing table entry for itself. After that, A sends
a directed setup message containing F ’s unmasked locator via the port mapped in the
unmasked routing table entry for F :
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {LocF , (E(LocA), T (LocA)), RDA}.
2. For the incoming setup message, a network node N checks whether it is specified as the
network node at which the setup has to terminate.
 If this is the case, it means that the setup message has arrived at its destination
node F . In this case, the network node creates masked routing table entries for A
and itself and continues with step 3.
 Otherwise, the network node creates a new entry or updates an already existing
one for A. After that, the updated setup message is sent via the port mapped in
the unmasked routing table entry for F :
drct-mRTE-setA→F : {LocF , (E(LocA), T (LocA)), (RDA + 1)}.
3. After creating masked routing table entries for A and itself, the network node F sends
a directed setup message for itself via the port which is specified in the entry for A:
drct-mRTE-setF→A : {E(LocA), (E(LocF ), T (LocF )), RDF }.
4. For the incoming setup message, network nodes on the route to the network node A
proceed analogously in order to create entries for the network node F .
5.2.7 Packet delivery
The source endpoint S in doms wants to send a packet to the destination endpoint D in domd.
Here, the source and destination addresses of the packet have to be masked according to
the selected masking ranks mrS and mrD. It is assumed that both endpoints have already
registered their masking ranks and the associated masking vectors as proposed in Section 5.2.3.
By means of PEKS, the source endpoint first encrypts the source and destination identifiers
with its own and D’s public keys which are assigned to the selected masking ranks. After
that, the source endpoint finds D’s appropriate locator and masking vector as introduced in
Section 5.2.4. Based on the locations of the domains doms and domd relative to each other,
we have the following cases.
5.2.7.1 Intra-domain packet forwarding
If the source and destination endpoints S and D reside in the same domain (see Figure 5.12),
i.e. s = d, the source endpoint gets D’s masking vector mvsD and s-level address addr
s
D
containing D’s unmasked or masked edge locator, and it thus generates the packet
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Figure 5.12: Intra-domain packet forwarding in BPF-HiLLIS.
< mrD | mrS | mvsD | mvsS | addrsD | addrsS >.
The source endpoint checks the masking type mtsD in D’s masking vector mv
s
D.
 If mtsD = 0, D’s address is semi-masked. In this case, the source endpoint checks
whether the source and destination addresses have the same unmasked locator.
 If LsS = LsD, i.e. both endpoints are connected to the same edge node, the source
endpoints resolves the masked destination identifier to the MAC address of the
destination endpoint and sends the packet to this MAC address (see Figure 5.12a).
 Otherwise, the packet is sent to the edge node to which the source endpoint is
connected (see Figure 5.12b).
 If mtsD = 1, the destination address contains D’s masked edge locator E(LsD). In this
case, S performs Test() with the masked destination locator and the trapdoor for S’s
edge locator as parameters.
 If Test() returns 1, i.e. the source and destination endpoints are connected to
the same local network, the masked destination identifier is resolved to D’s MAC
address, and the packet is sent to the destination endpoint (see Figure 5.12a).
 Otherwise, the source endpoint sends the packet to its edge node (see Figure 5.12b).
For the incoming packet, a network node in doms checks whether mtsD is set.
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 If this is the case, i.e. the destination address is fully masked, the network node per-
forms Test() with the masked destination locator and the trapdoor in each masked
routing table entry as parameters. The packet is then forwarded via the port mapped
in the entry for which Test() returns 1.
 Otherwise, the network node performs conventional longest prefix matching and sends
the packet via the port mapped in the matched entry.
Eventually, the packet arrives at the edge node to which the destination endpoint is connected.
The destination edge node determines that the packet is addressed to its own local network.
After resolving the masked destination identifier to D’s MAC address, the packet is sent to
this MAC address.
5.2.7.2 Top-down packet forwarding
If doms is a parent domain of domd with s < d, the source endpoint gets D’s masking
vector mvdD and s-level address addr
s
D which contains the s-level unmasked or masked locator
of LAP s via which domd can be reached. Thus, the source endpoint creates the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrsD | addrsS >.
To send the packet to the destination endpoint, the following steps are performed (see Fig-
ure 5.13):
1. According to the masking type mtsD, the packet is forwarded to LAP
s in semi- or fully
masked manner.
2. For the incoming packet with s ≤ k < d− 1, LAP k proceeds as follows:
 If mtk+1D = 0, i.e. the destination address has to be semi-masked in domk+1, LAP k
gets D’s (k + 1)-level address addrk+1D from MS
k+1 in domk+1. This address
contains the (k + 1)-level unmasked locator of LAP k+1 via which to reach domd.
 If the masking type mtk+1D is set, LAP k queries MSk+1 for D’s (k + 1)-level ad-
dress addrk+1D which contains the (k + 1)-level masked locator of LAP
k+1.
After that, LAP k replaces the k-level destination address of the packet with addrk+1D
and gets the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrk+1D | addrsS >.
According to the masking type mtk+1D , the packet is forwarded to LAP
k+1 in the semi-
or fully masked manner within domk+1.
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Figure 5.13: Top-down packet forwarding in BPF-HiLLIS.
3. Eventually, the packet arrives at LAP d−1. According to the masking type mtdD, LAP
d−1
queries MSd for D’s d-level address addrdD containing the d-level unmasked or masked
locator of the edge node to which the destination endpoint is connected. After replacing
the destination address with addrdD, the packet is forwarded to the destination endpoint
in the semi- or fully masked manner according to the masking type mtdD.
5.2.7.3 Bottom-up packet forwarding
If domd is a parent domain of doms with d < s, the source endpoint S obtains D’s masking
vector mvdD and d-level address addr
d
D. According to the masking type mt
d
D, the destination
address contains the d-level unmasked or masked locator of the edge node to which the
destination endpoint is connected. Thus, the source endpoint generates the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrdD | addrsS >.
For forwarding the packet to the destination endpoint, it is proceeded as follows (see Fig-
ure 5.14):
1. The packet is forwarded to LAP s−1 by means of the unmasked or masked default route
according to mtdD.
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Figure 5.14: Bottom-up packet forwarding in BPF-HiLLIS.
2. For the incoming packet with s−1 ≤ k < d, LAP k checks whether the masking type mtkS
is set.
 If this is the case, LAP k replaces the source locator of the packet with its k-level
masked locator.
 Otherwise, the source locator of the packet is replaced with the k-level unmasked
locator of LAP k.
Thus, the source address of the packet is substituted with S’s k-level address addrkS ,
and LAP k gets the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrdD | addrkS >.
After that, the packet is forwarded to LAP k−1 by using the unmasked or masked default
route according to the masking type mtdD.
3. Eventually, LAP d receives the packet. According to the masking type mtdS , LAP
d
replaces the source locator of the packet with its own d-level unmasked or masked
locator. After that, the packet is forwarded to the destination endpoint in the semi- or
fully masked manner on the basis of the masking type mtdD.
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Figure 5.15: Packet forwarding between sibling domains in BPF-HiLLIS.
5.2.7.4 Packet forwarding between sibling domains
If doms and domd are sibling domains and domp is their next common parent domain with
1 ≤ p < s and 1 ≤ p < d, the source endpoint S gets D’s masking vector mvdD and p-
level address addrpD. According to the masking type mt
p
D, this address contains the p-level
unmasked or masked locator of LAP p via which to reach domd. Thus, the source endpoint
creates the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrpD | addrsS >.
The packet is forwarded in the following steps (see Figure 5.15):
1. Until the packet arrives in domp, the packet is forwarded in the bottom-up manner as
described in Section 5.2.7.3. After replacing the source address of the packet with S’s p-
level address according to the masking type mtpS , L˜AP
p gets the packet
< mrD | mrS | mvdD | mvsS | addrpD | addrpS >.
2. On the basis of the masking type mtpD, the packet is forwarded to LAP
p in the semi-
or fully masked manner within domp.
3. From then on, the packet is forwarded in the top-down manner as proposed in Sec-
tion 5.2.7.2.
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5.2.8 Fully blind packet forwarding on demand
By means of masking registration, an endpoint D can implicitly signal in which mode at which
level a packet addressed to itself has to be forwarded. The endpoint D can register differ-
ent masking ranks so that it can communicate with multiple endpoints according to various
masking ranks. Here, a source endpoint S aiming to communicate with D selects a masking
rank and checks by means of masking lookup whether the masking rank is registered. If not, S
tries the lookup with another masking rank or with the lowest masking rank which is regis-
tered by default and indicates semi-masking in each domain on the route to D. In summary,
the endpoint D determines which masking ranks can be applied to packets addressed to itself.
However, it is also desirable that S is capable of requesting full masking at selected levels.
For that, we propose an approach described on the basis of sibling domain communication
which includes intra-domain, top-down, and bottom-up packet forwarding (see Section 5.2.7).
Thus, the endpoints S and D are located in doms and domd, and domp is their next common
parent domain with 1 ≤ p < s and 1 ≤ p < d.
We use approach 2 in case 3 (see Section 5.2.6.3) in order to set up a blind route between
two selected nodes. For setting up blind routes within domains at selected levels between the
endpoints S and D, it is proceeded as follows (see Figure 5.16):
1. S encrypts the destination identifier with D’s public key assigned to the lowest masking
rank and gets E(IDD). After that, S performs a lookup according to this masking rank
as proposed in Section 5.2.4. Thus, S gets the p-level unmasked locator Lp of LAP p
via which domd can be reached.
2. After defining the masking rank and vector (mrS ,mv
s
S) for itself, S registers them at
the mapping systems up to the level p as described in Section 5.2.3.
3. S defines the masking rank and vector (mrD,mv
d
D) for D and sends the p-level masking
request to its edge node:
masking-reqp{(mrD,mvdD, (Lp, E(IDD)), (mrS ,mvsS , addrpS)}.
Here, addrpS is S’s p-level address which is registered at MS
p in step 2.
4. For the incoming masking request, the edge node checks the masking type mtsS in the
masking vector mvsS :
 If mtsS = 1, the edge node initiates the setup of a blind route between itself
and LAP s−1 which is the LAP used for default routing to the next parent domain.
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Figure 5.16: Masking setup on demand in BPF-HiLLIS.
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After setting up the blind route, the masking request is sent to LAP s−1 by using
the default route.
 Otherwise, the masking request is directly sent to LAP s−1 by means of the default
route.
5. For the incoming masking request with s−1 ≤ k < p, LAP k checks whether the masking
type mtkS is set:
 If this is the case, a blind route is set up between LAP k and LAP k−1, and the
masking request is sent to LAP k−1.
 Otherwise, LAP k directly sends the masking request to LAP k−1 by using the
default route.
6. Eventually, the masking request arrives at L˜AP p which connects domp+1 and domp
with each other. This LAP checks the masking types mtpS and mt
p
D in the masking
vectors mvsS and mv
d
D:
 If both masking types are set, a bidirectional blind route is set up between L˜AP p
and LAP p whose p-level unmasked locator is specified in the masking request.
After that, the masking request is sent to LAP p.
 If mtpS = 1 and mtpD = 0, only a unidirectional blind route for L˜AP p is set up, and
the request is sent to LAP p. Here, L˜AP p puts an additional parameter into the
blind route setup message, which signals that LAP p does not have to send a blind
route setup message for itself.
 In case of mtpS = 0 and mtpD = 1, L˜AP p sends the masking request to LAP p.
Here, the masking request contains the p-level unmasked locator of L˜AP p and an
additional parameter signalling that LAP p has to induce to set up a unidirectional
blind route for itself in the direction of L˜AP p.
 Otherwise, the masking rank is directly sent to LAP p.
7. For the incoming k-level masking request at LAP k with p ≤ k < d− 1, it is proceeded
as follows:
(a) LAP k resolves D’s masked identifier to the (k + 1)-level unmasked locator Lk+1
of LAP k+1 via which to reach domd.
(b) Lk in the masking request is replaced with Lk+1, and LAP k gets the (k + 1)-level
masking request
masking-reqk+1{(mrD,mvdD, (Lk+1, E(IDD)), (mrS ,mvsS , addrpS)}.
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(c) If mtk+1D is set, a blind route is set up between LAP
k and LAP k+1, and the masking
request is sent to LAP k+1. Otherwise, LAP k directly sends the masking request
to LAP k+1.
8. Upon receipt of the (d − 1)-level masking request, LAP d−1 proceeds analogously. But
here, LAP d−1 gets D’s d-level unmasked edge locator LdD, and a blind route is set up
between LAP d−1 and the edge node to which D is connected, if mtdD is set.
9. For the incoming masking request, D’s edge node resolves E(IDD) to D’s MAC address
and sends the request to D.
10. After receiving the request, D registers the masking rank and vector (mrD,mv
d
D) at the
mapping systems up to the level p.
11. Finally, D generates a BPF-HiLLIS network packet addressed to S. As the source
and destination masking ranks and vectors as well as the destination address of the
packet, D takes the values from the masking request. The source address of the packet
is D’s d-level address registered in step 10. After that, the packet is sent to S as
described in Section 5.2.7.4. This packet signals the acknowledgment of the masking
setup in its payload.
After receiving the acknowledgment packet, the source endpoint S can start to send packets
whose source and destination addresses are masked on the basis of the masking vectors mvsS
and mvdD.
5.3 Analysis
In BPF-HiLLIS, the address of an endpoint consists of a locator and the identifier of the
endpoint. As described in Section 5.2.1, it depends on the domain within which the endpoint
has to be addressed, which locator has to be taken for the address. Moreover, the current
level locator of the address is replaced with the next level locator at each level border. In
this way, the length of the address is not dependent on the level of the domain in which the
endpoint is located. Thus, the address length remains constant unlike in BPF-HAIR.
The identifier part of the address is encrypted with the associated public key of the end-
point according to the selected masking rank to be applied for the address. If the address has
to be fully masked within a domain, the locator of the address is encrypted with the public
key of the owner of the locator. Thus, it is well-defined, which parts the address consists of,
and which part has to be encrypted with which public key. Hence, BPF-HiLLIS fulfils the
requirement for a hierarchical addressing structure.
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By means of mapping and masking lookup, a source endpoint directly gets the corresponding
masked locator of a destination endpoint from the mapping system. For packet generation,
the source endpoint thus needs only the corresponding public key of the destination endpoint
according to the selected masking rank. The public key of an edge node is maintained by
the DHCP server in the local network for which the edge node is responsible, where the edge
node and the DHCP server are under the control of the local network provider. Moreover,
the public key of LAP k connecting domk and domk+1 with each other is kept by MSk+1.
Here, LAP k and MSk+1 are managed by the provider of domk+1. Hence, an additional in-
frastructure is not required for exchanging and certifying the public keys of network nodes
and LAPs.
BPF-HiLLIS adopts the hierarchical scheme of BPF-HAIR, in which routing table entries
are already aggregated accordingly. In this way, the entire infrastructure is super- and sub-
netted by design. Thus, an additional process is not required to aggregate and partition the
networks. Moreover, BPF-HiLLIS extends the hierarchical scheme in a way that endpoints
can be attached to nodes at an arbitrary level. In summary, we can state that BPF-HiLLIS
fulfils all of the architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design.
5.3.1 Semi-blindness
If the masking vector for a packet address indicates a semi-masking within a domain at a
specified level, the identifier part of the address is transferred and processed end-to-end in
encrypted form, while the address locator is handled within the domain in cleartext. Thus,
semi-masking of a packet address within a domain provides network identifier confidential-
ity (NIC) for the address within the domain. In order to forward a packet whose destination
address is semi-masked within a domain, the network nodes in the domain do not need to
maintain masked routing table entries. Hence, a network node in the domain knows the pre-
vious and next hop of the packet.
As already discussed in Section 4.1.4.1, NIC deduces sender/recipient and relationship un-
linkabilities for communicating endpoints, since only they are the authorised entities having
access to the cleartext identifiers of packets transferred between them. Because of handling
locators in cleartext, the unlinkability properties do not apply to domains and local networks.
In case of intra-domain communication, a packet can thus be linked to its source or des-
tination local network, if the source or destination address of the packet is semi-masked. In
case of inter-domain communication, a local adversary being located within an intermediate
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domain can link a packet to its previous or next domain, if the source or destination address
of the packet is semi-masked within the intermediate domain. To a strong and weak global
adversary, the same unlinkability properties apply as in the semi-blind modes of BPF-GLI
and BPF-HAIR.
5.3.1.1 Mapping system
A semi-masked mapping table entry for an endpoint maintains its identifier in encrypted form
and the associated locator in cleartext. If an endpoint registers its semi-masked mapping at
the mapping system in the domain in which the endpoint is located, the location of the local
network, to which the endpoint is connected, is disclosed to the mapping system. But the
mapping system does not know which endpoint is connected to that local network. In case
of registering a semi-masked mapping of the endpoint at a mapping system at a higher level,
the mapping system knows the attachment point of the next child domain via which to reach
the endpoint. However, the mapping system does not know which endpoint can be reached
via that child domain. Thus, NIC also applies to semi-masked mapping table entries.
If the address of the requesting endpoint is semi-masked in a mapping/masking lookup request
transferred within a domain, the request cannot be linked to an endpoint as the requesting
endpoint. But due to the cleartext locator of the address, it is disclosed within the domain
from which child domain or local network the request originates.
5.3.2 Full blindness
In case of full masking a packet address within a domain, the identifier and locator parts of
the address are transferred and processed within the domain in encrypted form. This provides
NIC as well as network locator confidentiality (NLC) for the address within the domain. As
already stated in Section 4.1.4.2, together NIC and NLC provide the sender/recipient and re-
lationship unlinkabilities for communicating endpoints as wells as domains and local networks.
If the source or destination address of a packet is fully masked within a domain, a local
adversary being located within that domain thus does not know, from or to which endpoint
as well as domain and local network the packet originates or is addressed. Moreover, the same
unlinkability properties apply against a weak and strong global adversary as are the case in
the fully blind modes of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR.
As in BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR, semi- and full masking of a packet address in BPF-HiLLIS
do not aim to provide integrity of the address. In this regard, the same discussions also apply
here as in Section 4.1.4.5.
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5.3.2.1 Masked routing
In Section 5.2.5, we have discussed that a network node can make void the effect of the full
blindness, if both the semi- and fully blind mode are applied in a domain. In order to resolve
this issue, we have enhanced the masked routing as described in Section 5.2.5. Thus, network
nodes in a domain maintain random distances to each other in their masked routing tables. In
this way, the port-distance tuple in a masked routing table entry for the network node N does
not match the port-distance tuple in a unmasked routing table entry for the same network
node. Hence, a network node cannot disclose that a packet containing N ’s masked locator
as its destination locator is addressed to N by exploiting its unmasked routing table.In this
regard, both the semi- and full blindness can be applied within a domain.
For forwarding a packet with a fully masked destination address within a domain, network
nodes in that domain have to maintain masked routing table entries. In principle, it is suffi-
cient that each network node on the route of the packet within the domain keeps a masked
routing table entry for the node to be taken by the packet as its next hop. In Section 5.2.6, we
have proposed approaches for different cases to selectively set up masked routing table entries.
Section 5.2.8 has proposed an approach by means of which full blindness can be set up within
domains at selected levels between two endpoints. During the masking setup phase, network
nodes on the route between the endpoints only know to which local network and next domain
the masking request is addressed. After the setup, the packet addresses are masked on the
basis of the selected masking ranks for the source and destination endpoints. This means
that the packet addresses are encrypted with the public keys assigned to the selected masking
ranks. Since thus the byte values of the addresses in the masking request and network packets
transferred between the endpoints differ from each other, the masking request and network
packets cannot be correlated with each other.
5.3.2.2 Mapping system
If a mapping table entry for an endpoint is fully masked at a mapping system in a domain,
the entry holds the identifier of the endpoint and the associated locator in encrypted form.
In this way, information about endpoints as well as local networks and next child domains is
masked from the mapping system. Thus, NIC and NLC apply to fully masked mapping table
entries.
In case of full masking the address of the requesting endpoint in a mapping/masking lookup
request transferred within a domain, the request cannot be linked to an endpoint as the re-
questing endpoint. Moreover, it is also masked within the domain from which child domain or
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local network the request originates. If the requesting endpoint gets a fully masked address,
the endpoint does not know to which local network the requested endpoint is connected, or
via which domain the requested endpoint can be reached.
5.3.3 Blindness taxonomies
A masking vector for the address of an endpoint being located in a domain at level x is a bit
vector of length x in big-endian order. The masking vector determines at levels 1 to x whether
the semi- or full masking has to be applied for the address. Thus, up to 2x different masking
vectors can be defined for the address of the endpoint. The blindness level provided by a
masking vector is specified by its masking rank. Below, we define two blindness taxonomies
into which certain masking ranks are classified.
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…
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1…10…0
k bits (x-k) bits
1…10
…
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0 1 k x-1 xMasking ranks:
Masking vectors:
: Semi-blindness0,
: Full blindness1,
Figure 5.17: Blindness taxonomy 1 in BPF-HiLLIS.
5.3.3.1 Taxonomy 1
In this taxonomy, a masking rank determines how many bits are set beginning with the most-
significant bit in the masking vector (see Figure 5.17). For the endpoint X in domx, the
masking rank mrX = k with 0 ≤ k ≤ x specifies the masking vector
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mvxX = (1...1︸︷︷︸
k bits
(x−k) bits︷︸︸︷
0...0 ).
In case of performing this masking rank, the full blindness is effective for X’s address within
domains at levels 1 to k. Thus, NIC as well as NLC and their deduced unlinkability prop-
erties are the case within these domains. Moreover, the semi-blindness holds for the address
within domains at levels being higher than k. Hence, only NIC and the sender/recipient and
relationship unlinkabilities for the endpoint apply from level (k + 1). This taxonomy defines
up to (x+ 1) different masking ranks for the endpoint X. Here, the higher the masking rank
being applied to X’s address, the bigger is the radius of domains within which the address is
fully masked, beginning with the Core.
Since only the semi-blindness is the case up to level (k + 1), adversaries within domains
at these levels know from which previous domain packets sent by X originate, and to which
next domain packets sent to X are addressed. Thus, such packets may be affected by active
attacks performed against an entire domain, e.g., manipulating all packets originating from a
certain domain. In this regard, the endpoint can select the semi-blindness within a domain,
if the domain is protected against such attacks. Hence, the radius of domains regarded as
secure becomes smaller by applying higher masking ranks in this taxonomy. On that score,
this taxonomy is comparable with the security taxonomy in IPsec-VPN [YS01], where IP
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) tunnel length becomes longer.
In this taxonomy, up to ((s + 1) × (d + 1)) different masking rank combinations are pos-
sible for the source and destination endpoints S and D being located in sibling domains doms
and domd. Figure 5.18 illustrates the masking combinations for s = 3 and d = 3. Here, a
unbroken black or red arrow denotes that the source and destination addresses of the packet
are semi- or fully masked. Moreover, a dashed black-red arrow signifies that the source or
destination address is semi- or fully masked. If the start point of the arrow is black and
the end point is red, the source address is semi-masked and the destination address is fully
masked. In case of colouring the start and end points inversely, the full and semi-masking is
applied to the source and destination address.
By performing higher masking ranks, the communicating endpoints S and D initiates that
the respective previous and next domain of a packet is masked within more intermediate
domains. In case of symmetrically increasing the masking ranks for the source and destina-
tion addresses, we can observe that the scope of the full blindness grows in direction of both
endpoints, beginning with their next common parent domain (see the masking rank combina-
tions (0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3) in Figure 5.18). If we perform, for example, the masking rank 2
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Figure 5.18: Masking rank combinations in blindness taxonomy 1.
for the source address and increase the masking rank for the destination address, the full
blindness for both endpoints begins at level 2 on the source side and grows in direction of
the destination endpoint. Moreover, the blindness scopes are reversed in two mirror-inverted
masking rank combinations such as in (0, 2) and (2, 0).
5.3.3.2 Taxonomy 2
In contrast to the previous taxonomy, a masking rank in this taxonomy determines how many
bits are set beginning with the most-least bit in the masking vector (see Figure 5.19). For
the endpoint X in domx, the masking rank mrX = k with 0 ≤ k ≤ x specifies the masking
vector
mvxX = (
(x−k) bits︷︸︸︷
0...0 1...1︸︷︷︸
k bits
).
If we use this masking rank, the full blindness for X’s address begins from the level (x− k).
Thus, NIC as well as NLC and their deduced unlinkability properties apply to the endpoint X
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Figure 5.19: Blindness taxonomy 2 in BPF-HiLLIS.
within domains at levels being higher than (x−k). Moreover, the semi-blindness are the case
at levels 1 to (k−1). Hence, only NIC and its unlinkability properties hold for the endpoint X
within domains at these levels. As the previous taxonomy, this taxonomy defines up to (x+1)
different masking ranks for the endpoint X.
By applying higher masking ranks, the radius of domains becoming fully blind grows be-
ginning with the domain in which the endpoint is located. By means of the masking rank 1,
the endpoint masks the location of its edge node from the domain provider. In case of the
masking rank 2, the endpoint additionally masks the location of its domain from the provider
of the parent domain. In this way, the endpoint can mask its respective location within higher
parent domains in direction of the Core. Thus, the endpoint increases the radius of domains
within which the full blindness applies to the endpoint.
As the previous taxonomy, this taxonomy also defines up to ((s + 1) × (d + 1)) different
masking combinations for the source and destination endpoints S and D which reside in sib-
ling domains doms and domd. Figure 5.20 illustrates the masking combinations for s = 3
and d = 3. Here, we have used the same denotation as in Section 5.3.3.1.
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Figure 5.20: Masking rank combinations in blindness taxonomy 2.
If the communicating endpoints S and D symmetrically increase the masking ranks, the
scope of the semi-blindness for both endpoints decreases from the source and destination
sides in direction of their next common parent domain (see the masking rank combinations
(0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 2), (3, 3) in Figure 5.20). In the combinations (1, 1) and (2, 2), the full blind-
ness does not apply to both endpoints at once. Thus, the full blindness holds only for the
source endpoint in the ultimate source domain and its parent domain, while only the des-
tination endpoint gets the full blindness in the ultimate destination domain and its parent
domain. In order to achieve the simultaneous full blindness for both endpoints within one
or multiple domains, one of the communicating endpoints has to apply the masking rank 3,
while the other one has to use at least the masking rank 1. As in the previous taxonomy, the
blindness scopes are reversed in two mirror-inverted masking rank combinations.
Cross combinations of the masking ranks from the blindness taxonomies 1 and 2 are also
possible and illustrated in Figure 5.21. If we perform the masking rank 1 from taxonomy 1
for the source address and the masking rank 2 from taxonomy 2 for the destination address,
we have the simultaneous semi- and full blindness within the ultimate source and destination
domains as well as their parent domains. Moreover, an asymmetric blindness is the case
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within the common parent domain. By means of the cross combinations, the simultaneous
semi- and full blindnesses thus arise at once and within the ultimate source and destination
domains as well as their parent domains. Additionally, we have then an asymmetric blindness
within the common parent domain and its child domains.
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Figure 5.21: Cross combinations of the masking ranks from the taxonomies 1 and 2.
5.4 OLV-Openflow
In OpenFlow, a flow match field is based on the TLV format, and the types defined in Open-
Flow rely on the IP packet structure. Thus, we cannot define flows in order to realise a
clean-slate approach proposing another packet structure. One of the possible ways to im-
plement a clean-slate approach by means of OpenFlow is handling packets at the controller
hop-by-hop. For the prototype implementation of the basic BPF design, we have proceeded
in this manner, which has introduced a considerable amount of overhead.
For resolving this issue, we have reinterpreted one of the already existing flow match field
types in the implementations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. In this way, we could define flows
which make it possible to utilise the flow-based packet forwarding in OpenFlow. However,
packets still have to be sent to the controller at certain nodes, specifically at edge and gateway
nodes. This is because the flows which we could define are not able to realise the required
operations at these nodes. Thus, we could not leverage the benefits of OpenFlow in its entirety.
In principle, it is generally possible to extend OpenFlow by flow match field types required by
clean-slate architectures. But the extensions would be highly architecture specific, and each
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extension would introduce huge implementation costs. In this regard, we replace the TLV-
based mechanism in OpenFlow with an OLV-based proceeding, which we call OLV-OpenFlow.
This OpenFlow version defines a match field on the basis of an offset and length. Thus, OLV-
OpenFlow is type-free. In this way, an approach defining another packet structure can be
readily realised to leverage the SDN-like implementation and flow-based packet forwarding.
5.4.1 Construction
In OpenFlow 1.3, a packet arriving at a datapath is firstly parsed on the basis of pre-defined
types defining the respective fields of the packet according to supported protocols. Next, the
packet (i.e., its field values) goes through a pipeline in which flows matching the packet are
determined as well as the instructions defined in these flows are performed on the packet.
OLV-OpenFlow adopts this packet processing pipeline except the packet parsing step. Thus,
a datapath does not have to be protocol aware anymore.
OLV-OpenFlow also adopts the OpenFlow 1.3 protocol via which a datapath communicates
with a controller and the controller manages the datapath. Moreover, all of the structures de-
fined in OpenFlow 1.3 remain the same in OLV-OpenFlow with the exception of the structures
for flow match and instruction fields, which we describe below.
5.4.1.1 Flow match field
In OLV-OpenFlow, a flow match field consists of the following attributes:
[ Offset | Length | Comparison operator | Object | Value ].
Here, the Offset and Length are specified in bits. OLV-OpenFlow supports the comparison
operators: equal to, not equal to, greater than, and less than. The Object determines whether
the Value has to be compared to the packet, the metadata, or the ingress port number of the
packet. The metadata is a register used by OpenFlow to carry information from a flow table
to the next one.
If the Object in the match field of a flow is the incoming packet itself, a datapath firstly
takes the field from the packet which is specified by the Offset and Length in the flow match
field. Next, the datapath compares the value of this field with the Value in the match field. If
both values match, the instruction defined in the flow is performed. In case the Object is the
metadata of the packet, the datapath takes the correspondent field from the metadata and
proceeds in the same manner. If the Object specifies the ingress port number of the packet,
the Value is compared to the number of the port via which the packet has arrived.
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5.4.1.2 Flow instruction
In OpenFlow, a flow contains one or multiple instructions. An instruction can modify pipeline
processing such as directing the packet to another flow table or contains actions which are
performed either immediately or after exiting the processing pipeline. The type-free actions
(e.g., sending the packet via a specified port) remain the same in OLV-OpenFlow. The
type-related actions (e.g., pushing a VLAN tag) are replaced with the following ones:
Manipulating the value of a field
This action consists of the following attributes:
[ Offset | Length | Operator | Value ].
Here, the Offset and Length are specified in bytes and determine the field from the matching
packet which has to be manipulated with the Value on the basis of the Operator. In this
way, the value of the field from the packet can be overwritten with the Value. Moreover,
OLV-OpenFlow supports the operators: addition, subtraction, and, or, xor, not, left-shift,
and right-shift.
Adding and deleting a field
By means of this action, a field from the packet can be removed, or a new field can be added
to the packet. Here, the field is specified by a offset and length.
Replacing two fields with each other
This action replaces the values of two fields from the packet with each other. Here, both fields
have the same length and are specified with two offsets and the length.
5.4.2 Implementation
For the implementation of OLV-OpenFlow on the switch and controller sides, we have utilised
the OpenFlow 1.3 user-space software switch implementation [CPq16b] and the OpenFlow
controller NOX implementation [CPq16a] as the basis code. Here, we have reimplemented
both realisations by replacing the type-related parts with the type-free structures described
above. The OLV-OpenFlow compatible controller is called OLV-NOX.
5.5 Implementation
In the realisation of BPF-HiLLIS, two data structures implement semi- and fully masked
addresses. In each of them, an attribute defines the level of the locator. For BPF-HiLLIS,
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BPF_HiLLIS_Node
+datapath_id:uint64_t
-level:uint8_t
-locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_locator:Masked_Data
-trapdoor: uint8_t[65]
-ports: map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-neighbour_table: map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_id_res_table:vector<Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry*>*
-mapping_system:BPF_HiLLIS_Mapping_System*
-init_flows()
-add_flow_for_unmasked_RTE(entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_flow_for_masked_RTE(entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_flow_for_masked_id_res_table_entry(entry:Masked_ID_Res_Table_Entry*)
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet()
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update()
-send_masked_routing_update()
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-forward_packet(packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-default_forward(packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward(addr:Semi_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward(addr:Fully_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-masked_id_res(packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-handle_masked_id_res_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_ID_Res_Packet*)
-handle_dhc_req(in_port_no:uint32_t, saddr:uint8_t[6])
-handle_mapping_reg_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, saddr:uint8_t[6], packet:MR_Packet*)
-handle_ml_req_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, saddr:uint8_t[6], packet:ML_Req_Packet*)
+datapath_id: uint64_t
-upper_level:uint8_t, -lower_level:uint8_t
-upper_level_locator: uint8_t[16], -lower_level_locator:uint8_t[16]
-key_pair:PEKS_Key_Pair
-masked_upper_level_locator:Masked_Data, -masked_lower_level_locator:Masked_Data
-upper_level_trapdoor:uint8_t[65], -lower_level_trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
-ports:map<uint32_t, Port*>*
-upper_level_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-lower_level_neighbour_table:map<uint32_t, Neighbour_Node*>*
-unmasked_upper_level_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_upper_level_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-unmasked_lower_level_routing_table:vector<Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-masked_lower_level_routing_table:vector<Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*>*
-mapping_system:BPF_HiLLIS_Mapping_System*
-init_flows();
-init_flows_for_upper_level()
-init_flows_for_lower_level()
-add_flow_for_unmasked_RTE(level:uint8_t, entry:Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_flow_for_masked_RTE(level:uint8_t, entry:Masked_Routing_Table_Entry*)
-add_flow_for_semi_masked_MCE(loc_level:uint8_t, loc:uint8_t[16], id:Masked_Data*)
-add_flow_for_fully_masked_MCE(loc_level:uint8_t, loc:Masked_Data*, id:Masked_Data*)
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_packet_in(in_port_no:uint32_t, data:uint8_t*, size:size_t)
-send_lld_packet(level:uint8_t)
-handle_lld_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:LLD_Packet*)
-send_unmasked_routing_update(level:uint8_t)
-send_masked_routing_update(level:uint8_t)
-handle_unmasked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Routing_Update*)
-handle_masked_routing_update(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:Masked_Routing_Update*)
-handle_network_packet(in_port_no:uint32_t, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_upper_level(packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet)
-handle_network_packet_from_lower_level(packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet)
-semi_masked_forward_in_upper_level(addr:Semi_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_in_upper_level(addr:Fully_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-semi_masked_forward_in_lower_level(addr:Semi_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
-fully_masked_forward_in_lower_level(addr:Fully_Masked_Addr*, packet:BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet*)
BPF_HiLLIS_LAP
<<struct>>
BPF_HiLLIS_Network_Packet
+default_routing:uint8_t
+dst_addr_masking_rank:uint8_t
+src_addr_masking_rank:uint8_t
+dst_addr_level_depth:uint8_t
+src_addr_level_depth:uint8_t
+dst_addr_masking_vector:uint8_t
+src_addr_masking_vector:uint8_t
+dst_addr_size:uint16_t, +src_addr_size:uint16_t
+header_size:uint16_t
+payload_type:uint16_t, +payload_size:uint16_t
+dst_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+src_addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/Fully_Masked_Addr*
+payload():uint8_t*
<<struct>>
MR_Packet
+masking_rank:uint8_t
+level_depth:uint8_t
+masking_vector:uint8_t
+loc_level:uint8_t
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+locator():uint8_t*/Masked_Data*
<<struct>>
ML_Reply_Packet
+masking_rank:uint8_t
+level_depth:uint8_t
+masking_vector:uint8_t
+addr_size:uint16_t
+addr():Semi_Masked_Addr*/
Fully_Masked_Addr*
<<struct>>
ML_Req_Packet
+masking_rank:uint8_t
+masked_id:Masked_Data
X
<<struct>>
Mapping_Table_Entry
+masking_rank:uint8_t
+level_depth:uint8_t
+masking_vector:uint8_t
+loc_level:uint8_t
+masked_id:Masked_Data
+trapdoor:uint8_t[65]
+locator():uint8_t*/Masked_Data*
<<struct>>
Fully_Masked_Addr
+locator_level:uint8_t
+masked_locator:Masked_Data
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
<<struct>>
Semi_Masked_Addr
+locator_level:uint8_t
+unmasked_locator:uint8_t[16]
+masked_identifier:Masked_Data
-level:uint8_t
-mapping_table:map<uint8_t, 
vector<Mapping_Table_Entry*>*>*
-laps:vector<BPF_HiLLIS_LAP*>*
-Test(masked_id:Masked_Data*, trapdoor:uint8_t*)
+handle_mapping_reg(packet:MR_Packet*)
+handle_ml_req(packet:ML_Req_Packet*):ML_Reply_Packet*
BPF_HiLLIS_Mapping_System
X X X X
X X
X
X X X
X X
X X
Figure 5.22: UML diagram of BPF HiLLIS Node and BPF HiLLIS LAP.
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we have implemented a network packet header structure according to equation 5.3 (see Fig-
ure 5.22). Here, we have omitted the last address field as in the implementations of BPF-GLI
and BPF-HAIR. Moreover, a flag in our header structure states whether the packet has to
be forwarded by using the default route. Furthermore, two attributes define the levels of the
domains within which source and destination endpoints are located. Each of the source and
destination masking vectors has one byte. By means of this implementation, we can thus
realise a topology consisting of up to eight levels.
Since we can realise up to eight levels, a masking rank belonging to taxonomy 1 can have one
of the natural numbers 10,...,18. Here, the first digit represents the taxonomy, and the second
one determines the number of bits to be set in the associated masking vector according to
the taxonomy. Analogously, taxonomy 2 provides the masking ranks 20,...,28.
Multiple new packet structures have been implemented to realise the mapping and DHCP
functionalities in BPF-HiLLIS. For the link layer discovery, masked identifier resolution and
unmasked/masked routing, the same packet structures have been used as in the implementa-
tions of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. Each of these packet types gets a new Ethernet payload
type in our implementation. For encryption of locators and identifiers as well as for generation
of key pairs and trapdoors, we have leveraged the PEKS library [ALPK07].
The BPF-HiLLIS functionalities on the host side have been realised by the C++ class BPF-
HiLLIS-BNS implemented in the same manner as in the implementations of BPF-GLI and
BPF-HAIR. The framework BPF-HiLLIS-BNS interacts with applications via the interface
BPF HiLLIS BNS Socket in the same way as in the realisations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR.
For realising the BPF-HiLLIS functionalities on the network side, we have expanded the
OLV-OpenFlow controller OLV-NOX by the component BPF HiLLIS. Here, the C++ classes
BPF HiLLIS Node and BPF HiLLIS LAP implement the functionalities of a network node
and LAP. An UML diagram of both classes and the associated data structs is given in Fig-
ure 5.22. Here, we have omitted the data structures whose UML diagram is already presented
in Figures 3.9, 4.12, and 4.35.
As in the implementation of BPF-HAIR, a new controller component is started for each
domain. Here, network nodes and LAPs of each domain are managed by the controller com-
ponent started for that domain. For each node and LAP in a domain, a new object is created
from the classes BPF HiLLIS Node and BPF HiLLIS LAP. Moreover, the controller compo-
nent for that domain identifies and manages the objects representing nodes and LAPs in the
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same manner as proposed for the implementations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR.
5.5.1 Packet processing pipeline
For each node and LAP in a domain, the associated controller component defines flows sending
link layer discovery, routing update as well as mapping registration and lookup packets to
the controller. Additionally, each network node maintains further flows sending DHCP and
identifier resolution packets to the controller. These flows are maintained in the first flow
table (default flow table) at each node and LAP. The offset and length in the match field of
such a flow is the offset and length of the EtherType. Moreover, the match field contains one
of the values defined for the packet types above as the value of the match field. The flow has
a single instruction consisting of the action Controller-Output. In this way, packets of such
types are sent to the controller for handling them in the SDN-like manner, which we discuss
below.
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Figure 5.23: Flowchart for packet processing pipeline at network node.
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5.5.1.1 Network node
The packet processing pipeline at a network node consists of the multiple flow tables. The
flowchart of this processing pipeline is given in Figure 5.23. Besides the flows described above,
the network node maintains a further flow in its default flow table. This flow checks whether
the flag for default routing is set, and forwards the matching packets via the specified port.
Moreover, a further flow in the default flow table checks the level of the current destination
locator in an incoming packet. If the level does not match the level of the node, the flow sets
the flag for default routing and forwards the packet via the port specified for default routing.
The controller component defines a further flow for the node in its default flow table to
check the current masking type for the destination address of an incoming packet which does
not match the two flows defined above. If the destination address is semi-masked, the packet
is directed to the flow table containing the flows for unmasked routing table entries. In case
of full masking, the flow tells the packet to go on with the flow table for masked routing table.
In each of the flow tables for unmasked and masked routing tables, one flow is defined with
the routing information for the node itself. If the packet matches one of these two flows, i.e.
the packet is addressed to the node, the packet is directed to a further flow table holding the
flows for identifier resolution table entries. The packet is sent to the controller, if no flow in
the respective flow table matches the packet. Thus, an incoming network packet goes through
a pipeline consisting of two further flow tables which are discussed in detail below.
Flow tables for routing tables
The unmasked and masked routing table setups are implemented in the same SDN-like manner
as in BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. For a newly created or updated routing table entry for the
node Ni at the controller component, the network node N creates a new flow or to update
the flow for the entry in the flow tables for the unmasked and masked routing tables.
If the entry is masked, the offset and length of the flow match field is the offset and length
of the locator part in the fully masked destination address of a BPF-HiLLIS network packet,
and the value is the entire byte value of E(LocNi). Moreover, the flow has a single instruction
having the action Output with the port number specified in the routing table entry for Ni.
Additionally, the instruction contains actions updating the Ethernet source and destination
addresses of matching packets. In this way, packets having Ni’s masked locator as their
destination locator match the flow and are forwarded via the specified port.
The offset and length of the unmasked flow for the node Ni is the offset and length of
the unmasked locator in the semi-masked destination address, and the value is the byte value
of LocNi . As in the masked flow, the actions in the unmasked flow induces to update the
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Ethernet source and destination addresses as well as to forward the matching packets via the
port whose number is specified in the unmasked routing table entry for Ni.
Flow tables for identifier resolution table
For the identifier resolution cache table entry for the host X, the controller component tells
the network node N to create a new flow or to update the existing one for the entry. Such
a flow is put temporarily. Since unmasked and masked locators have different sizes, the
destination identifiers have different offsets in network packets addressed to host X in the
semi- and fully masked manner.
Because of this reason, two flows with different offsets in their match fields have to be
defined in two different flow tables for the host X. A packet is directed from the flow tables for
the unmasked and masked routing tables to these flow tables. The offsets in the match fields
of these flows are the offsets of the identifier parts in the semi- and fully masked destination
addresses. The match fields of both flows have the same byte length and value of E(IDX).
Moreover, both flows contain actions to update the Ethernet source and destination addresses
and to forward matching packets to the specified port.
In this way, only the first packet for a communication endpoint pair has to be sent to
the controller by the destination edge node. After this packet, a corresponding flow for the
destination endpoint is defined. Thus, the remaining packets match this flow and do not have
to be sent to the controller anymore.
5.5.1.2 Level Attachment Point
The packet processing pipeline at a LAP also consists of multiple flow tables, and its flowchart
is given in Figure 5.24. Here, a flow in the default flow table checks whether an incoming
packet has arrived from a domain at the lower or upper level, and directs the packet to the
flow table for lower or upper level. In two further flow tables, a LAP maintains flows for semi-
and fully masked mapping cache entries. These flow tables are discussed below.
Four flow tables are maintained for the unmasked and masked routing tables at the up-
per and lower levels. Flows in each of these flow tables are defined in the same manner as the
flows for the routing table entries at a network node. In each of the flow tables for the routing
tables at the upper level, a further flow checks the destination locator level. If the level is not
equal to the upper level, the flag for default routing is set, and the packet is forwarded via
the port specified for default routing. In each of these flow tables, a further flow sends the
packet to the controller, if no flow in the respective flow table matches the packet.
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Figure 5.24: Flowchart for packet processing pipeline at LAP.
Flow table for the lower level
A packet arriving from the domain at the lower level is directed to this flow table. A flow in
this flow table checks whether the flag for default routing is set. Moreover, the flow checks the
destination locator level and the destination address masking type of the incoming packet.
If the flag is not set as well as the level is the lower level and the destination address is
semi-masked, the packet is directed to the flow table for the unmasked routing table at the
lower level. In the same manner, a further flow directs the packet to the flow table for the
masked routing table at the lower level, if the masking type is the full masking. Thus, the
packet is forwarded within the domain at the lower level.
If the flag for default routing is set, the packet is directed to one of the flow tables for upper
level routing tables. Before that, the source locator has to be replaced with the upper level
locator of the LAP. For that, the corresponding flows have to look first into the destination
address masking type, since the offset of the source locator changes according to this masking
type. After that, the source address masking types for the lower and upper levels are checked.
In this way, the matching flow is determined which substitutes the unmasked or masked source
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locator with LAP’s unmasked or masked locator for the upper level and directs the packet to
the flow tables for unmasked or masked routing tables at the upper level. Thus, the packet
is forwarded within the domain at the upper level.
Flow table for the upper level
If the packet has come from the domain at the upper level, the packet is directed to this flow
table. After checking the masking type of the destination address, a flow in this flow table
determines whether the destination locator has the same byte value as LAP’s unmasked or
masked locator for the upper level. If this is not the case, the packet is directed to one of
the flow tables for upper level routing tables in order to forward the packet back within the
domain at the upper level.
If the byte values of the destination locator and LAP’s unmasked or masked locator for the
upper level are the same, the destination address masking type for the lower level is checked.
After that, the packet is directed to one of the flow tables for semi- and fully masked mapping
cache entries.
Flow tables for mapping cache entries
After a semi- or fully masked mapping lookup, a LAP caches the mapping. For a semi- or fully
masked mapping cache entry containing the masked identifier of the endpoint X, a temporary
flow is defined in the semi- or fully masked mapping flow table. The offset and length of the
flow match field is the offset and length of the identifier part in the semi- or fully masked
destination address of a BPF-HiLLIS network packet. Moreover, the flow match field value
is the byte value of E(IDX). The flow contains three actions. The first two actions updates
the destination locator level and the destination locator with the level and locator from the
mapping cache entry. The last one directs the packet to one of the flow tables for lower level
routing tables.
In this regard, the first packet for a communicating endpoint pair is sent to the controller
by LAPs on the destination side in order to perform the mapping lookup. Since an associated
flow is created after the first packet, the remaining packets match the flow and do not have
to be sent to the controller anymore.
5.5.2 DHCP and Mapping
The mapping functionalities in BPF-HiLLIS are realised in the same SDN-like manner as
in the implementations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. These functionalities are implemented
by the C++ class BPF HiLLIS Mapping System. Each controller component managing a
domain creates an object from this class. Thus, this instance represents the mapping system
in this domain. Each object representing a node or LAP in the domain keeps a pointer to
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the mapping system instance. Moreover, the mapping system instance holds a pointer to
each object representing a LAP in the domain. In this way, the mapping system instance has
access to the attributes of LAP objects.
A mapping registration packet arriving at a node in a domain is sent to the controller compo-
nent. After creating a new mapping entry or updating the already existing one, the mapping
system instance updates the packet with the corresponding upper level locator of a LAP re-
sponsible for the domain. After that, the mapping system instance tells one of the datapaths
acting as LAPs in the domain to send the packet via a port interconnected with a node in
the domain at the upper level. This node and the mapping system instance of the controller
component responsible for the domain at the upper level proceed analogously.
Upon receiving a mapping lookup request packet, a datapath acting as a node sends it to
the controller component. The mapping system caches the requested identifier as well as
the ID of the sending datapath, the number of its receiving port, and the Ethernet source
address of the packet. If a mapping entry is found for the requested identifier, the mapping
system instance creates the reply packet and finds the datapath whose ID is cached for the
request. After that, the mapping system instance orders the datapath to send the packet via
the specified port. Otherwise, the mapping system instance tells one of the datapaths acting
as LAPs to send the request packet via one of its ports for the upper level. Because of this
SDN-like implementation, the request packet does not have to contain the network address
of the requesting endpoint anymore.
If a datapath acting as a node receives a DHCP request packet, it sends the packet to the
controller. The object representing this node creates the reply packet and instructs the asso-
ciated datapath to send the reply packet via the port through which the request packet has
arrived. Due to the SDN-like implementation of the mapping functionalities, the reply packet
does not have to contain the network address of the mapping system in the domain within
which the node is located.
5.5.3 Flow setup
Before sending application data, the source endpoint S sends a network packet to the destina-
tion endpoint D. This network packet contains a certain payload type which signals the flow
setup to the destination endpoint. By means of this packet, mapping and identifier resolution
flows for the destination endpoint are set up at LAPs on the destination side and at the
destination edge node.
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Upon receiving the flow setup packet, the destination endpoint acknowledges the flow setup
by sending a network packet back to the source endpoint. The acknowledgment packet has the
same payload type as the flow setup packet. Thus, mapping and identifier resolution flows for
the source endpoint are set up at LAPs on the source side and at the source edge node. After
receiving the acknowledgment packet, the source endpoint can begin to send application data.
If the source endpoint is finished with its application data, it can send a further network
packet to the destination endpoint. The payload type of this packet signals to delete map-
ping and identifier resolution flows for both endpoints at LAPs on the route as well as at the
source and destination edge nodes.
5.6 Testbed
The implementation of BPF-HiLLIS has been deployed in a software testbed realised by the
network emulator Mininet [Min16] on a PC with eight Intel Xeon 2.00 GHz CPUs. In this
testbed, we run 26 OLV-OpenFlow compatible datapaths which are interconnected according
to the testbed topology illustrated in Figure 5.25. Here, each link between two datapaths
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S50
…
Controller
component
instance D3
Controller
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Controller
component
instance S3
Controller component instance C1
D1
D50
UDP Stream 1
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…
Figure 5.25: Testbed topology for BPF-HiLLIS.
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or between a host and a datapath has a bandwidth of 1000 Mbps. Moreover, each network
interface of a host and datapath has a MTU of 9000 bytes and a queue length of 1000 frames.
The topology consists of the Core, two domains at level 2, and two domains at level 3.
Each of these domains contains four nodes and is interconnected with its immediate par-
ent domain by a single LAP. Thus, each node maintains six unmasked and masked routing
table entries. Moreover, each LAP keeps two unmasked and masked routing tables which re-
spectively have six entries. Each domain is managed by its own controller component instance.
In the testbed topology, we have 50 source and destination endpoints which are connected
to the edge nodes in the sibling domains at level 3. Thus, a packet from a source endpoint
to a destination endpoint, or vice versa, takes 16 hops. Each endpoint is represented by a
instance from BPF-HiLLIS-BNS. At each source endpoint, a sender runs, while a receiver
runs at each destination endpoint. A sender starts an UDP stream to the receiver at a spec-
ified destination endpoint. Each stream between 50 source and destination endpoints takes
the same route and has a duration of 60 seconds. In an UDP stream, a new UDP datagram
is sent every ten milliseconds. Thus, we have a sending rate of 100 Hz which is more than
enough for a real-time media communication [ZP13]. Each UDP datagram has a payload size
of 8000 bytes carried by an Ethernet jumbo frame.
5.7 Evaluation
In our implementation, a cleartext identifier and locator consists of 16 bytes. Thus, the
benchmarks for the cryptographic operations are the same ones as in the implementations of
BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR, which are already presented in Table 3.1. For masked identifier
resolution and umasked/masked routing, we have used the same structures as in the imple-
mentations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. The sizes of these structures are already given in
Table 4.2. Due to the hierarchical scheme and SDN-like realisation, we have achieved similar
routing convergence times as in BPF-HAIR (see Table 4.5).
Table 5.2 shows the sizes of semi- and fully masked structures implemented for BPF-HiLLIS.
Unlike in BPF-HAIR, the sizes of endpoint’s semi- and fully masked addresses do not depend
on the level of the domain in which the endpoint is located. This is because the current level
locator is replaced with the next level locator at each domain border.
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Size in bytes
Semi-masked Fully masked
Address 210 387
Network header 437 791
Mapping registration packet 279 456
Mapping lookup request packet 197 197
Mapping lookup reply packet 283 460
Mapping table entry 288 465
Mapping lookup cache entry 306 483
Table 5.2: Sizes of semi- and fully masked structures.
By means of multiple scenarios, the performance of BPF-HiLLIS’s implementation has been
evaluated in the testbed topology described in Section 5.6. In the first scenario, only the end-
points S1 and D1 communicate with each other by means of the masking rank combinations
in blindness taxonomies 1 and 2 as well as their cross combinations. For each masking rank
combination, S1 starts a single UDP stream to D1, and only one UDP stream runs in the net-
work. Each stream has a duration of 60 seconds and a fixed sending rate of 100 Hz. Thus, S1
sends 6000 packets to D1 for each masking rank combination. In this regard, an UDP stream
is comparable with a directed flooding of the network with UDP datagrams.
Figures 5.26, 5.27, and 5.28 show the flow setup times and average one-way delays (OWDs)
in the first scenario. The flow setup times represent the sum of mapping lookup times and
OWDs of the flow setup packets for the masking rank combinations. These packets are sent
to the controller at the LAPs on the destination side. After mapping lookup and setting
up mapping flows for the destination endpoint, semi- or fully masked packet forwarding is
performed at the controller on the basis of the masking type for the destination address at
the next level. Thus, the masking rank of the destination address is crucial for the flow setup
time: the higher the destination masking rank, the more the flow setup time. Moreover, each
flow setup packet is also sent to the controller at the destination edge node in order to per-
form masked identifier resolution and to set up associated flows for the destination endpoint.
After the flow setup, packets carrying user payloads are forwarded on the basis of the con-
structed flows. In this way, the packets do not have to be sent to the controller anymore.
This introduces a significant performance increase in comparison with the implementations of
BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. Thus, the average OWD for each masking rank combination is not
more than 0.6 milliseconds. Here, the masking rank for the destination address of a packet is
also crucial for its OWD. This is because more bytes have to be compared and replaced for
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Figure 5.26: Masking rank combinations in blindness taxonomy 1.
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Figure 5.27: Masking rank combinations in blindness taxonomy 2.
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Figure 5.28: Masking rank cross combinations from blindness taxonomies 1 & 2.
a fully masked address than for a semi-masked address. But the differences of the average
OWDs for the masking rank combinations vary only within microsecond ranges. Hence, we
can state that security levels provided by the masking rank combinations introduce similar
overheads regarding the average OWDs. Moreover, the jitter of packet OWDs is also in mi-
crosecond ranges. Furthermore, the average throughput for each masking rank combination
is 6.4 Mbps.
In the second scenario, the network is stressed by up to 50 streams between the source
and destination endpoint pairs (S1, D1),...,(S50, D50). Here, each stream is masked by means
of the weakest and strongest masking vector combinations (000, 000) and (111, 111). In this
scenario, we have evaluated the properties of the stream between S1 and D1, which are given
in Figure 5.29. Packet loss starts from 20 streams and increases exponentially. Packet loss
happens, since the queues for the network interfaces of the datapaths begin to be full. For the
same reason, the average OWD also increases exponentially. The average throughput stays
the same up to 20 streams and then decreases exponentially. For the other masking vector
combinations, the stream behaves in the same manner.
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Figure 5.29: Stream properties in a network stressed by up to 50 streams.
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Figure 5.30: Carried load for up to 50 streams.
In the last scenario, we have evaluated the carried load, i.e. the sum of the average through-
puts for up to 50 streams between the endpoint pairs (S1, D1),...,(S50, D50). As in the previ-
ous scenario, each stream here is also masked by means of the weakest and strongest masking
vector combinations (000, 000) and (111, 111). As illustrated in Figure 5.30, the carried load
firstly increases up to 20 streams linearly but then only logarithmically. This is also because
packet loss begins from 20 streams. For the other masking vector combinations, the carried
load behaves the same. During the entire evaluation, the system load average2 was not more
than 5.15 corresponding to a CPU utilisation of 64.375% on the testbed PC with eight cores.
In summary, we can state that BPF-HiLLIS’s implementation achieves a high performance
by leveraging flow-based packet forwarding in its entirety. In this way, the implementation
of BPF-HiLLIS can even support multiple real-time media communications each with a high
sending rate of 100 Hz.
5.8 Conclusion
BPF-HiLLIS combines the beneficial aspects of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. In this way, it ful-
fills all of the architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design. Moreover, BPF-HiLLIS
provides an enhanced masked routing which makes it possible to apply both the semi- and
fully blind mode in a domain. Furthermore, this chapter has presented an approach which
enables a selective masked routing table entry setup so that the fully blind packet forwarding
can be performed on demand.
In BPF-HiLLIS, the masking vectors in a packet determine the blindness modes for the packet
2On Unix-like systems, the system load average is a measurement of the computational work performed by
the system.
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addresses level by level. The blindness level provided by a masking vector is specified by its
associated masking rank. Thus, up to 2x masking ranks can be applied to the endpoint X
being located in a domain at level x. We have defined two blindness taxonomies into which
certain masking ranks are classified. In blindness taxonomy 1, the higher the masking rank
being applied to X’s address, the bigger is the radius of domains within which the address
is fully masked, beginning with the Core. By applying higher masking ranks in blindness
taxonomy 2, the endpoint X can mask its respective location within higher parent domains
in direction of the Core. Each of these taxonomies provides (x + 1) different masking ranks
for the endpoint X. In each taxonomy, up to ((s + 1) × (d + 1)) different masking rank
combinations are possible for the source and destination endpoints S and D being located in
sibling domains at levels s and d. Moreover, cross combinations of the masking ranks from
both blindness taxonomies are also possible. Thus, BPF-HiLLIS supports multiple blindness
levels providing different NAC levels which can be flexibly adapted to certain use cases.
In order to leverage the flow-based packet forwarding in its entirety, we have replaced the
TLV-based mechanism in OpenFlow with an OLV-based approach, which we have called OLV-
OpenFlow. Moreover, we have adapted the implementation of the OpenFlow controller NOX
to this OLV-based proceeding. This version of NOX has been called OLV-NOX. For realising
the BPF-HiLLIS functionalities on the network side, we have expanded the OLV-OpenFlow
controller OLV-NOX by a further component. On the host side, we have extended the frame-
work Blind Network Stack (BNS) to BPF-HiLLIS-BNS. The implementation of BPF-HiLLIS
has been deployed in a software testbed realised by the network emulator Mininet.
The performance of BPF-HiLLIS’s implementation has been evaluated by means of multiple
scenarios. In the first scenario, we have evaluated the flow setup times and average OWDs for
masking rank combinations in blindness taxonomies 1 and 2 as well as their cross combina-
tions in an unstressed network. Here, the average OWD for each masking rank combination
was not more than 0.6 milliseconds, which represents a significant performance increase in
comparison with the implementations of BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR. Additionally, the dif-
ferences of the average OWDs for the masking rank combinations have varied only within
microsecond ranges. Thus, we can state that security levels provided by the masking rank
combinations introduce similar overheads regarding the average OWDs. Moreover, the jitter
of packet OWDs was also in microsecond ranges. Furthermore, the average throughput for
each masking rank combination was 6.4 Mbps.
In the second scenario, the network has been stressed by up to 50 streams between 50 endpoint
pairs. Here, each stream had a fixed sending rate of 100 Hz and has been masked by means of
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the weakest and strongest masking vector combinations. In this scenario, we have evaluated
the stream properties. Packet loss has started from 20 streams and increased exponentially,
since the queues for the network interfaces of the datapaths have begun to be full. For the
same reason, the average OWD has also increased exponentially. The average throughput
has stayed the same up to 20 streams and then decreased exponentially. In the last scenario,
we have evaluated the carried load for up to 50 streams masked by means of the weakest
and strongest masking vector combinations. The carried load has firstly increased up to 20
streams linearly but then only logarithmically. This was also because packet loss has begun
from 20 streams.
In summary, we can state that BPF-HiLLIS fulfills all of the architectural requirements for an
adequate BPF design and provides a fine-grained, flexible and dynamic blindness supporting
multiple NAC levels. Moreover, BPF-HiLLIS is a high performance network protocol which
can even support multiple real-time media communications each with a high sending rate
of 100 Hz.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and outlook
In this thesis, we have presented the Blind Packet Forwarding (BPF) allowing to simultane-
ously provide network address confidentiality (NAC) and to establish the packet forwarding
service. NAC supplies confidentiality for the network addresses of the packets transferred
between two communicating endpoints, where only both endpoints are the authorised enti-
ties to access the packet addresses in cleartext. Thus, confidentiality for packet addresses is
provided during transmission as well as during processing by network nodes.
To demonstrate the general feasibility of our approach, Chapter 3 has presented a basic BPF
construction that redesigns the packet forwarding and its associated services to blind ones
which can still correctly process masked network addresses being based on a basic structure.
In this chapter, we have discussed NAC and its deduced security properties – sender/recipi-
ent and relationship unlinkability against different adversary models – local adversary, weak
global adversary, and strong global adversary. Moreover, we have declared the effects of ap-
plying BPF in the current Internet architecture. This chapter has also discussed the prototype
implementation of the basic BPF design. For the implementation on the network side, we
have utilised OpenFlow. On the host side, we have created a framework called Blind Network
Stack (BNS) in Linux that implements a basic network stack with a socket-like interface in
the user space. The prototype implementation of the basic BPF design has been deployed
in a real hardware testbed to demonstrate its feasibility for practical deployment capability.
Furthermore, this chapter has evaluated the prototype implementation of the basic BPF de-
sign.
The basic BPF design and its implementation demonstrate the general feasibility of our
approach and its practical deployment capability, while introducing a considerable amount
of overhead. Moreover, the basic BPF design is not suitable to be deployed in the current
Internet architecture (see Section 3.2.3). Therefore, Chapter 4 has defined the requirements
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to be fulfilled by a suitable architecture for BPF. In order to achieve the features for an
adequate BPF design, we have used the Loc/ID split principle. Here, we have chosen the
approaches GLI-Split and HAIR relying on this principle and extended the basic BPF design
to BPF-GLI and BPF-HAIR.
BPF-GLI fulfils the architectural requirements with the exception of a fine-grained hierarchi-
cal architecture so that performing super- and subnetting is not always possible in its entirety.
This BPF extension supports three modes of blindness providing different NAC levels. While
the semi-blindness only provides network identifier confidentiality (NIC), the full blindness
provides both NIC and network locator confidentiality (NLC). In case of intra-domain com-
munication, the alternately blind mode only offers NIC as in the semi-blind mode, while
NIC and domain-to-domain NLC are supplied in case of inter-domain communication. The
sender/recipient and relationship unlinkability properties of these three blindness modes have
been discussed against local, weak and strong global adversaries.
BPF-HAIR fulfils all architectural requirements for an adequate BPF design, while the length
of a locator sequence for an endpoint is dependent on the level of the domain in which the
endpoint is located. Moreover, attaching endpoints to nodes at an arbitrary level is not de-
fined in BPF-HAIR. This BPF extension also defines semi- and full blindness modes which
provide the same NAC levels as in BPF-GLI.
Chapter 4 has also presented the prototype implementations of both BPF extensions. Here,
we have leveraged the SDN-like realisation and flow-based forwarding for the implementations
of both BPF extensions. On the host side, we have extended the framework BNS to BPF-
GLI-BNS and BPF-HAIR-BNS. The prototype implementations of both BPF extensions have
been deployed in a real hardware testbed to demonstrate their feasibility for practical deploy-
ment. Furthermore, this chapter has evaluated the implementations of both BPF extensions.
While both BPF extensions demonstrate that BPF can in principle be realised by means
of the existing FNA approaches, neither of the BPF extensions can achieve all of the proper-
ties required for an adequate BPF design. Therefore, Chapter 5 has combined the beneficial
aspects of both BPF extensions into a new design called Blind Packet Forwarding in Hierar-
chical Level-based Locator/Identifier Split (BPF-HiLLIS). BPF-HiLLIS provides an enhanced
masked routing which makes it possible to apply both the semi- and fully blind mode in a do-
main. Furthermore, this chapter has presented an approach which enables a selective masked
routing table entry setup so that the fully blind packet forwarding can be performed on de-
mand.
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BPF-HiLLIS provides a fine-grained, flexible and dynamic blindness providing up to 2x mask-
ing ranks for the endpoint X being located in a domain at level x. We have defined two blind-
ness taxonomies into which certain masking ranks are classified. In blindness taxonomy 1,
the higher the masking rank being applied to X’s address, the bigger is the radius of domains
within which the address is fully masked, beginning with the Core. By applying higher mask-
ing ranks in blindness taxonomy 2, the endpoint X can mask its respective location within
higher parent domains in direction of the Core. Each of these taxonomies provides (x + 1)
different masking ranks for the endpoint X. Thus, BPF-HiLLIS supports multiple blindness
levels providing different NAC levels which can be flexibly adapted to certain use cases.
In order to leverage the flow-based packet forwarding in its entirety, we have replaced the
TLV-based mechanism in OpenFlow with an OLV-based approach, which we have called OLV-
OpenFlow. Moreover, we have adapted the implementation of the OpenFlow controller NOX
to this OLV-based proceeding. This version of NOX has been called OLV-NOX. For realising
the BPF-HiLLIS functionalities on the network side, we have expanded the OLV-OpenFlow
controller OLV-NOX by a further component. On the host side, we have extended the frame-
work BNS to BPF-HiLLIS-BNS. The implementation of BPF-HiLLIS has been deployed in
a software testbed realised by the network emulator Mininet. The performance of BPF-
HiLLIS’s implementation has been evaluated by means of multiple scenarios. On the basis
of the evaluations, we have stated that BPF-HiLLIS is a high performance network protocol
which can even support multiple real-time media communications each with a high sending
rate.
6.1 Outlook
PEKS gives the ability to blindly but still correctly compare encrypted data with each other
without revealing their cleartext contents. In this thesis, we have discussed that PEKS can
be used to realise a new kind of end-to-end confidentiality for data processed by third parties,
where only the data owner is classified as authorised entity having access to the data in clear-
text. As discussed in Section 2.1, PEKS has been already applied in multiple approaches. In
contrast to these approaches focusing on high-level services, BPF has tackled the packet for-
warding service in order to provide NAC. Network packet addresses are the basic information
transferred between two communicating endpoints, and the packet forwarding service is the
fundamental in-network service needed by the endpoints.
NAC has not been tackled only by BPF. IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol
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in tunnel mode also focuses on the confidentiality for the ultimate source and destination ad-
dresses of a packet within the public network (see Section 3.2.1.1). But NAC is not provided
within private networks, and security gateways still have access to the addresses in cleartext.
Moreover, the addresses of the security gateways in the outer header are transferred in clear-
text so that NAC is not supplied for these addresses. In this regard, BPF is the first approach
providing NAC in its entirety. Additionally, BPF, due to its traffic flow confidentiality, hides
potential targets against active attacks such as address spoofing, man-in-the-middle and rep-
etition attack. However, BPF defines a new network architecture and addressing structure.
Therefore, deploying BPF in the Internet needs the support of network providers and can
thus take time as well as effort.
As already discussed in Section 3.2, anonymity of a subject and confidentiality of informa-
tion, which can be used to identify the subject, are related to each other. In this regard, we
have stated that NAC deduces the anonymity properties – sender/recipient and relationship
unlinkability introduced in Section 2.4.1. In Section 3.2.1, we have discussed multiple promi-
nent low-latency anonymity systems aiming to provide these unlinkability properties as well
as their vulnerabilities. Section 3.2.2 has stated that BPF with regard to sender/recipient
and relationship unlinkability is resistant to a strong adversary model. Thus, BPF can be
also regarded as a low-latency anonymity system supplying these crucial security properties.
In contrast to other low-latency anonymity systems to be deployed in the current Internet
architecture, BPF, however, requires a new network architecture.
Beside the security properties above, information integrity is also crucial. However, BPF
does not aim to provide integrity of network packet addresses, routing update messages, and
DHCP reply messages. In Sections 3.2.2 and 4.1.4.5, we have discussed how to extend BPF
in order to also provide integrity for packet addresses as well as routing update and DHCP
reply messages.
For the implementation of BPF functionalities on the network side, we have leveraged the
SDN-like realisation by using OpenFlow (see Section 4.1.5.1). In this way, we have demon-
strated that the networks and functionalities can be bundled together, which improves the
performance and makes the network configuration more flexible and dynamic. Here, the
routing functionalities are crucial. Although we have just implemented a decentralised rout-
ing algorithm in central manner, we have achieved a significant performance increase for the
routing table setup (see Tables 4.3 and 4.5). In this regard, the existing routing algorithms
can be adapted to the SDN-like realisation, but also new routing algorithms acting in central
manner can be developed.
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For realising the BPF functionalities on the host side, we have implemented the frame-
work BNS in the user space (see Sections 3.3.2 and 4.1.5.2). In order to boost BNS’s perfor-
mance, it can be integrated into the Linux kernel. BNS implements only UDP functionalities.
Here, BNS can be expanded by the functionalities of other transport protocols such as TCP.
In order to achieve a BPF implementation which provides high performance, we have ex-
tended OpenFlow to OLV-OpenFlow (see Section 5.4). This OpenFlow extension makes it
possible that clean-slate designs, which define another packet structure than the IP packet
structure, can leverage the flow-based packet forwarding in its entirety. In order to demon-
strate the feasibility of this approach, we have implemented the OLV-OpenFlow functionalities
in a user-space software switch. Here, OLV-OpenFlow can be realised in a hardware switch
and evaluated with respect to its performance.
On the basis of multiple scenarios, BPF’s implementations have basically been evaluated
in software as well as hardware testbeds set up in a laboratory environment. Before deploy-
ing BPF in a customer environment like the Internet, it is highly recommended to widely
evaluate BPF in extensive research environments such as German-Lab [SRZ+14]. Here,
ToMaTo [MSC14] can be used to manage the experiment components with regard to high
realism.
As stated above, BPF is just the beginning and provides a solid base for future research
towards achieving a new state “establishing smart in-network services as well as providing
information confidentiality”. On the basis of BPF, further in-network services requiring ac-
cess to control data at different layers can be redesigned to blind ones which can still correctly
process control data in encrypted form. Since BPF handles packet addresses in encrypted
form and packet addresses act as the basis for operations performed by further in-network
services, a redesign of the services is highly recommended. Here, Deep Packet Inspection
systems give prominence to the importance of handling control data in encrypted form, since
information needed by these systems are more user-specific. Moreover, BPF is a clean-slate
approach supplying significant anonymity properties against a strong adversary model. There
arises the question whether, if even possible, how to achieve these properties or a part of them
without a clean-slate proceeding.
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